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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Communication Analysis (CA) suffers from an imaqe problem.
Critics (Logue, 1981; McGee, 1983; Larson and O'Rourke, 1983;
Murphy, 1983) argue that CA has low participation, shoddy analysis
and generally poor execution. Murphy (1983) writes:
At each tournament it (CA is invariably the smallest
event. Many tournaments even dropped it from the
schedule. The reason for this decline is clear.
Students, coaches and judges do not agree on the
goals, methods or criteria of rhetorical criticism
(918).
In terms of most CAs, Murphy and the other critics are correct.
CA does have its share of problems. However, not all CAs are
problematic. If we turn our attention to the good CAs and try to
determine what makes them good, we can improve CA's image and
quality. By outlining just what a good CA is, competitors can
know what to do when writing a CA. VJith the present negative
literature, the only advice to competitors seems to be what not
to do.
This study wishes to change that image. There are two goals
to this analysis. First, I would like to develop some definition
as to what a CA should be. Second, based on that definition, I
would like to educe some specific guidelines for writing a good
CA. Hopefully, this will improve the general quality of CA.
2There is a need for such research as there is a dearth of
literature on CA. No articles have been published on CA at this
writing in JAFA, Speaker and Gavel
,
QJS , or the regional journals.
Aside from the occasional convention paper, most CA literature has
appeared at the Summer Conference on Arguemtn (1981, 1983). This
prompted Larson and O'Rourke (1983) to note, "CA has spawned little
academic interest until recent years. What little literature
exists on the topic focuses on what the authors view to be prob-
lems with the event as practiced today" (1).
It is precisely for this lack of academic interest in CA
that this project is being conducted. To set up this project,
this paper will first review the pertinent literature on CA. The
review will entail an overview of the three categories of research
and literature on CA. Then the literature will be summarized and
critiqued. On the basis of this review, the study will be justi-
fied more fully.
Three types of literature have been written that are pertinent
to CA. First, there have been attempts to determine the relevant
attitudes of judges and contentants in CA. Second, one attempt
has been made to analyze CA from an argumentative perspective.
Finally, essays have been written that are basically opinion pieces
on what is wrong with CA as it is practiced today.
In reviewing the attitude research, the first significant
work pertaining to CA was conducted by Larson and O'Rourke (1981).
Their study examined the predominant forms of arguments used in
3individual events. Larson and O'Rourke conducted a content analy-
sis of 550 ballots from the 1981-81 forensics season to see judges'
preference toward argument forms. Overall, the results noted
two common strategies and two subtle forms. The two strategies
labeled "common" were the use of expert testimony and the use
of statistics. The two subtle forms were first, the use of meta-
phor and analogy and second, the use of humor. For CA specifically,
two points became apparent. "Humor was seen as a good way to
'enliven the presentation' or 'to keep the audience interested'"
(329). Judges indicated that more humor in CAs would be appre-
ciated. Second, judges indicated that they preferred topics that
were "relevant" (329).
Larson and O'Rourke (1981) pointed out one potential weakness
with their research: the study was conducted with their local
judges. They argued that local judges may operate with different
standards from judges across the nation. If this is so, then
the results of the study can only be generalized to one local
area.
Larson and O'Rourke (1983) were also responsible for the
second study concerned with the attitudes of judges and contes-
tants about CA. Acknowledging the lack of rhetoric background
in forensics and the lack of sources indicating what constitutes
a good CA, Larson and O'Rourke surveyed the judges and contes-
tants in CA at the 1983 AFA NIET "to discover (1) what critics
expect a communication analyst to do when presenting a speech.
4and (2) how CA as a forensic event differs from rhetorical criticism
in general" (1 ).
The first part of the study asked participants to weigh sixteen
statements designed to answer the question, "What are the most
important standards used to evaluate?" (2). The results were
placed in three categories of importance. The first category
contained the seven statements receiving a mean score of 5.0 or
better on a 7.0 scale. These statements were then deemed very
important. The second category was called important, and mean
scores ranged from 5.9 to 5.0. The specific questions asked and
their scores are:
1. A student should use outside sources for proof
or documentation. 5.56
2. A student should analyze appropriately the topic
in a communication analysis. 6.42
3. A student should explain properly the analytic
method used in the analysis. 5.42
4. A clear organization is important in communica-
tion analysis. 6.29
5. Proper support (illustration) material is
important in communication analysis. 6.23
5. A significant topic (subject matter) is important
in communication analysis. 6.01
7. Effective delivery is important in communica-
tion analysis. 6.0
8. A speaker should justify the selection of the
analytic method in communication analysis. 5.89
9. An in-depth analysis is important in communica-
tion analysis. 5.82
10. A speaker should justify the rhetorical (com-
munication) importance of the event. 5.82
11. Choice of language is important in communica-
tion analysis. 5.67
12. Students should note the unique insight on
the topics discovered from the analysis. 5.64
13. A speaker should justify the topic selection
in communication analysis. 5.33
14. Students should not rely on a script in communi-
cation analysis. 5.06
15. A critique of the usefulness of the analytic
method is important. 4.81
16. Students need to be objective (detached) when
doing a communication analysis. 4.3
(4-5)
When comparing judges' and competitors' responses on the
sixteen items, a significant difference was found on only two.
Judges place more emphasis on noting the unique insight discovered
with the analysis than the students do. On the other hand, the
students were more adamant than the judges in their insistence on
having the speech memorized.
Respondents were then asked to indicate the goals of CA.
Then they were asked to indicate how well that goal was being met.
There was not one clear answer for what CA's goal was. Thirteen
possible goals were listed on the survey and none received a
majority (over 50%). In response to the question of how well
CA was meeting its goal, 3.1% gave students a superior grade,
10.9% excellent, 37.5% good and 25% were deemed poor; 22.5% did
not respond. Larson and O'Rourke interpreted tv;o justifications
for the overall grades. Complaints centered around superficial
analysis and lack of effective application of method to the facts
under investigation.
On the basis of the study, Larson and O'Rourke made several
suggestions for the improvement of CA. First, they recommended
that more students be encouraged to compete and that they be
educated better in rhetorical theory prior to competition. Second,
increase the ten minute time limit for the speech and evaluate
6the manuscript along with the speech. Third, judges should maintain
an open and unbiased view toward methodologies. Fourth, the purpose
and rules for CA should be made clearer.
The second literature category is comprised of Logue's (1981)
examination of the finals of the 1981 AFA NIET. Logue looked at
how argument was applied in individual events using the finals
round as her data. Pertinent to her review was the examination
of the CA finals. Logue found general trends concerning topics,
methodologies, and analysis. First, Logue found that the signi-
ficance of the topic needed to be justified. This mirrors Larson
and O'Rourke's (1981) findings and lends some credence to the
universality of their claim. Second. Logue (1981) noticed that
the topics centered upon recent events. In turn, she suggested
that topics for CA's should be no older than "five years" (391).
Of the six speeches in finals, four were within those guidelines.
Logue expected that the CAs would employ "typical" methods
dominated by Aristotle, Burke, Black and Bitzer. Instead, after
listening to finals, the uniqueness of the method became apparent.
Students were opting to use more obscure methods that would help
the CA appear unique. For example, John Murphy used the Quest
Story for his method.
Logue was critical of the analysis displayed in the speeches.
Compared to other events, less evidence was cited. Moreover,
Logue was disappointed that only one speech attempted to make
an argument that the analysis would make a contribution for those
7in the field of communication. On the basis of the CA finals,
Logue claimed that the general rule for a speech is to claim that
if the communication act being analyzed was successful, this was
because the act followed the analytic method being used for the
criticism. If the communication act was a failure, this was because
the act failed to follow the method being used for the criticism.
Successful communication was being defined as how well an act con-
formed to a theory, regardless of the act's effects. In other
words, the competitors were taking only a classificatory approach.
On the basis of this, Logue felt that the CA's did not function as
rhetorical criticism. She argued that the speeches were mere
classification or "cookie-cutting" in the forensic slang.
The final category of CA literature is the opinion essay,
characterized as critical position papers on the current status
of CA. Shawn McGee's (1983) essay is exactly this sort of paper.
McGee was responding to the complaint about CA's poor analysis
and the tendency for CAs to rely on classification.
McGee notes that the field of rhetorical criticism is in a
state of "uncertainty" and this is reflected in the forensic event
(1-2). For example, the field of rhetoric has no dominating
paradigm. If the "experts" are at odds, how are coaches, judges,
and students to be sure in what they are doing? As a result,
McGee (1983) is not surprised that CA is one of the smallest
events in forensics. "In light of the limited theoretical back-
ground which many coaches and students have in rhetorical criticism.
8this (CA's small numbers) should not be perceived as a startling
claim" (McGee 5). Because many coaches and students are not well
versed in rhetoric, McGee argues that their uncertainty tends to
make them avoid CA. This avoidance is reflected in the low number
of people who compete in CA.
Up to this point in the literature concerning CA, one implied
standard is that CA should mirror academic criticism in general
nature {Logue, 1981; Larson and O'Rourke, 1983; McGee, 1983).
Murphy (1983) would change our focus. Murphy argues, "Due to an
inordinate emphasis on the methodology, the event has encouraged
classification rather than argumentation" (918). Murphy's position
is that the academic critic seeks to discover the processes and
explain the theory that governs communication. The data, the
communication acts, are used to further theory. As a result,
coaches who are academicians have students trying to make a con-
tribution to rhetorical theory. Considering the ten minute time
limit alone, the very nature of competitive forensics mitigates
against this. "By forcing students to use the standards or aca-
demic criticism, specifically the need to make a contribution to
throty, we damage competitive rhetorical criticism" (Murphy 918).
Murphy's argument about the present practice in the event
centers around the degree of evaluation in CA. "Two different
levels of claims are found in rhetorical criticism, an overall
evaluation of effectiveness and individual claims made in the
course of the speech to support this judgment. It seems as if
9very few in forensics believe that evaluation need exist" (Murphy
919). Murphy not only notes an avoidance of evaluation on the
part of the competitor but also on the part of the national organi-
zations that run forensics. As he notes, neither the AFA nor the
NFA organizations specifically ask for evaluation.
Murphy sees two reasons for evaluation. First, quoting Black
(1978), he argues that "evaluation inevitable exists in any criti-
cism" (919), so we should encourage that evaluation. Second,
Murphy accepts an argument offered by Rosenfield (1968), "By
requiring students to risk evaluation, we automatically ask them
to argue in support of that evaluation" (919). Unfortunately,
under current practices, students in CA are confined "to a state-
ment indicating that this speech fulfilled the criteria set down
by a renowned critic and thus won wide applause" (Murphy 919-920).
Even worse, these claims flow from the methodology that is being
used, not from the speech.
As a result of this lack of evaluation and the over-reliance
on the method, the student is merely classifying. Murphy claims
that the students are making no inferential leaps. "Students
are not evaluating, they are doing 'cookie-cutter' analysis with
no cazeful contextual analysis" (Murphy 920). By "cookie-CUtter"
,
Murphy is referring to an analysis that is more concerned with
finding out if all the speech really fits the method being used.
Murphy's solution for CA is that it become "social criticism"
(918). Adopting Campbell's (1974) view of criticism. Murphy
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would have the critic analyze the communication act in such a way
that a general audience would be served by the critique. In
effect. Murphy would like to see rhetorical critics shift their
emphasis away from theory. Instead, he would like rhetorical
criticism to function in much the same way that an editorial does
in the newspaper. The critic should select socially relevant and
recent rhetorical acts with the aim of exposing fallacious rhetoric
and praising good rhetoric.
Murphy argues that there are four problems with the present
bent in CA. First, the time limit is only ten minutes. A student
is hard pressed to do in 10 minutes what an article in QJS can
do in 20 pages. Second CA is a competitive speech event. "Sty-
listically, it must be different from a scholarly article in the
QJS " (922). Third, a contribution to rhetorical theory requires
a skilled critic, while undergraduates are competing in CA.
Fourth, Murphy notes that students who want to win in CA focus
on their methodology at the expense of their new analysis.
By changing the focus from method to the actual coirmunica-
tion act, Murphy claims four advantages. First, by reducing the
import of the method, the time limit is less problematic. Second,
by looking more at the "real world", the event is more educa-
tional. Third, social criticism would permit better teaching
of argument. And finally, social criticism would broaden the
focus of the event.
Looking at all of the research as a whole, some commonali-
ties appear. First, Logue (1981) noted that topic significance
nwas important and criticized CA's shallow analysis. Larson and
O'Rourke (1983), McGee (1983), and Murphy (1983) all argue that
the topic should be significant. The same authors also agree on
the presence of shallow analysis in most CAs. McGee's (1983)
claim of "uncertainty" in CA due to coaches and student's inexper-
ience with rhetoric is reflected by Larson and O'Rourke's (1983)
findings that indicate that there is no clear purpose for CA.
This is further substantiated by the poor grade CA received for
achieving its purpose (Larson and O'Rourke, 1983).
But while there is some agreement among these authors, more
research needs to be done before CA can shed its problematic
image. The attitudinal research is troublesome primarily because
Larson and O'Rourke (1981, 1983) do not demonstrate any link
between the expressed attitudes about what is a good CA, and
what actually is a good CA. Their work is based on the assump-
tion that judges use the same criteria in judging CAs that they
say they do. The very real possibility exists that judges vote
on the basis of something that is not written on the ballot.
For example, a judge could react to a competitor's reputation.
If so, it is doubtful that a judge would indicate that on the
ballot.
The argumentative research avoids the problem of analyzing
attitudes. Logue's (1981) study actually looks at the behavior
exhibited. But two problems exist. First, the study was of only
one year's finals. Was the 1981 final a representative example
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of all CA finals? We have no way of knowing this from Logue's
work. Second, Logue was looking at the CAs from an argumentative
perspective alone. That is not the sole criterion for judging CA.
Logue's points about CA as argument are interesting, but they are
irrelevant to a study of CA as a forensics event.
With the opinion work, problems are clearly delineated, but
useful solutions are found wanting. McGee (1981) is correct in
lamenting the general lack of expertise in rhetoric in coaches
and competitors. But the likelihood that a coach will make the
effort to become an expert in rhetoric purely for the sake of one
forensics event is nil. With other responsibilities, a coach
(who is normally an instructor as well) just does not have the
time nor reasons to devote energy to the extra study of rhetoric.
The undergraduate student is not likely to be an expert in rhe-
toric either. Like McGee, Murphy (1983) presents a compelling
criticism of CA. However, despite Murphy's argument for changing
the focus of CA, the event is presently operating under its old
rules. Unless a coach or student is willing to forego the current
trend in CA, Murphy's article is of no value to participants.
One point is consistent within all of the literature; CA
has problems. As a result, suggestions for future CA practices
encourage avoiding the problems of the past. But, if competi-
tors are not to make mistakes, what are they to do? Nobody really
offers firm advice in this area. We know what is wrong with CA,
but what is right with it? I would have us focus on what we are
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doing right in CA. Then we can not tell students not only what not
to do, but also what to do. This study will analyze successful
CAs and determine the characteristics and strategies that make
them successful
.
There are two justifications for this study. First, set
down in an orderly fashion, the characteristics and strategies
of a competent and competitive CA can increase the quality of
present speeches. As documented (Gaske, 1981; Larson and O'Rourke,
1983; McGee, 1983), there is a dearth of literature on CA. By
presenting exactly what is a good CA, coaches and students will
have a model on which to base their efforts. They will know what
a good CA should look like. While the guidelines will not auto-
matically give coaches and students the requisite knowledge of
rhetoric for CA, they will erase some of the "uncertainty" that
HcGee (1983) sees as characterizing the event.
Second, this research will also balance our vision of CA.
Current literature easily tells us what is wrong with the event.
This study can tell us what is right with CA. At present, it is
too easy to look at the negative criticism of CA and concede
that the event is in bad shape, but this is a case of selective
perception. Nobody has made a real effort to look at the posi-
tive side of CA. When critics claim that CA is in trouble, we
should ask compared to what? An ideal version of CA? If this
is the case, problems can always be found.
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So a guideline would be useful in putting our view of CA in
perspective and in providing a text for the coach and competitor.
Presently neither is in existence.
And until the forensics community knows what makes a competi-
tive CA, it will continue to avoid the event. Avoiding the event
is an educational sacrifice. To get the most out of CA, the
qualities that make a good CA need to be delineated. The purpose
of this study will be to delineate such qualities.
CHAPTER 2
Methodology
This study will first look at the rhetorical environment of
forensic competition for CA. With this perspective in mind, suc-
cessful CAs will then be examined to see whether they are rhetorical
criticisms and why they are successful CAs. The speeches and
their placings used for this study are:
Sam Marcosson Bradley University 1980 AFA 3
Julie Goodlick Illinois State University 1980 AFA 4 NFA 3
Sam Marcosson Bradley University 1981 AFA 5
John Murphy Bradley University 1981 NFA 6 Iowa 1
Andy Heaton Bradley University 1982 AFA 1 NFA 4
Sam Marcosson Bradley University 1983 AFA 1 NFA 1
Steve Sudhoff Bradley University 1983 AFA 4
Cham Ferguson Kansas State University 1983 AFA 4
Todd Rasmuson Iowa State University 1984 DSR-TKA 1
Steve Sudhoff Bradley University 1984 NFA 1
The analytic tools used will be Lloyd Bitzer's (1968) "The Rhetori-
cal Situation", Wayne Brockriede's (1984) "Rhetorical Criticism as
Argument", and Shawn McGee's (1983) essay on CA.
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The rationale for using these specific CAs as data is based
on the expected quality attributed to a national finalist or to
the winner of the Iowa tournament. Since these CAs are winners,
they represent the best speeches at the time they were in competi-
tion. While the speeches are not perfect, they are the best CAs
that forensics has to offer. For national finalist, the speeches
had to qualify for nationals and survive the pre-lim and initial
elimination rounds at nationals. The normal pressure and scrutiny
of an invitational tournament is increased at nationals. Nationals
has judges and critics from across the nation. Problems of local
biases that potentially plague the Larson and O'Rourke (1983)
study can be avoided.
CAs winning the Iowa tournament were selected because of
the emphasis that Iowa places on the event. Iowa has a specific
trophy for CA, the "Donald Bryant Memorial" trophy. Finals judges
are selected from rhetoric scholars from the highly respected Iowa
program. No other tournament to my knowledge places the impor-
tance on CA that the Iowa tournament does.
The actual speeches chosen were selected simply because they
were available. Either I already had a copy of a speech, or I
was able to contact the students who provided me with a copy of
their CA. This sample represents the total number of people who
were willing to provide speeches.
Before these speeches are specifically analyzed, the context
in which they are delivered needs to be examined. Outside of the
17
actual rules for the event, no specific article or paper attempts
to set down the environment of competitive forensics. To under-
stand CA, a coach or student needs to understand its context. As
Simons (1978) argues, "Rhetoric as a pragmatic, adaptive art, is
highly constrained by purpose and situation" (41). To understand
the effects of the purpose and situation on CA, Bitzer's (1968)
"Rhetorical Situations" will be used. Bitzer was the first to
discuss the rhetorical situation and greatly influenced Simons
(Bormann, 1980, 211).
Bitzer's (1968) basic position is that rhetors do not create
rhetoric as an action, but as a reaction to a specific situation,
called a rhetorical situation, which he defines as:
"... a complex of persons, events, objects, and
relations presenting an actual or potential exi-
gence which can be completely or partially re-
moved if discourse, introduced into the situation,
can so constrain human decision or action as to
bring about the significant modification of the
exigence" (386).
There are three key terms to understand within any rhetorical
situation: exigence, audience, and constraints. The exigence
is the problem that initiates the situation. It is the exigence
that the rhetor hopes to alleviate with a speech. Bitzer calls
an exigence "an imperfection narked by urgency" (386). To be
rhetorical exigence, the exigence must be solvable by discourse,
otherwise it is not rhetorical.
By audience, Bitzer does not mean anyone who hears a speech,
but specifically that portion of the audience that can solve the
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exigence. For example, a politician is heard by many during a
campaign, but only those who are registered voters can be the
rhetorical audience. With every exigence and audience, a rhetori-
cal situation also contains a set of constraints: the people,
events, objects, and relations which may hinder a speaker in a
given situation. For example, a president asking for a tax in-
crease is going to be constrained by the public's general distaste
for such measures. The constraints represent roadblocks for the
rhetor.
In every rhetorical situation, a rhetor must confront the
exigence. The constraints need to be removed or circumvented.
Then the audience will hopefully modify the exigence in the appro-
priate manner. Each rhetorical situation has an appropriate
fitting response. "One might say metaphorically that every situation
prescribes its fitting response; the rhetor may or may not read the
prescription accurately" (Bitzer, 390).
To analyze whether CAs are rhetorical criticisms, I will use
the criteria developed by Brockriede (1974). Brockriede's position
is that all rhetorical criticism should function as argument. By
argument, he means the process a person engages in as he/she rea-
sons his/her way from one idea to the choice of another idea.
This concept implies five generic characteristics:
(1) an inferential leap from existing beliefs to
the adoption of a new belief or the reinforcement
of an old one; (2) a perceived rationale to justify
the leap; (3) a choice among two or more competing
claims; (4) a regulation of uncertainty in relation
to the selectee claim—since someone has made an
19
inferential leap, certainty can be neither zero nor
total; and (5) a willingness to risk a confrontation
of that claim with one's peers (166).
Rather than seeing a rhetorical criticism as being either
argument or not an argument, Brockriede argues that "this defini-
tion implies an argument-nonargument continuum" (165). For example,
making a statement that a speech was successful without presenting
any reason is closer to the nonargument end of the continuum.
While the criticism makes a claim and is presented in a forum,
it does not provide a rationale; it does not justify the rationale
nor regulate uncertainty. This is why Brockriede writes "any
concrete rhetorical experience may embody these characteristics
in varying degrees" (166). To make an argument, critics must say
why they evaluated a rhetorical experience as they did.
Brockriede breaks down rhetorical criticism into three cate-
gories. They are description, classification, and explanation.
The first two, description and classification, are seen as being
closer to the nonargument end of the continuum. Since description
does not make an inferential leap, nor does it provide any justifi-
cation for a leap, the reader or audience has no question of choice
about regulating uncertainty. Description can only serve as an
argument if the critic draws conclusions from the data. Classi-
fication is rarely an argument because the critic is blindly apply-
ing bits of data to appropriate cubby holes. Brockriede makes it
clear that he has no objections to categories. "No critic can
manage without some categories in his head" (Brockriede, 170).
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Brockriede's objection is to critics who use categories slavishly.
The problem lies with critics who are "determined to force a con-
crete rhetorical experience into the confines of a closed system,
a system that Is closed because the critic will not allow himself
to discover or create new categories while in the process of his
analysis" (170).
There are at least five reasons why a category system tends to
be nonargument. First, there is no inferential leap. Second a
priori selection of a category system provides little if any ration-
ale. Third, because of this, there Is not much regulation of
uncertainty. Fourth, the critic Is taking only a small risk of
confrontation. Finally, the critic is failing to answer the so-
what question. A speech may use ethos, logos, and pathos, but
why is that important? No answer Is provided by a classification
criticism.
The style of analysis favored by Brockriede Is explanation.
Explanation avoids the pitfalls of description and classification.
The critic is comparing the rhetorical experience to a more general
concept, so that the critic is not just describing. The critic
also looks at the data and potential methodologies before analysis.
Effort is given to selecting an appropriate method so that the
critic Is not making an a priori decision toward a particular
category system. Then doing the actual analysis, the critic who
attempts to explain is not using the category system as a passive
receptable. The critic is making active use of both data and
method.
21
One significant advantage to criticism by explanation is "a
better understanding of rhetoric itself" (Brockriede, 171). When
rhetorical criticism is practiced as argument, it fulfills one
of two functions. It serves to "validate the present concepts or
to discover new ones" (Brockriede, 171). A critic who validates
is supporting a theoretical position or a generalization within
a given theory. The criticism not only explains the rhetorical
experience but substantiates theory as well. On the other hand,
when the interpretation or explanation is not consistent with
theory, the critic can rework and improve rhetorical theory. So
a critic can corroborate or improve existing theory as well as
analyze rhetoric.
As a result, Brockriede feels that "critics who argue are
more useful than critics who do not" (173). First, significant
arguments are more informative than nonarguments. And more impor-
tantly, "when a critic assumes the responsibility and risk of
advancing a significant argument about his evaluation or explana-
tion, he invites confrontation that may begin or continue a process
enhancing an understanding of a rhetorical experience or of rhe-
toric" (Brockriede, 174).
Brockriede will be used because his essay has served as the
comnon criteria for prior claims that CA is not rhetorical criti-
cism (Logue, 1981; Murphy, 1983). Brockriede can be used to settle
that claim based on the CAs to be examined. Other critics agree on
Brockriede's standards for judging just what is rhetorical criticism
(Benoit, 1981; McGee, 1983). Also, since CA has been rated as the
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second most argumentative event in individual events {Benoit, 1981),
it is appropriate to use an argumentative perspective in judging
the event. Another reason for using Brockriede (1974) is that his
essay can be applied to any CA, no matter what the topic or methodology.
Finally the CAs will be examined using the criteria set down by
McGee (1983). McGee initiates her argument by first noting that many
coaches and students have a weak background in rhetoric and CA. Her
essay then is an attempt to provide a guide in the composition of a
good CA. This guide is based on McGee's experience as a national
finalist in CA and her experience as a successful forensic coach.
McGee also bases the guide on input that judges consistently put on
CA ballots.
I selected McGee's criteria for this study for two reasons.
First, McGee is an experienced veteran of forensics both as a com-
petitor and a coach. While the criteria are opinion, they are
educated opinion. Second, McGee's essay is the only source on how
to write a CA. McGee is confident that if the criteria are followed,
coaches and students will realize CA's values.
For organizational purposes, McGee divides her criteria into
three sections, the introduction, the body, and the conclusion.
For the introductory section, there are three broad criteria.
First, as with any speech, there should be a good introduction.
There should be a good attention getter, thesis sentence, and pre-
view. Second, as suggested by others (Logue, 1981; Larson and
O'Rourke, 1981, 1983), the significance of the rhetorical arti-
fact must be stated. "In doing this, the student also generates
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a 'need' which will hopefully be fulfilled by the application of
the critical perspective" (McGee, 7). Finally, the methodology or
critical perspective should be introduced. McGee cautions that
justification of the method should be placed in the body of the
speech.
There are five criteria for the body of the speech. First,
the justification of the appropriateness of the methodology should
be made. Without the justification, the "rhetorical criticism becomes
little more than an experience in cookie-cutting" (McGee, 7). This
suggestion is echoed by Larson and O'Rourke (1983) in their research.
Second, the method should be explained. The appropriate vocabulary
and source of the method should be offered. This too is recommended
by Larson and O'Rourke (1983). Next, the speaker should indicate
the rhetorical purposes of the topic. In other words, what was the
speaker under scrutiny trying to do with her or his speech? This
should be substantiated. Fourth, the method should be applied to
the topic. The organization will be dependent upon the particular
method of the analysis. Fifth, the speaker should assess the effec-
tiveness of the speech. McGee makes it clear that the claim of
effectiveness should be "supported as thoroughly as the other essen-
tial elements of the criticism" (8) and argues that this development
can better be served in the body of the speech than in the conclu-
sion. In demanding support, McGee is once more in agreement with
the findings of Larson and O'Rourke (1983).
There are three criteria for the conclusion section. As with
any speech, the speaker should synthesize the information presented.
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Second, the significance of the topic and the justification of the
method should be reiterated. Finally, the speaker should finish
(with a statement which retains their attention while offering
finality to the presentation" (McGee, 9).
The next chapter will first apply Bitzer (1968) to the rhetori-
cal situation. Then each CA will be analyzed using Brockriede's
(1974) and McGee's (1983) criteria. From this, the guidelines of
what constitutes a good CA will be derived.
CHAPTER 3
Analysis and Results
This chapter will first establish the rhetorical situation
facing a competitor in CA. Then the individual CAs will be analyzed
with McGee's (1983) and Brockriede's (1974) criteria. From this
analysis, the guidelines of what constitutes a competent CA will
be established.
The rhetorical situation facing a competitor in CA is centered
on the exigence. The contestant is trying to convince the judge
that his/her CA deserves the top rank in the round. The judge or
judges serve as the rhetorical audience. Completing the situation
are the four constraints. The constraints are the judges, the
methodology used in the CA, CA rules and the qualities of a CA
identified by Larson and O'Rourke (1983). As this analysis pro-
gresses, a synopsis of each data CA can be found in Appendix A
and the full text in Appendix B.
First, some judges' inexperience with rhetorical theory serves
as a constraint. As McGee (1983) pointed out, many coaches are not
well versed in rhetorical theory. On the other hand, it is not
uncommon for a tournament to ask the local professors of rhetoric
to judge CA finals. So in the course of a tournament, a student
may address an audience that runs the gamut from inexperienced to
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expert. The student then needs to write the CA in a way that, on
the one hand, does not appear shallow, yet on the other hand, does
not appear so sophisticated that it talks over the head of a less
experienced judge.
Second, the judge may present a bias in regard to what is an
acceptable method or topic. Larson and O'Rourke (1983) have found
that some judges prefer specific schools of thought in methods.
This reflects the present state of uncertainty in rhetorical theory.
As Black (1965), Campbell (1970) and Scott and Brock (1972) all
argue, there is no one accepted theoretical paradigm for rhetoric.
As coaches are taught rhetorical theory, they are being educated
in a particular school of thought. This can be reflected as a
methodology bias.
The situation of uncertainty in rhetoric also creates a bias
as to what is rhetorical or not. As Berg (1972) observes, only
discourse is universally accepted as being rhetorical. Depending
on the theoretical school, art, movies and architecture may or
may not be rhetorical. So, dependent on the judge's rhetorical
philosophy, the topic of a CA may or may not be considered rhetori-
cal. The only topics that can be assured of acceptance or speeches.
The methodology within the CA is the second major set of con-
straints. Logue (1981) found that the uniqueness of the method
appears to be a factor in winning. Logue anticipated that CAs
would use the methodologies of the major theorists such as Burke
and Aristotle. Instead, lesser known methodologies were used.
However, a difficulty arises in this research. Even though the
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field of rhetoric is fragmented, most methods do belong to a parti-
cular school of thought. So even if a methodology is attributed to
someone else, it may still be Burkeian or Aristotelian.
The question of uniqueness will have to be defined operationally.
Rosenfield (1968) notes that a critical theory will encompass four
"gross variables" (58). The variables are the source(s) or creator(s)
of communication, the message of the communication, the context or
environment of the communication and the critic him/herself. Rosen-
field refers to these variables as SMEC for Source, Message, Environ-
ment, and Critic. When a theorist like Burke or Aristotle arrives at
a theory of rhetoric, the theory has specific interpretations about
the v/hole SMEC interaction. However, a unique method would only
concern itself with one or two specific variables. Based on its
foundation, the unique method assumes a prior understanding of the
remaining variables. A unique method is a specific method in that
it limits its scope of analysis to a particular SMEC variable.
The data CAs demonstrate this specificity. Marcosson's analysis
of South Africa's racism is conducted using a power maintenance
theory. The theory is Burkeian in nature and is Message centered.
Goodlick's analysis of Phyllis Schlafly also relies on a Burkeian or
dramaturgical theory, fantasy analysis. Again, the emphasis is on
the Message. Marcosson's third CA uses a neo-Aristotelian method
concerned with delivery. The analysis is centered on the Message.
Murphy and Heaton both analyze different speeches by President Ronald
Reagan. Both CAs focus on the Message with theories that are Burkeian.
Murphy uses the Quest Story and Heaton uses the strategies identified
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by Murray Edelman. Marcosson's third CA looks at how Lyndon Johnson
tried to justify the Viet Nam war. The analysis used the theories
of how a president tries to justify war. The analysis was Message
centered and dramaturgical. Sudhoff's CA on Jimmy Carter used
apologia, which is Message centered. The method is also dramatur-
gical in lineage. Ferguson's CA looked at beer commercials and used
two methods. The first looked at American values in persuasion.
This was a neo-Aristotel ian theory. The second method looked at
how images are manipulated. This theory is Burkeian in nature.
But both methods are Message centered. Rasmuson's CA is the unique
speech. Rasmuson analyzed the whole S-M-E relationship of Paul
"Bear" Bryant with a fantasy theme and a minor concept of Burke's.
This is the only CA that really focused on more than one variable.
Finally, Sudhoff's last CA used a neo-Aristotel ian theory about
diplomatic rhetoric to analyze the Message in a John Kennedy speech.
This is not to saythat a unique method cannot concern itself
at all with any other variable. What this is saying is that a unique
method focuses primarily on one variable in the SMEC interaction.
To a certain degree, all of the variables need to be addressed.
However, for forensics, it seems that a method should concern itself
with one primary variable to be unique.
Another constraint applicable to the method is the question
of time. Since a CA can last no longer than ten minutes, how long
it takes to explain the method is an important consideration. All
other things being equal, a CA would be better off with a concise
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method. By concise method, the author neans one that is quickly
explained. The concise method would allow the competitor to spend
more time on the actual analysis.
Along with the judges and the methods, the third major set of
constraints is the rules for CA. While the National Forensics Asso-
ciation (NFA) and American Forensics Association (AFA) rules vary
slightly, for the most part they are similar. The only significant
difference is that the AFA rules allow for a broader range of topics.
The NFA rules require a more traditional topic, primarily discourse.
Otherwise, it is the rules for the event that prescribe the ten
minute time limit and that the speech have some sort of method.
As Murphy (1983) notes, the rules do not specifically ask for eval-
uation. In many ways, it is assumed that a CA will resemble an
academic criticism in form (Murphy, 1983).
But, because the rules do not make a distinction between a
CA and a rhetorical criticism, those differences should be made
clear. First, a rhetorical criticism is written to be read. A CA
is written to be spoken. Both Larson and O'Rourke (1983) and
Murphy (1983) make this point. Campbell (1982) clearly makes the
distinction between oral and written style:
Oral style must be more redundant. Because you
can re-read material and pause to think between
paragraphs, a writer need not repeat and restate.
But listeners do not have such options. As a
result, successful speaking requires internal
summaries, transitions connecting ideas, repeti-
tion of major steps in the argument and the like.
Such redundancy increases both comprehension and
impact for listeners (263).
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A competitor cannot get as much information out in the same space
as the writer of a rhetorical criticism. Combine this with CA's
time limit and it is easy to see how the level of analysis between
a CA and a rhetorical criticism can differ.
There is a difference in the quality of analysis in a CA and
a rhetorical criticism. The CA is operating under the restriction
of an oral style and a time limit. Analysis will be more superfi-
cial than in a rhetorical criticism. The time limit may be the
underlying reason for the judges' complaints of shallow analysis
in CAs (Logue, 1981; Larson and O'Rourke, 1983).
Finally, the audience analysis required for a CA differs from
that in a rhetorical criticism. As discussed earlier, judges fall
into various categories. "Competitors in communication analysis
have to confront the problem of adapting to a changing audience
where authors of criticism papers do not have to worry about this
requirement as much" (Larson and O'Rourke, 1983, 7).
The last general set of constraints is the recommendations
that Larson and O'Rourke (1983) made on the basis of their research.
These serve as constraints because they are expected by judges.
Judges want the recommendations fulfilled as one part of the desired
response to the rhetorical situation. Judges expect the methods to
be justified, explained, and used properly. The CA must exhibit
clear, critical thinking and be fully documented. Since these points
are covered well by McGee's (1983) criteria, they will be dealt with
when McGee's essay is used.
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Of Brockriede's five criteria for an argument, the fifth is
clearly met by all the data CAs. Brockriede states that an argu-
ment must be presented for public scrutiny. Since an argument
existing in a vacuum is useless, Brockriede would have the rhetori-
cal critic share and defend his/her views with others. Since all
of the CAs were presented in competition, they are consistently
evaluated by peers. To avoid needless redundancy, this fifth cri-
terion will not be acknowledged for all of the CAs.
The first CA to be analyzed is Sam Marcosson's criticism of
South Africa's apartheid. Marcosson examines how the white govern-
ment rhetorically maintains its pov/er. The method for the CA is
Andrew King's theory of power maintenance. King outlines the verbal
strategies that groups in power use to rebuff challenges. This CA
specifically examines how the strategies of definition, "cry anar-
chy" and "co-optation" are used.
With definition, the power group attempts to define the rules
of the challenge in such a way that favors the status quo. In
South Africa, Marcosson demonstrates that the problem is not rep-
resented as multi-racial, but as multi-national. Also, the right
to power is defined as whoever was in South Africa first (the
whites), instead of by majority.
When the status quo represents the challengers as potentially
creating chaos, this is the strategy of crying anarchy. The white
government depicts any black rule as leading to riots and civil
war.
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Finally, co-optation is when ground is given to the challeng-
ing group in a way that does not involve a real loss in power.
South Africa did this by creating supposedly independent home-
lands for the blacks. However, the homelands are still under
South African rules while depriving the blacks of South African
citizenship.
Marcosson's specific claim is that the South African white
dominated government is partially maintaining its power with their
rhetorical strategies. The rationale for this claim is the insight
provided by King's theory of power maintenance. Since power main-
tenance focuses on how the status quo stays in power and that is
the whole point to the analysis, there is a perceivable rationale
for the central claim.
The third criteria is that a choice be represented among two
or more competing claims. This is to deter obvious statements
being represented as arguments. Moreover, this criteria forbids
a critic from assuming absolute certainty in his/her claim. For
Marcosson's CA, the choice is at best implied. Marcosson states,
"How the government is holding to power is a classic example of
the rhetoric of power maintenance as outlined by Andrew King."
While this claim does not dismiss the use of force to maintain
white rule, it also does not acknowledge the possible use of force.
However, in application of King's theory, Marcosson does
present a degree of choice. Instead of forcing all of the strate-
gies of power maintenance into the analysis, Marcosson acknowledges
that only three are used. To that extent, Marcosson provides a
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choice in that while power maintenance strategies are used, not all
strategies are present. An argument for the specific strategies
becomes apparent.
The regulation of uncertainty is the execution of the argument.
Does the critic back up the claim? To support the claim of defini-
tion, Marcosson demonstrates the definition of the problem as multi-
national and the definition of the right to power on the basis of
who was in South Africa first. The cry anarchy strategy was demon-
strated by official references to violence in Tanzania and Mozambique
and civil war in Angola. For co-optation, Marcosson identified the
creation of black workers' unions and the black homelands. In both
cases, substantive gains for blacks were not present. To this
point, there is an attempt to prove the presence of the strategies.
The regulation of uncertainty is continued with the argument
of effectiveness. First, the fact that power maintenance was suc-
cessful is argued by pointing out that the white government is still
in power. For each strategy, specific arguments of success are
made. With definition, the lack of violence was seen as a sign
of success. Specifically, Rhodesia dealt with their problems as
multi-racial, and had violence. South Africa has had virtually
no violence due to its "multi-national" problem. To an extent,
cry anarchy has been successful since some tribal chieftans have
accepted the homeland proposals. Co-optation's success was demon-
strated by acceptance of rank-and-file South African whites and
by evoking "excitement among South African blacks" for the changes.
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As an argument, this CA has problems only with the third cri-
teria with a choice among claims. On the basis of these criteria,
the CA moves closer to the argument end of the continuum. This CA
then serves as a rhetorical criticism.
With this established, an analysis of the CA as a competitive
speech is in order. McGee's (1983) first requirement of a CA is
the normal introduction requirements. Marcosson started the speech
with an analogy to a Star Trek television show episode. Two men
from a racially strife torn world are determined to kill each other.
Marcosson used them to point to the problems that face South Africa.
This introduction idea works first to establish an accepted comment
on bigotry and then to transfer that comient to South Africa. The
introduction analogy serves to create a justification for and need
to analyze the topic. The power and clarity of the thesis
statement
are negated by the fact that the thesis is in two sentences,
"The
South African whites, now isolated from the rest of the world are
clinging tenaciously to power. How the government is holding to
power is a classic example of the rhetoric of power maintenance
outlined by Andrew King." One definite weakness is the lack of a
preview.
Marcosson established the significance of his topic by point-
ing out the power discrepancy in South Africa (% million whites
control ISij million blacks). Pointing out the strategic location
and mineral wealth of the country also gives the CA significance.
Plus, he noted the educational gains to be made from this analysis.
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The method is introduced and explained in the introduction. The
speech is clear and is easy to follow at all times.
The three things that McGee (1983) wishes the body to start
with, justification of method, the explanation of the method and
the explanation of the rhetor's objective, were all clearly in the
introduction or in the ambiguous area between introduction and body.
All of these considerations were clearly presented and easy to under-
stand. The analysis and discussion of effectiveness were well sup-
ported with four outside sources and three examples.
In the conclusion, Marcosson chose to forsake a surmary and
instead pointed to the future. Since this is an ongoing rhetori-
cal act, it appears that to look back on it as being over is
inappropriate. But Marcosson's conclusion is excellent in that
it makes a comment and ties back in with the introduction. Mar-
cosson noticed how the two men from the Star Trek show returned
to find their planet destroyed because of the racial wars. Mar-
cosson then asked if this is the fate that faces South Africa unless
they can solve their problems. The essentials of a CA were all
present.
The next CA is Julie Goodlick's analysis of Phyllis Schlafly's
speech delivered October 8, 1976 to Executive Council members of
the Eagle Forum. Goodlick examines how Schlafly spread her anti-
ERA message to fellow believers. The method for the analysis is
Ernest Bormann's fantasy theme analysis. Bormann outlines the
rhetorical function of fantasy for an audience. A given fantasy
or vision is used to acculturate people into a rhetor's group or
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movement. A rhetorical vision is an angle on events that makes
sense out of them. It consists of one or more interpretations in
which human beings, fictitious characters and/or supernatural
forces enact behavior that explain why things happen.
A speaker will develop a fantasy theme that is central for
the group. For Schlafly, this fantasy theme is the difference
between the sexes. Women's "libbers" are seen negatively and tra-
ditional women are heroines. As this fantasy is chained out, the
group should adopt a specific language. Again, the libbers are
villains and the anti-ERA women are called positive women. Once
the language has been adopted, group members are motivated to
action. Schlafly urges her followers to devote a half-hour a day
to saving the family, God, home, and country while stopping the ERA.
Goodlick's claim is that Phyllis Schlafly is the one respon-
sible for motivating women to negate the ERA. Goodlick is then
trying to explain how Schlafly gained their support. The rationale
for this claim is Bormann's fantasy theme analysis. Since fantasy
themes are presented to primarily believers, and since the Eagle
Forum is a group developed by Schlafly, as Goodlick says, "This
speech (was) v;ell -suited for study via Ernest Bormann's Fantasy
Theme Analysis."
The choice of competing claims is presented by not represent-
ing Schlafly as the single reason for the ERA's defeat. While
citing Schlafly's effort as significant in stopping the ERA, Good-
lick does not present Schlafly as the only reason the ERA failed.
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The regulation of uncertainty begins with the selection of
the speech to be analyzed. Goodlick picks the October 6th speech
since it was typical of her speeches at the height of the ERA
controversy and it served as the basis of the first chapter for
her book. The Power of the Positive Woman .
Using examples from Schlafly's speech, Goodlick demonstrates
the theme of libbers destroying traditionalism. Again, examples
of the language to be used are indicated in the speech. However,
if the followers are to adopt the language, in this case libbers
as villain and positive women as hero, where is the proof? Nowhere
does Goodlick demonstrate if this particular theme was picked up
by the audience. It is not enough to demonstrate that a theme is
used; it has to be chained out. So in this particular sense, the
stopping of the ERA cannot be equated with the fantasy theme.
Granted, women may have opposed the ERA, but why they did is not
clear within this CA.
The argument in this CA serves as a description. While a
rhetorical criticism can be descriptive, it serves its purpose
better as an explanation. Since the explanatory function cannot
be justified with this particular CA, the analysis is closer to
the non-argument end of the continuum.
In terms of McGee's criteria, Goodlick's CA does not have
a good introduction, but it is solid in the body. The introduc-
tion is not very interesting. Instead of trying to gain attention,
the introduction appears to be a means of getting to the thesis.
Simply put, the introduction says the ERA was introduced, met with
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early success and has since faltered. Why? The answer is Phyllis
Schlafly. While the introduction is sound with a clear thesis, it
is not particularly interesting. Nor does Goodlick use a preview.
Goodlick made a very clear argument concerning McGee's call
to justify the analysis. She used Schlafly's success as the justi-
fication for the analysis. Goodlick also gave a good argument as
to why the particular speech of Schlafly's should be the one to look
at. Essentially she argued that "Understanding the Difference" is
a representative example of all of Schlafly's efforts. The speech
used themes common to Schlafly and would later be the opening chapter
to her book, The Power of the Positive Woman .
In the body, Goodlick did an excellent job of justifying the
use of Bormann. The justification moved smoothly into the explana-
tion of the analysis. As for the analysis, it was sound and clear,
but could have easily been clearer. Goodlick's analysis took three
steps: identify the fantasy theme, identify the specific language
for the theme, and identify the eventual attitude change or rhetor's
motivating plea. By simply saying that she was going to look at the
themes, language and motivation of Schlafly, Goodlick could have
solidified the organization of the analysis. Not that the organiza-
tion was bad, but a simple use of labels would have been an improvement.
Since the CA used Schlafly's effectiveness as the rationale for
the speech, there is not a discussion of the effectiveness in the
body of the speech. There should have been some demonstrated link
between the fantasy theme and the success. It would seem that if
a competitor is using the effectiveness of a rhetor as the justification
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for the CA, the student must prove that the success can be linked
with the reasons for it from the analysis.
The conclusion manages to quickly summarize the CA. Goodlick
noted that while the ERA was successful in its early stages, in
recent years Schlafly and her followers have blunted that success.
This ties in with the introduction. This not only summarizes well
but it also reiterates the significance of the analysis. However,
Goodlick ignored rejustifying the method. The concluding statement
is solid as Goodlick notes that the silent majority "didn't stay
silent for long." That conclusion says in effect that the anti-ERA
movement won, and appreciating that victory is important. Except
for the poor introduction and the omission of proof of the fantasy
theme's involvement in stopping the ERA, Goodlick's CA fulfilled
McGee's criteria.
The next CA to be analyzed is Sam Marcosson's critique of the
1976 Democratic Convention keynote speeches of John Glenn and
Barbara Jordan. Marcosson examines how the message presentation
of the speeches determined their success. The speeches were anal-
yzed using Robert Oliver's rhetorical model, "Delivering the Per-
suasive Speech." Oliver discusses the conforming to audience
expectations on three levels that leads to effective oratory.
Level one entails the speaker's and the audience's personali-
ties. Marcosson asserts that Glenn came off as boring, and he
misread the audience. On the other hand, Jordan was her expected,
exciting self who recognized the convention audience for the
pumped up crowd that it was.
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Level two deals with the attitude that exists between the
audience and the speaker. Ideally, the speaker solidifies a
mutual attitude with the audience. Because he misread his audi-
ence, Glenn actually widened the attitude between himself and
his audience. By fulfilling expectations, Jordan focused the atti-
tude between the audience and herself.
Level three concerns the elements of .the speech such as the
voice, diction and the phrasing. Glenn was trite and uninspired
while Jordan was described as being magic. Based on the analysis,
it was argued that Glenn flopped and Jordan excelled due to their
message presentation.
Marcosson's claim was that the crucial difference between
Glenn's and Jordan's speeches was the way that the message was
presented. Specifically Jordan delivered a wonderful speech and
Glenn did not. This was reflected in their subsequent successes
and failures.
The rationale for this is Oliver's model of delivering the
persuasive speech. To the extent that the analysis is looking
at message presentation, Oliver's model is germane. But, Harcosson
offers no further reason for using Oliver's model. The CA does
not supply the rationale for this specific method.
For the choice among competing claims, Marcosson acknowledged
that there was more than one potential explanation for the reac-
tions to the speeches. However, Marcosson did explain that the
actual messages for both speeches were similar. So the crucial
difference between the two speeches was the message presentation.
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To regulate the uncertainty for the claim, Marcosson examined
specific examples of each level of Oliver's model. First, Marcosson
pointed out that Glenn knowingly gave a low key address. However,
convention audiences are volatile crowds. Marcosson cited a Quarterly
Journal of Speech article that pointed out that keynote address is
expected to have grand phrases and excited tones. So Glenn failed
to fulfill the criteria of the first level. Jordan, though, acknow-
ledged the nature of her audience. Marcosson cited her use of
partisan phrases and grand phrases.
For the second level, Marcosson noted that Jordan anticipated
and took advantage of teh audience's expectations. The audience
realized that Jordan was a unique spokesperson, being black and
female. Jordan played off of this by noting that the occasion was
"special" and "different." Glenn failed to use the opportunity
presented. Marcosson characterized Glenn's performance as a "wet
firecracker" when "oratorical dynamite" was expected. Marcosson
described Glenn's attitude as being like a lecturer, somberly teach-
ing class.
For the third level, Marcosson noted that Jordan's vocal per-
formance was equated to that of a Shakespearean actor by the New
York Times . Time called the speech a "classic." Again, Glenn
was seen as "monotone" and "amateurish." Marcosson cited an
article in The Forensic calling the speech "trite, unimaginative,
lacking in style and imagery, lackluster in delivery and deadly
dull." Marcosson made convincing arguments for each part of the
analysis.
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To support the impact of the speeches, Marcosson noted the
different fate of the tvw politicians. Jordan was being touted
as a Supreme Court Justice, and Glenn was no longer mentioned as
a potential running mate for Democratic nominee Jimmy Carter.
Carter aide Hamilton Jordan was cited by Marcosson as squelching
any Glenn-for-Vice-President talk.
Marcosson 's CA successfully employs all but one of Brockriede's
criteria. The analysis needed to justify the selection of the
method more. With what the speech presents as a rationale for the
claim, it is difficult to determine if Oliver's model is appropriate
or was an a priori selection. To that extent, the CA should be
placed on the non-argument end of the continuum.
Marcosson's CA was a well-written analysis. Of all McGee's
criteria, the lack of method justification is the only one really
omitted. And even then, by his phrasing, Marcosson gave the
impression that he did indeed justify the method. In effect,
Marcosson said, ".
. . and so it is appropriate to use Oliver's
model." He then explains Oliver's approach. This gives the
impression that the explanation is also the justification. But
a closer reading of the explanation does not bear this out.
Otherwise, the CA is a well-written speech. The introduc-
tion is interesting with the parallelism of Glenn's "high" as
an astronaut and "low" as a speaker. The thesis is clear, and
Marcosson offered a sound theoretical reason to hear the speech.
He pointed out the opportunity to learn by comparing successful
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and unsuccessful like speeches. He then added credence to this
claim by noting that this is exactly what Campbell and Jamieson
(1978) say to do with the Glenn and Jordan speeches in their book.
Form and Genre . A need to do the analysis is generated, and the
method is introduced.
In the body of the speech, the method is clearly explained.
Marcosson also took the time to have labels for each part of the
analysis. As mentioned before with the Goodlick CA, the method
labels help make the organization more concrete and observable.
The discussion of effectiveness is especially good. For example,
Marcosson uses five separate sources to verify his claims. The
entire CA was well documented. Except for why the method was
appropriate, no single assertion was left unsupported.
As for the conclusion, the last coment regarding Glenn's
failure makes for a nice transition to the ending. The conclusion
is concise and ties back into the introduction. Marcosson observed
that after the reaction to his speech, Glenn probably wished that
he were back up in space listening to Jordan giving a speech.
Marcosson made the whole point of his CA with that ending.
The next CA is John Murphy's analysis of Ronald Reagan's
1980 presidential nomination acceptance address. Murphy examined
how Reagan became a legitimate presidential candidate in 1980.
The method was Herman Steltzner's Quest Story Theory. Steltzner
explains how a rhetor can portray his/her cause as a quest. Five
qualities of a quest must be met.
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First, a prized object exists to be obtained. For Reagan,
this prized object was making America great again. Second, there
is a long journey to find the prized object. Reagan incorporates
the American march over time since the Revolution as the long jour-
ney. Third, a hero exists. As would be expected, Reagan is the
hero. Fourth, the guardians are overcome before the prized object
can be realized. The guardians, or villains, were the Democratic
leaders in the White House and in the Congress. Finally, the hero
needs helpers to get the prized object. Reagan asked for the
American people to be his helpers. Because of this approach,
Reagan was nominated and won the 1980 election.
Murphy has two claims within the CA. First, Murphy argues
that the nomination acceptance address can serve as a representa-
tive example for a particular candidate. Second, Murphy's argument
is that Reagan's emergence as a president, after being considered
washed up, is in part due to his quest rhetoric. The rationale
for the fir'.t claim is that candidates tend to use their best
appeals from the campaign within the nomination acceptance. Murphy
cites evidence for this from the Central States Speech Journal .
Moreover, Time made the same observation about Reagan's address.
The rationale for the second claim is the Quest Story Theory.
Murphy justifies this rationale by noting Reagan's strong personal
identification with his message. This indicates the hero role.
The quest and prized object were indicated by Reagan's call for
"a great national crusade."
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For the question of choice among competing claims, Murphy indi-
cates that Reagan was not successful only because of his rhetoric.
Murphy only wanted to examine the rhetoric of Reagan in his hour of
victory. Murphy said, ".
.
.we must wonder what rhetorical strate-
gies Reagan used." So Murphy granted the possibility that other
factors could have been present that helped Reagan to victory.
To regulate the uncertainty, specific examples for each part
of the quest story are drawn from the address. Murphy noted that
Reagan set up the prized object by reviewing America's apparent
downfall, ".
. .
grave threats to our very existence." Based on
this, Reagan located and defined our "new beginning" as the prized
object.
By reviewing our revolution, Abe Lincoln, and now Ronald
eagan, Reagan associates the quest with the country's march through
time. That, and the phrase, "the time is now," indicate the cul-
mination of the long journey.
While Reagan is obviously the hero, it is not as simple as
that. There are two types of heroes. One has a "superior aura."
Reagan noted that such heroes were Barry Goldwater and Franklin
Roosevelt. Both wished to simplify government and, according to
Reagan, they failed. Reagan was the second hero type, of the
"concealed aura." Murphy noted that Time wrote that Reagan sounded
as if "the thoughts had just occurred to him, and darn it, he was
going to share them with his friends all over the country."
Reagan created a limited set of guardians. Murphy pointed
out that only the Democratic presidential administration and
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Congress were at fault in Reagan's quest. By saying, "Can anyone
look at the record of the Administration and say well-done?"
Reagan created specific guardians while leaving all others to be
potential helpers.
And that is what Murphy indicated that Reagan did. Murphy
said, "Ronald Reagan opens his ranks to all Americans." Murphy
also noted that a former John F. Kennedy speechwriter, Theodore
Sorensen, made the same appraisal of the address.
That the quest story was used effectively is partially sup-
ported by the fact that Reagan won the election. However, more
indicative of the quest story's effectiveness is Murphy's observa-
tion of how George Bush described the outcome. Said Bush, "Even
people who weren't enthusaistic about us at first are hoping
for an awful lot." So despite the limited power of the presi-
dency, it would seem that people expect a hero's performance from
Reagan.
Brockriede writes that an argument can also become a signi-
ficant argument when it presents some use beyond the iirmediate
analysis. Murphy's analysis approaches a significant argument
when he points out the future problems Reagan's quest story strate-
gies may present. Murphy argues that by creating such high expec-
tations, Reagan may be setting himself up for future failures.
Murphy's CA fulfills all the criteria and operates as a
significant argument. The CA not only describes, but also ex-
plains Reagan's rhetorical effectiveness. The speech can be
placed on the argument end of the continuum.
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Murphy's CA conformed for the most part to McGee's criteria.
The introduction sets up Reagan as the underdog who ultimately
triumphed. By being sarcastic about those who called Reagan washed
up, Murphy gave the introduction some bite. The thesis is not
so much a statement, but a question. Murphy asked how Reagan
made his comeback. Answering this is the whole point to the
speech. As seems to be conmon in all of the prior CAs, no preview
is used.
Murphy established the significance of the topic in two ways.
First, as noted, Reagan had made a comeback. Murphy is interested
in finding out how he did that. Second, Murphy narrowed the
focus of the comeback bid by looking specifically at the nomina-
tion acceptance speech. As Murphy noted, nomination speeches are
claimed to be brief rhetorical sunmaries of a candidate's best
appeals. So Murphy essentially argued that the campaign was
important and the best way to look at it is to look at the nomina-
tion acceptance. Immediately following this. Murphy introduced
and justified the method.
In the body of the speech, the method is explained by break-
ing down the quest story into its five elements. Murphy then took
each element and delineated its counterpart in Reagan's speech.
The analysis is complete in that it also explains why Reagan used
each element as he did. For example, the guardians of the prized
object are the "bad guys" and the helpers of the hero are the hero's
supporters. Murphy noted that Reagan limited his guardian list
to mainly the Carter administration. By having a short guardian
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guardian list, Reagan could ask all Americans, Republicans and Demo-
crats alike, to be his helpers. By taking that extra step to explain
these things. Murphy made the analysis better.
Like Goodlick's CA, Murphy started off by granting that the
CA's topic was successful. So the discussion of success is not
really present. The end of the analysis is the end of the body
of the speech. The conclusion serves to point to the future by
its discussion of the implication of using the quest story. Doing
the conclusion this way reiterated the significance of Murphy's
topic. By implying that while Reagan's strategy caused a victory.
Murphy also pointed out that this strategy could just as easily
lead to his defeat in the long run. The conclusion ends well with
Murphy making his final prediction that the potential political
ramifications of the quest story could be devastating.
The next CA to be analyzed also deals with Ronald Reagan.
Andy Heaton examined Reagan's July 27, 1981 television address
for his tax plan. Heaton analyzed how Reagan created the message
for the speech. The analytical tool that Heaton employed was the
work of Murray Edelman. Edelman is concerned with the way our
political process is influenced by the language strategies of
our leaders. Heaton examined how Reagan's speech exhibited the
strategies Edelman calls strategy, simplification, and ambiguity.
Strategy entails creating the impression that the leader
has a plan. The leader knows what he/she is doing. Simplifica-
tion is when a leader simplifies a complex situation to make it
palatable to large numbers of people. Ambiguity is the use of
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phrases that can have a variety of meanings. The idea is to use
ambiguous phrases that everyone can interpret differently and
accept or reject as the case may be. According to Heaton, Reagan
used strategy by presenting his tax cut as a "carefully constructed
plan." Plus he made it look as if the Democrats had no plan.
Heaton argued that Reagan used simplification by making the tax
cut a simple issue: you were either for or against it. A complex
issue was set up in black and white. And finally, Reagan used
ambiguity by using broad, patriotic appeals.
Heaton's claim was that Reagan's speech was effective due
to the way the message was prepared. Heaton's point was that
Reagan's Impressive delivery style should not make us overlook
the actual message construction. Edelman's theory served as the
perceived rationale. The rationale is justified in two ways.
First. Edelman is concerned with only political discourse's influ-
ence. Reagan's address is obviously political. Second, Edelman
relied heavily on examples from presidents. As Heaton noted,
this too suggests the suitability of Edelman to justify the claim.
Heaton did a very good job of fulfilling the criteria of
choice among competing claims. First, Heaton does not deny Reagan's
delivery skill. Heaton's point is that to "completely" appreciate
Reagan's rhetoric, a critic should look at more than Reagan's
delivery. Second, the analytical tool allows for a degree of
choice. Heaton noted that "Edelman does not claim political
rhetoric must contain these three elements (strategy, simplification
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and ambiguity) to be successful." This means that the message
does not have to be placed in cubbyholes that may not actually
be present in the message.
To regulate the uncertainty, to execute the argument, Heaton
relied mainly on examples from the speech and outside sources.
To set up the initial claim, Heaton cited an article from the
Quarterly Journal of Speech that substantiates the delivery claim.
This set up Heaton's point that we must not overemphasize the
delivery. To prove it was Reagan's skills at speech writing,
Heaton cited an Associated Press article that explained Reagan
relies little on speech writers.
For the strategy element, Heaton gave specific examples
where Reagan portrayed his tax-cut as a plan, and the democratic
option as lacking any strategy. Further proof came from a Chicago
Tribune article that noted that Reagan came off as presenting a
"comprehensive economic plan." However, not all of the arguments
for simplification exist in fact. Heaton used three specific
points to prove the existence of simplification. First, Reagan
simplified his description of the all-savers plan. Second,
Heaton noted how Reagan reduced the whole tax-cut question to
a simple, "Well, are you fur 'em, or agin 'em?" Finally, Heaton
quoted a Newsweek article describing Reagan as the best president
at simplifying an issue since Harry Truman. While some sort of
proof is offered for the last two arguments for simplification,
only an unsupported assertion is the proof for the all-savers
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example. There was no proof that the issue was more complicated
than indicated in Reagan's speech.
With the last element, ambiguity, Heaton first demonstrated
that Reagan extensively used terms like "renew the American spirit,"
"make America great again," and the "new beginning." Then Heaton
explained how professors John Cragin and Donald Shields charac-
terize such language as "safe political phrases." Heaton argued
that these phrases fulfill the ambiguity criteria.
Finally, to demonstrate the impact of the message, Heaton
first quoted former Jimmy Carter speechwriter, Hendrick Hertzberg.
Hertzberg claimed that Reagan's speech would have been a success
even read with a monotone. Second, to demonstrate the impact
of the speech itself, Heaton noted that there was a tenfold in-
crease in telegram traffic and Congress received twice its normal
mail, most in favor of the tax-cut. Heaton also quoted two Con-
gressional Representatives who attested to Reagan's effectiveness.
The only fault in Heaton's analysis was his failure to go
beyond the assertion level with the all-savers argument. Other-
wise, the rest of the criteria for an argument are made. Since
the all-savers point is relatively insignificant, the CA should
most definitely be placed near the argument end of the continuum
and can be called a rhetorical criticism.
Heaton's CA was as good a speech as it was a rhetorical
criticism. Heaton's introduction took advantage of a witty poli-
tical jab by Tip O'Neill to garner audience attention. For the
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thesis, it was clear that Heaton wished to prove that Reagan's
speech was not only delivered well, but was also well written.
Again, no preview is used. In justifying the significance of
the topic, Heaton first points out that the speech was successful.
But he also created a need to listen by saying that Reagan will
continue to speak out on issues. To further understand future
speeches, Heaton wants to look at what Reagan has been doing pre-
viously. Then, the method is introduced.
In the body of the speech, Heaton combined the justification
of the method with its explanation. This works because in justi-
fying it, Heaton had to explain it first. As discussed earlier,
the analysis was organized and conducted properly. While the CA
did not have a preview, Heaton did use the method strategy names
for a means of forecasting and labeling throughout the speech.
For example, the terms strategy, simplification and ambiguity are
used as a means of signposting each section of the analysis.
Finishing the body of the speech, Heaton demonstrated that Reagan's
rhetoric was successful with four separate pieces of evidence.
The conclusion summarizes Heaton's point well. Heaton re-
peated that it was the key to Reagan's speech. By pointing to
the future, the significance of the analysis is also re-established.
The last line of the conclusion is an inside joke to forensic
competitors. Since the joke applies to the CA and would be appre-
ciated by forensic people, it ends the speech nicely.
The next CA to be analyzed is Sam Marcosson's examination
of Lyndon Johnson's rhetoric concerning our entrance into the
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Vietnam conflict. Marcosscn examined how Johnson failed to justify
the war to the American people. The method for the analysis was
Robert Ivie's theory of how a president motivates a nation to war.
Ivie maintains that a successful entry into war requires that the
president fulfill four rhetorical criteria.
The four criteria must all be completed to successfully
initiate a war. First, the President must identify an ideal.
Second a crisis, threatening the ideal, must be identified. Third,
the President identifies a cause for the crisis. Finally, the
President will have to propose war as the final option to solve
the crisis. For Johnson, the ideal was freedom for South Vietnam.
The crisis was aggression against South Vietnam caused by Communism
and North Vietnam.
Marcosson's specific claim is that Johnson failed to success-
fully justify the Vietnam War because in setting up the first
three criteria, Johnson prevented a successful fulfillment of
the fourth criteria. The rationale is Ivie's theory. Ivie's
approach is justified in that Ivie examines the Presidential
justification of war, and as Marcosson stated, this is "precisely
the rhetorical process in which Lyndon Johnson (is) engaged."
Marcosson acknowledged a certain degree of choice among
claims. First, in the introduction, Marcosson states that John-
son's rhetoric "contributed greatly" to his problems with Vietnam.
Note that Marcosson does not use Johnson's rhetoric, and rhetoric
alone to explain Johnson's troubles. Second, Marcosson noted
54
that Johnson's failure was not only due to a poor justification
of the war, but in his misrepresentation of the conflict as well.
Marcosson's analysis acknowledged that Johnson's rhetoric was a
prime factor, but not the only factor in the situation.
To justify the first part of the claim, Marcosson explained
that over a two year period, Johnson used freedom as the ideal.
In 1966, Johnson had 49 references to freedom in a February speech.
Two years later, in reference to South Vietnam, Johnson said,
"Its people maintain their determination to be free of domination
by the North."
The crisis was aggression. Marcosson quoted F. M. Kail's
book. What Washington Said , as making that point. A communist
North Vietnam was the cause. Marcosson argued that Johnson set
this up by presenting in a January 1966 address an idyllic South
Vietnam attacked by a communist North Vietnam. In the same speech,
Johnson had 12 references to this aggression.
Up to this point, Marcosson pointed out that Johnson was
making a convincing plea. But, Johnson set the situation up
where war was not an acceptable option. Marcosson noted two
speeches where Johnson's position was that the main burden in
Vietnam was on South Vietnam. But, Marcosson asks, if we were
to have a limited role, "Why was the U.S. committing 500,000
young men, and billions of dollars a year, to the fight?" Mar-
cosson noted that the early criticism and protest of the war
was on such grounds. Marcosson cited such protests from Senator
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William Fulbright, Arthur Schlesinger, and new left activitist
Carl Ogles by.
Marcosson's argument not only fulfilled Brockriede's criteria,
but it moved in the direction of a significant argument as well.
First, Marcosson made the argument that to a degree the analysis
helps validate Ivie's theory. Second, it raised some questions
as to the differences between a war and a "limited war" from a
rhetorical sense. Since the argument presents some value beyond
the immediate analysis, Marcosson's CA is definitely placed on
the argument end of the continuum.
Using McGee's criteria the CA is well written. The intro-
duction was a catchy bit from a Vietnam protest song which is
not only interesting, but also reminds the audience of Johnson's
failure, which sets up this analysis. While the thesis is clear,
once more there is no preview. By linking Johnson's rhetoric with
the public dissent over the Vietnam war and by projecting the
possibility of learning more about presidential war rhetoric,
Marcosson legitimized and justified the topic and the analysis.
Right after this, the method is introduced.
The method is justified in the initial explanation of the
theory. Immediately after this, Marcosson went into the details
of the analytical tool. The analysis is backed up with specific
examples and outside sources. For example, Marcosson argued that
Johnson used freedom as a god term in his speeches on Vietnam.
To back this up, he noted that in one speech alone, Johnson made
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49 separate references to freedom. In another case, Marcosson uses
F. M. Kail's book. What Washington Said , to back up a claim. The
discussion of effectiveness was well reasoned. By showing how
America reacted specifically to the final stage of Johnson's justi-
fication of the war, Marcosson could back up his ultimate claim.
Moreover, by looking at two specific outside sources that support
his point, Marcosson's claim is well supported.
The conclusions drawn by Marcosson not only sumnarized the
speech, but they also lent some significance to the analysis. The
concluding thought that we are a public that is becoming sophisti-
cated enough to no longer senselessly condone a war is especially
good. It praises the audience and condemns war. These last thoughts
are likely to be seen positively by the critic.
The next CA to be analyzed is Steve Sudhoff's analysis of
Jirmiy Carter's defense of the "Billygate" scandal. Sudhoff cen-
tered on an August 4, 1980 press conference where Carter defended
his administration's handling of Bill Carter's dealings with
Libya. Sudhoff used B. L. Ware and Wil Linkugel's Theory of
Apologia as his analytical tool. Apologia is a genre approach,
analyzing how rhetors defend themselves.
Apologia centers on a defensive posture. Of the four possi-
ble postures, Sudhoff focused the analysis on the absolutive
posture. An absolute posture is one seeking acquittal, a not
guilty verdict. As for Carter, he was trying to explain that
he was not guilty of any involvement with his brother's dealings
with Libya. To do so. Carter would use two strategies, denial
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and differentiation. Denial is simply that you deny that you did
something. Differentiation is the separation of the charge from
the actual behavior. A rhetor would say that he/she did actually
do something, but that the act was not what it was represented to
be. Carter denied any wrongdoing and differentiated his adminis-
tration's behavior from the charge of incompetence.
Sudhoff's claim was that Carter was able to successfully main-
tain a hold on the Presidency due to his defense of the Billygate
issue. Sudhoff's point was to explain how Carter made a successful
defense. The rationale is the Apologia Theory. Since apologia
is designed to study apologetic address, and Carter was making
such an address, the use of apologia is warranted.
To a certain degree, on one level Sudhoff's CA presents no
choice. It is obvious that Carter is trying to defend himself.
The question of choice enters in when we ask how the defense was
done. Ware and Linkugel offer a possibility of four explanations.
To that extent, Sudhoff's CA offered a choice among four claims.
Sudhoff argued for his one claim.
To regulate the uncertainty, to prove the claim, Sudhoff
pulled pertinent examples from the press conference and outside
sources. Sudhoff gave four separate examples of where Carter
denied any wrongdoing. That this was successful, Sudhoff indi-
cated by noting that newspaper headlines reflected Carter's inno-
cence. Further proof of the denial success was offered by quoting
from the New York Times , Washington Post , opinion polls and the
fact that a senate investigation was dropped.
58
For the issue of differentiation, Sudhoff first explained that
Carter's administration was perceived as incompetent. So Carter
had to separate the administration's actions from the issue of
incompetence. Sudhoff noted that Carter first admitted to errors
in handling Billygate, but errors from hurrying to get all the
information public. Carter was claiming that a desire for honesty,
not incompetence, was the issue. Plus Sudhoff quoted Carter argu-
ing that history will find his administration competent. That
differentiation was successful was indicated by Sudhoff noting that
one expert claimed that Carter made the press look foolish. Indeed,
one reporter even got complaints about his attitude toward the
president. Further proof was given by opinion polls concerning
Carter's 1980 candidacy.
To a degree, Sudhoff supposedly offers a significant argument
by advancing the rhetorical theory. Sudhoff claimed that now
apologia could be found in extemporaneous events like a press
conference. However, nowhere do Ware and Likugel exclude extem-
poraneous address. So Sudhoff's extension of theory is actually
non-existent.
However, despite that problem, the speech still acts as an
argument. As such, it should be classified as a rhetorical criti-
cism and placed on the argument end of the continuum.
In terms of McGee's criteria, Sudhoff's CA began in a very
interesting and brilliant manner. It was interesting and atten-
tion getting in the use of humor. The example of the president's
brother relieving himself on the White House lawn is funny. The
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brilliance is displayed in how the speech creates a need. Sudhoff
portrayed a Jimmy Carter who is down to his last straw. The crisis
is at hand and Carter is going to have to save his career or face
a massive defeat. Sudhoff pictured a man whose back is to the wall.
It is only natural to wonder how he will react. And as Sudhoff
put It, "Carter put on the show of his life." The need to know
how this desperate underdog succeeded has been created. And in
creating the need, the topic is then given significance. The
thesis is clearly established when Sudhoff claimed that Carter
won because of his excellent self defense. Prior to this, Sudhoff
both introduced and justified the method. For once, a clear pre-
view was used.
In the body of the speech, Sudhoff gave the needed specifics
to understand apologia and applied the theory. Seven separate
sources and examples were used to establish that Carter had indeed
negated Billygate. Throughout the body, both the preview and the
development of the analysis kept the CA organized.
The concluding section of the CA was an example of a bit of
apparent brilliance and a bit of mediocracy. The brilliance came
with the claim that this analysis extended Ware and Linkugel's
theory. The assertion sounds brilliant on the surface and as
far as it goes lends some extra stature to the CA. Unfortunately,
the concluding paragraph is not as good. Essentially it says
that in the long run Carter still lost since he was not re-elected.
Not only is this irrelevant to the CA, it is a bland conclusion
when compared to the triumphant upset created in the introduction.
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The next CA to be analyzed is Cham Ferguson's examination of
Miller Beer television advertisements. Ferguson looked at how
Miller marketed its three main brands of beer. Miller Hi-Life,
Lowenbrau, and Miller Lite. Ferguson used the work of Edward
Steele and W. Charles Redding concerning the American Value System.
In conjunction, Ferguson also used Walter R. Fisher's "A Motive
View of Communication." Steele and Redding identified specific
values that can serve as persuasive appeals to Americans. Fisher
examined how an image may be manipulated in various persuasive ways.
For this analysis, Ferguson identified three different values.
First, the Puritan morality value, which is an extension of the
Puritan work ethic. Hard work is rewarded with economic success
or impulse gratification. Second, the material comfort value,
which is the idea that Americans like material comforts. Third,
the macho male value, which is the idea that Americans like mascu-
line, "macho" males.
Fisher's approach takes the stance that rhetors either affirm,
reaffirm, subvert or purify an image. To affirm an image is to
give birth to an image. To reaffirm is to revitalize an image.
To attack an image is to subvert an image. Finally, purification
is the correlation of an image. The ethos of the image is effected
depending on the manipulation.
In the CA, Ferguson argued that the Miller Hi-Life ad used
the Puritan morality value, and that the value was affirmed. For
the Lowenbrau ad, the material value was reaffirmed. For the Lite
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beer ad, light beer's "Diet Beer" image was purified by the use of
the macho male value.
Ferguson's central claim is that Miller's ads helped make
Miller the second biggest brewery in the U.S. The CA then attempted
to explain how the ads worked. The rationale for the claim were
Steele and Redding's and Fisher's theories. However, Ferguson
offered no reason for the analytical tools. Why these particular
methods were used was never stated. Obviously, this is a major
problem with the CA.
The presentation of choice is evident in the CA. First,
Ferguson acknowledged that the ads alone are not the only factor
in Miller's success. Ferguson was intent on garnering "insight"
into the issue, not a complete explanation of the success. Second,
Steele and Redding's theory presents a wide range of choice. There
are many values that underlie our culture, and so there are many
choices for the criticism. The same holds true for Fisher's theory.
A critic has four options within the theory. To this extent, a
degree of choice is present within the CA.
To regulate the uncertainty, Ferguson demonstrated the presence
of a particular value in each commercial. For the Miller Hi -Life
commercial, Ferguson explained that by showing people rushing off
from work to embrace a Miller Hi -Life, the Puritan morality value
is evident. As Ferguson put it, "We are told that we have worked
hard and it is time to have fun .... our reward has to be a
Miller." Ferguson then argued that since the commercial was trying
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to get the audience to adopt a new image for Miller Hi-Life, affirma-
tion was present.
With the second cotimercial , Ferguson claimed that Lowenbrau
was employing the material comfort value. Since the people in
the commercial were obviously wealthy, Ferguson argued that Lowen-
brau was being shown as a "money" beer. That Lowenbrau is offered
to all is claimed to be an example of reaffirmation. Ferguson made
the point that since we cannot all be rich, we can drink Lowenbrau.
Therefore, the beer's image was reaffirmed. The image was tied to
a wealth value.
The final analysis looked at a typical Lite Beer from Miller
commercial. Ferguson first noted that light beers had never sold
well as "diet" beers. Thus, the beer ads emphasized masculine,
male athletes to overcome this effeminate image. Ferguson argued
that the value present was a macho male value. While Steele and
Redding never defined or indicated such a value, Ferguson pointed
out that they never claimed that theirs was an exhaustive value
list. Since the point of such macho commercials was to make a
diet beer acceptable to males, Ferguson called the value manipula-
tion an act of purification.
Ferguson then substantiated the point that the commercials
were rhetorically powerful. First, Ferguson quotes Business Week
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noting Miller's increase in market share. Second, Ferguson pointed
out that this success was due to the commercials. Finally, Ferguson
explained that the number one beer producer, Anheuser-Busch, "decided
to fight fire with fire" and increase their ad budget in response.
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While the impact of the commercials can be granted, the implied
point to this CA cannot. There is no proof that the value manipu-
lation contributed to the commercials' success. Since the CA is
only descriptive, and has no perceived rationale due to the failure
to justify the method, it does not operate as an argument. This
CA should be placed on the non-argument end of the continuum.
An astute observer may question why such a poor argument could
be fourth in the nation. Probably the best explanation is that
Ferguson's CA is a very well written speech. Where substance fal-
tered, style excelled.
McGee advises CAs to have an attention getting introduction.
Ferguson's language choice in the introduction does this. For
example, the image of sex leaps out when Ferguson says, "Everyone
likes to be seduced." Now as it develops, he is not talking about
sexual seduction, but that immediate shock value does grab atten-
tion. Humor and word play are the vehicles for the rest of the
speech. For example, the transitions were funny as they drew on the
speech's beer topic for their theme, "Our first order from our rhe-
torical barmaid will be a draw of Miller Hi-Life commercial."
The CA also followed the basics of McGee's criteria. It had
a clear preview and organization. The speech clearly explained the
method, conducted a superficially sound analysis and nicely argued
discussion of effectiveness. All of this coupled with the creative
language use kept the speech fun. Since the topic, beer commer-
cials, is not quite as grave as war rhetoric or apartheid, Ferguson
could get away with this light approach. Probably the best example
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of this was in the conclusion. Sumrarizing the commercials and
paradying Miller Hi-Life's theme, Ferguson ended with, "So if you
are into rowdy good times at the local bar, relaxing with friends,
bowling with the buddies or just browsing through Aristotle, remember,
if you've got the time. Miller's got the rhetoric." If nothing
else, Ferguson's CA was a very well written speech.
The next CA to be analyzed is Todd Rasmuson's exploration of
the mythic aspects of Paul "Bear" Bryant's life. Rasmuson claimed
that Bryant, as a very successful football coach at the University
of Alabama, served as a secular Christ figure for Alabama. Rasmuson's
analytical tools were the works of Kenneth Burke and Ernest Bormann.
Burke is concerned with how our society adopts secular Christ
figures. To serve as such a figure, Burke suggests that three cri-
teria be fulfilled. First, there must be mutual beliefs between
the rhetor and the audience. Second, the rhetor should exhibit
strong leadership. Third, there must be an element of sacrifice
from the rhetor.
Bormann, as explained with Goodlick's CA, is concerned with how
fantasy themes are spread among groups. For this analysis, Rasmuson
was primarily concerned with the actual audiences of change.
Rasmuson claimed that Bryant evoked mutual beliefs with the
people of Alabama by winning and being a Christian. Strong leader-
ship was evinced by the fear and respect that coaches and players
held for Bryant. Bryant's sacrifice was resigning as coach in
1982. The myth was spread by three audiences, the fans, the media,
and Bryant's players.
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Rasmuson's claim for the first half of the analysis is that
Bryant served as a secular Christ figure for Alabama. The rationale
for this claim is Burke's theory of what constitutes such a mythic
figure. The method is justified by noting that it is Burke who
"discusses the structure of a rhetorical myth." This is further
reinforced when Rasmuson pointed out that it was Burke who intro-
duced the rhetorical concept of a secular Christ.
Very little choice is offered within the CA. At no point
did Rasmuson indicate any possibility that Bryant could have served
any other role or myth for Alabama. Considering some of the pro-
blems within Rasmuson's argument, a choice of competing claims
should have been offered.
In executing the argument, Rasmuson begins with the question of
mutual beliefs. The mutual beliefs centered on Christianity.
Rasmuson noted the constant allusions to Bryant as a Christ figure
with jokes like "an Athiest in Alabama is someone who didn't
believe in Bear Bryant." The Christianity link was reinforced
when Rasmuson demonstrated how Bryant had a strong Christian back-
ground and how Bryant considered himself a preacher of sorts through
football
.
For strong leadership, Rasmuson relied heavily on anecdotes
about Bryant's coaching style. First, Rasmuson noted two tales
where it became clear that Bryant's players feared him and his
coaches fanatically obeyed him. Further proof of Bryant's leader-
ship was established by discussing how Bryant used his coaching
tower. Several sources attested to how the tower let Bryant give
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the impression of seeing everything going on at practices. The point
is that Bryant appeared as an omnipresent God-like figure as a coach.
Rasmuson argued that retirement was Bryant's sacrifice. But,
if that is so, how did Bryant operate as a secular Christ prior to
1982? This error within the argument seriously hurts the point of
the CA. So while an attempt was made to regulate the uncertainty
towards the claim, the flaw in the proof prevents the claim from
being upheld.
At this point, the CA moved to the second half of the argument.
The central claim was that Bryant's myth was chained out by Alabama
fans, players, and the news media. Bormann's fantasy theme analysis
was selected to serve as the rationale for the claim. Rasmuson's
argument was that since Bormann discusses how myths are propagated,
and the analysis was on such a phenomena, the method was appropriate
for the CA.
Little choice was offered among competing claims. The CA made
the assumption that Bryant's myth was spread, and that the fans,
players, and media did all the spreading. To no degree were any
of these points qualified. Considering the problems with the proof
for the second half, such a tone of finality in the CA was not
warranted.
First, Rasmuson claimed that Bryant propagated the myth through
his players. The argument ran that since Alabama teams won, the
myth was spread. However, to prove this point, Rasmuson recounts
a story where Bryant remembered an old player and his girlfriend.
This has nothing to do with winning. The story does not support
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the claim. Second, the fans supposedly spread the myth. The argu-
ment was that Bryant's winning converted fans across the nation
into believers. But that is it, no further substantiation was
offered. Again, the claim is poorly supported. Third, Bryant's
nyth was spread by the media. This argument had support. Rasmuson
noted that three-quarters of the audience at Bryant's retirement
speech were reporters. It was also noted that there was coverage
by TV, radio, magazines, and newspapers. To this extent, this
particular claim was substantiated.
That Bryant was a Christ figure was claimed by Rasmuson based
on how Bryant's successor, Dan Perkins, reacted. Since Perkins
did not use Bryant's tower to coach, Rasmuson reasoned that Perkins
did not want to try and replace "God." However, all that proved
was that Perkins did not want to copy Bryant. That Bryant was a
Christ figure cannot be established on the basis of this reasoning.
Because of the problems within this CA, it does not work well
as an argument. The failure of the sacrifice argument and the
weak arguments for how the myth was spread undermine the analysis.
The lack of competing claims being acknowledged implies an a prior
judgment. On the whole, the CA is on the non-argument end of the
continuum.
By McGee's standards, Rasmuson's CA had a strong introduction.
The humor of all the Bear Bryant jokes was an effective device.
Since the humor revolved around Bryant's image, the point of the
jokes was also an effective foreshadowing of the speech. The
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thesis was clearly that Bryant's life had reached mythical levels.
Once more, no preview was used. The rhetorical artifact, Bryant's
life, was given significance by Bryant's powerful image. In turn,
this created an unvoiced question as to how a football coach
could have so much power. A need for the audience to care about
the topic was therefore created. Following this, Rasmuson intro-
duced the methods.
In the body, Rasmuson followed McGee's form twice. First,
the use of Burke was justified, explained, applied and evaluated.
Then the same thing was done using Bormann. Considering what Ras-
muson was trying to do in the CA, this made sense. The Burke section
had to be completed before the Bormann part of the analysis could
take place.
Rasmuson saved the broader question of the overall impact of
Bryant as a myth for the conclusion. Rasmuson indicated that the
Bryant tradition still lives. Specifically, he pointed to the new
Alabama coach, a Bryant disciple. Rasmuson noted that the new
coach, Dan Perkins, was chaining out Bryant's myth, but was also
deferring to it by avoiding a close personal identification with
Bryant. In effect, Perkins is saying that Bryant is still with us.
But no more would a mere mortal assume Jesus' mantle than Perkins
would try to imitate Bryant.
By doing this in the conclusion, Rasmuson effectively repeated
the point that he was trying to make that Bryant is indeed a Christ
figure for Alabama. The humor that marked the introduction was
also used in the conclusion. Referring to Alabama's faithful
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carrying on in Bryant's wake, Rasmuson said ".
. . they will no
doubt remember that believing and winning are the 'Bear' necessities.
The last CA to be examined is Steve Sudhoff's analysis of
President John F. Kennedy's June 10, 1963 speech, "A Strategy of
Peace." The analysis centered on how Kennedy's speech helped ini-
tiate a Strategic Arms Treaty later that year. Sudhoff used Robert
Oliver's theory of diplomatic rhetoric as his analytical tool.
Oliver's approach discussed the elements of effective diplomatic
address.
Oliver contends that a successful diplomatic speech usually dis-
plays four characteristics. First, the speech will appeal to a tri-
level audience. The speech will talk to the diplomat's domestic
audience, the "enemy," and neutral governments. Second, the speech
should be ambiguous enough to provide a loop-hole to retreat through
if needed. Third, the diplomat should be able to rationalize any
deviations from prior policy. Fourth, the speech should be depersonal-
ized. The diplomat needs to indicate that it is not he/she that is
speaking, but is his/her government.
Kennedy's speech was a graduation address at American University.
Kennedy addressed the first level audience, the U.S. Congress, by
insuring that the U.S. would not give up to the Soviets. To the Soviets,
Kennedy promised a change at peace. For the neutral audience, Kennedy
insured that the U.S. would stand by its commitments to its allies.
For the ambiguity, Kennedy stressed "Peace." And who is not for peace?
But Kennedy never specifically detailed what this peace would entail.
Kennedy's rationalization for the apparent break in policy was that
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the situation had changed. Kennedy contended that since nuclear was
has no survivors, peace and arms talks were needed. Finally, Kennedy
did not use depersonalized speech. Instead, Kennedy relied on using
personalized speech.
Sudhoff s central claim was that Kennedy's speech was instrumental
in initiating the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty in August of 1963.
The point of analysis is to explain Kennedy's success. The rationale
for the claim was Oliver's theory of diplomat address. Sudhoff opted
for Oliver's theory for two reasons. First, the method allowed for an
analysis of the "specific attributes" of diplomatic speech "which give
it its effectiveness." Second, the method is practical in that it helps
us understand how nations talk to each other in an era of a "shrinking
globe."
The question of choice came into the analysis when Sudhoff applied
the method. First, Sudhoff pointed out that Kennedy's diplomatic
speech "violates" the accepted theory. Sudhoff allowed that not all
speeches will be true to a given formula. Second, Sudhoff also noted
that Kennedy's address was successful despite the violation. We are not
bound by the theory within the analysis.
In regulating the uncertainty, Sudhoff relied heavily on examples
in the speech. First, Sudhoff argued that Kennedy's domestic audience
was Congress. Sudhoff noted that the general public was not the audi-
ence because it was not an election year. Instead, due to the Cuban
Missile Crisis, Congress was understandably cognizant of Kennedy's
speech. Sudhoff backed this up with a quote from then Senate Minority
Leader Dirksen. Kennedy supposedly placated this audience by promising
not to "release our guard."
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The neutral audience was our Western Allies. Sudhoff described
how Kennedy specifically mentioned Western Europe and West Berlin.
Kennedy assured those countries and our allies that, "The United States
will make us deal with the Soviet Union at the expense of other nations.
Obviously, the enemy audience was the Soviet Union. Kennedy was des-
cribed as being conciliatory in tone because he stressed that the U.S.
and the Soviets have common interests and we all "inhabit this small
planet."
For ambiguity, Sudhoff looked at how Kennedy discussed peace.
Kennedy called for a "genuine peace." As Sudhoff noted, "No one, of
course, would want to disagree with his hopes, but Kennedy's ambiguity
about the specifics of his proposal enabled him to preempt potential
criticism from
. . . Congress." Sudhoff's point was that Kennedy could
not be faulted for his appeals for "genuine peace."
Sudhoff noted that Kennedy rationalized the change in policy by
claiming that the situation called for a change. Kennedy was quoted
first noting the threat of nuclear war, and second using that threat
as a rationale for a treaty. And, as Sudhoff pointed out, Kennedy
needed to rationalize since he campaigned for closing the "missile gap."
Up to this point, Sudhoff noted how Kennedy's speech followed
Oliver's criteria for successful diplomatic address. But, Kennedy did
not use depersonalized speech. Instead, Sudhoff counted seventeen
times when Kennedy referred to himself, while only making references
to the U.S. four times. Sudhoff maintained that Kennedy established
a personal tie within the speech.
Sudhoff argued that the speech was successful based on the com-
ments of several observers. A Kennedy speech writer called it "JFK's
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greatest speech." The New Republic called it a success. Pravda printed
the text in full, a rare occurrence during the Cold War. Soviet leader
Nikita Kruschev reacted positively to the speech. And a Kennedy
advisor credited the speech with the successful signing of the Limited
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. In all, Sudhoff cited five separate sources
attesting to Kennedy's success.
Based on the success, and the apparent violation of Oliver's
theory, Sudhoff suggested that possibly the "top national diplomat"
can use a more personalized speech and be successful. This in turn
suggested an "affirmation and an extension of Oliver's method." Based
on this, and the fulfillment of Brockriede's criteria, I would classify
Sudhoff's CA as a significant argument and call it a rhetorical criticism.
Sudhoff followed HcGee's criteria for the most part. The intro-
duction used humor and the implied end of the world as an attention
getter. By noting the U.S. and USSR's failure to reach an arms control
agreement, Sudhoff indicated the significance of understanding a suc-
cessful attempt at arms control like Kennedy's speech. The introduction
said we cannot achieve peace the way that the world powers are going
about it presently, but Kennedy managed to do it in 1963. How did he
do it, and can we do it today? The CA gained relevance this way. The
thesis was clear, and the CA had a preview. As would be expected, the
method was presented in the introduction. But Sudhoff also justified
the method in the introduction. Since the justification of the method
was also part of the justification for doing the CA, this worked.
Within the body of the CA, the method was explained and clearly
applied. The discussion of the effectiveness of Kennedy's speech was
•>jMa
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well documented. The conclusion then was divided into two parts.
First, the implications were examined. Since this involved a quick
discussion of the salient points of the analysis, this summarized the
CA well. Second, the actual ending thought and the significance of
the analysis were intertwined. In his final statement, Sudhoff looks
to a hopeful future "where ... the president can become an instrument
of hope for all men everywhere." Since Sudhoff 's intent in doing this
CA is to point out what a wise president can do about the arms race,
the conclusion is fitting.
Based on the analysis of the speeches, specific points about the
topic, analytic method, the CA as argument and McGee's (1983) standards
can be demonstrated. First, concerning the topics, it becomes apparent
that successful CAs have a traditional topic of a single act nature.
By traditional, I mean a topic that is a speech, or an obviously per-
suasive act of discourse. Only Marcosson's CA on South Africa and
Rasmuson's on Bear Bryant are non-traditional topics. All of the ten
CAs focus on an obviously discoursive event.
The topics of the successful CAs also focus on a single act as
a rule. Six of the CAs (Goodlick's, Murphy's, Heaton's, Rasmuson's
and both of Sudhoff's) looked at one specific speech. Marcosson's
CAs on South Africa and Lyndon Johnson narrowed the topics by looking
at only one theme across the topics. Marcosson's analysis of Gleen
and Jordan looked at only one particular aspect of two speeches. And
Ferguson examined three commercials that in total lasted only three
minutes. One way or another, all of the topics were selected so that
the analysis focused on only one act or theme.
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Second, the analytic methods used in successful CAs are appro-
priate and justified, concise and unique. Obviously a nethodology
should be appropriate and justified. All ten of the CAs used appro-
priate methods. The analysis and/or the conclusions drawn justify
the selection of the methodologies. As for justifying the method
selected, eight of the CAs offered believable arguments. One CA that
did not, Marcosson's analysis of Glenn and Jordan, at least asserted
the appropriateness of the method. Only Ferguson's CA offered no
rationale for the methods used.
The methodologies used in successful CAs also appear to be con-
cise. All ten CAs have methodologies that are concise. As explained
earlier, by concise I mean a method that is easily and quickly explained.
Each method requires a short general explanation and then a simple
description of no more than four or five stages, strategies or concepts.
The methods were unique as well. This supports Logue's (1981)
argument that unique methods seem to be a factor in winning. As I
defined a unique method, only Rasmuson's CA fails to fulfill this
criteria. His analysis centered on the S-M-E (Speaker, Message and
Environment) variables. All the other CAs looked at only one of the
SMEC variables.
Third, based on this analysis, a CA can operate as an argument
and can be considered a rhetorical criticism. Six of the CAs were
clearly arguments. Of the remaining four, Marcosson's Glenn-Jordan
CA and Ferguson's CA only lacked a justification of the method to fit
the criteria for an argument. I say "only" because it would have been
relatively simple for either CA to add a method justification. One or
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two sentences in either speech, and they would have moved to the argu-
ment end of the continuum. Only Goodlick's and Rasmuson's CAs fail
to come close to the argument end of the continuum. Both CAs made
claims that the available evidence could net support.
One interesting point about the CAs operating as an argument is
the significant argument issue. Murphy (1983) considered it unwise
for a CA to try and advance the rhetorical field of thought. Still,
three of the data CAs tried to do just that. Sudhoff's Carter CA
failed to do so. Sudhoff tried to claim that he had made a breakthrough
by noting taht apologetic address could occur in an extemporaneous
setting. However, Ware and Linkugel never claimed that all apologetic
address had to be planned discourse.
But with the other two CAs, it becomes evident that a CA can
make a significant argument. Marcosson's Johnson analysis and Sudhoff's
Kennedy analysis both deal with speeches that contain a deviance from
what would be expected. Johnson should have been a success according
to Ivie's theory, but was not. According to the theory of diplomatic
address, Kennedy should have failed, but did not. Based on these
inconsistencies, Marcosson and Sudhoff do not declare new theories,
but only raise questions that could be dealt with at some later time
by rhetoricians. Marcosson did not say that there was a new sub-genre
of limited war rhetoric. Instead, he asks if such a sub-genre could
exist. Sudhoff does not say that presidential diplomatic address
differs from all other diplomatic address. Instead, he asks if a
possible difference could exist. Murphy (1983) is right to say that
it is absurd to attempt a legitimate contribution to rhetorical theory
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in ten minutes. But it is not absurd to ask an insightful question
that could spur a contribution. To a limited extent, a CA can make
a significant argument.
Fourth, based on the analysis, McGee's (1983) standards seem to
be evident in successful CAs. The only major deviance between the
criteria and the speeches was a lack of previews. Only three of the
CAs, Sudhoff's two and Ferguson's, had previews. However, before this
casts aspersion on the other CAs, it should be noted that five of the
other speeches used a labeling system which roughly serves the same
purpose as a preview. A contestant would use the major parts of the
analytic method as a labeling system to signpost throughout the speech.
Heaton's CA is the best example of this. He emphasized the method's
terms of STRATEGY, SIMPLIFICATION and AMBIGUITY in the speech such as
to keep matters organized and recognizable. The other speeches doing
this were both of Marcosson's and Murphy's.
Based on this labeling effort, it would seem that even this diver-
gence from McGee's criteria was relatively minor. So on the whole,
the data CAs demonstrate sound speech construction. Moreover, this
also lends credence to McGee's criteria for writing and organizing a
good CA. The only error, a lack of previews, should be an easy one
to avoid.
At this stage, I would like to tie together what we know from
the situational analysis and textual analysis, and argue for a set
of specific guidelines to consider when writing a CA. To set this
up, I would like to first quickly reviwe what we know of CA's rhetori-
cal situation. Judges, as a rule, are inexperienced in terms of
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rhetorical theory, potentially easily bored with a CA, and likely
biased in regards to analytical methods or speech topics. Because
of the time limit and the judge, analytical methods should be unique
and concise. While related to rhetorical criticism in form and pur-
pose, a CA differs from rhetorical criticism because it is a speech,
cannot be as complete in its analysis, and is delivered to an
audience different than rhetorical criticism's. Finally, a CA is
expected to adhere to certain criteria as outlined by McGee (1983).
From this information and the textual analysis, specific guide-
lines for a CA's topic, methodology, analysis and structure can be
explained. With each of the areas, I will explain what a CA should
try to accomplish and possible ways to do so. The data CAs not only
offer general principles, but alternative ways to achieve these
principles.
One of the first obvious steps in writing any speech is selecting
a topic. The two points that become clear from the analysis is that
the topic should be traditionally considered rhetorical and should be
a concise or single act. First a competitor should opt for a topic
that is obviously rhetorical. Since a judge may have a bias as to
what is or is not rhetorical, it makes sense to pick a traditional
topic. While a contestant could try to satisfy a non-traditional
topic as being rhetorical, there are two reasons to avoid doing so.
First, it is not very likely that one single undergraduate is going
to change the philosophy of what is rhetorical for an instructor or
professor in ten minutes. Second, any time spent justifying the
rhetoricity of a topic is depriving the speaker of analysis time.
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So, it is likely to be a waste of time and an unsuccessful effort if
a CA focuses on a non-traditional topic.
Now actually defining just what is obviously rhetorical can be
problematic. However, based on the data CAs, it seems clear that
speeches are considered rhetorical. Seven of the CAs analyze speeches.
Of the remaining three CAs, only one is clearly not a traditional CA
in regards to the topic. This CA is Rasmuson's on Bear Bryant as a
secular christ figure. The last two CAs, Ferguson's on beer conrier-
cials and Marcosson's on South Africa are not as clearly traditional
topics. However, Ferguson's CA is clearly dealing with oral persuasion
since it deals with advertisements. And while Marcosson's topic is
a bit different, he does focus on the communication used to maintain
apartheid. In that sense, the topic is rhetorical.
After selecting a traditional topic, an effort should be made
to limit the topic as well. A concise or single act topic should be
selected. A concise topic can be more thoroughly analyzed in ten
minutes than a complex topic. If shallow analysis is a constant com-
plaint about CA, why make the problem worse by picking a topic that
too little time exists to legitimately analyze. Plus, by narrowing
the focus, the analysis is easier to do. Fewer factors need to be
considered. Then the inexperienced judge can follow the analysis more
easily. There will also be less room for error with a single act.
The experienced judge will be less likely to find something signifi-
cant to criticize in the analysis. The simpler the focus, the harder
it is to make mistakes, and the easier it is to follow. Then the CA
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will have a wider audience appeal. It will be easier for all judges
to approve of the CA.
The CAs analyzed offer four ways to narrow the topic down. The
first, and most obvious way, is to select a single act. Analyze only
one speech.
Second, the topic can be limited by looking at a specific strategy
or theme across speeches from one rhetor. To narrow a topic this way,
the speaker would either look for the most prevalent categories of
the analytic method that apply to the topic or look for a consistent
theme of the speaker. Either way, the analysis is not concerned with
any one communication act, but is concerned with a pattern of communi-
cation. For example, Marcosson's analysis of South Africa limited an
entire government's policy within three categories of communication
behaviors. If you explain to the judge what you are doing and justify
why you are limiting your analysis to a specific set of categories,
the topic can be legitimately held in check.
In terms of using a particular theme to limit the topic, Mar-
cosson's analysis of Johnson's war rhetoric is a good example. While
the CA looked at several speeches delivered by Johnson, it limited the
analysis to specific themes. While Johnson gave several speeches
while in office, Marcosson looked only at those that had to do with
the conflict in Viet Nam. Even more specifically, the CA looked at
the speeches where Johnson was trying to justify the war. By analyzing
a specific theme, a competitor can look at significant acts over time
and still realistically analyze the acts in ten minutes.
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Third, a contestant can look at a larger rhetorical act and still
keep it simple by looking at a representative example. Murphy's CA on
Reagan's nomination acceptance is a fine example of this. Murphy
manages to look at the whole Reagan presidential campaign of 1980 by
arguing that Reagan's nomination acceptance address is a representa-
tive example of the campaign.
The representative example technique has a solid theoretical
foundation. Smith and Windes (1978) argue that some rhetorical acts
can operate as a text for a larger rhetorical act. Their point is
that some acts are legitimate representative examples, called ideomemes
(116). When a contestant wishes to analyze a rhetorical movement,
instead of looking at the whole movement, the contestant can turn to
the appropriate ideomeme. The important thing to remember is that
the student will have to demonstrate that the topic is actually a
representative example of the larger act. Murphy did so by citing
evidence that supported his ideomeme.
Fourth, a contestant may pick multiple topics just as long as
they can still be dealt with within the time limit. For example,
Ferguson's analysis looked at three commercials, but since the commer-
cials were only three minutes in length, the topic was still concise.
The point to be learned from Ferguson's topic choice is that even
though the topic must be limited, a certain degree of flexibility
still exists. The overall concern is analyzing the topic well within
the time limit. Just as a competitive persuasion would limit the
scope of the topic within the confines of the timie limit, so should
a CA.
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The data CAs demonstrate how any one or a combination of the ways
to limit a topic can work. Aside from those already used as examples,
Goodlick's analyzed a single act, Marcosson's analysis of Glenn and
Jordan used their analytical method to limit the topic to delivery
style, Heaton looked at a single act, Sudhoff's Carter analysis looked
at a single act, Rasmuson used a single act (a speech Bear Bryant gave)
as an ideomeme as well as only looking at a particular theme of a
secular Christ to limit the topic, and Sudhoff's analysis of Kennedy's
speech focused on the single act.
Once the topic has been selected, the next consideration is the
analytic method for the CA. Three factors should influence the method
selection besides the fact that the method should be appropriate for
the topic. The method should not be terribly involved, should be
unique and should be traditionally based.
Again the time limit affects the selection of the method. The
methodology should be relatively simple since it will have to be ex-
plained and applied within the time limit. Select a concise method.
The data CAs provide three possible options for a competitor to take
when selecting a method. First, use a method that is designed for a
specific type of cotmuni cation. Because the method narrows its focus,
it is more likely to be concise. Four of the CAs used this approach.
Marcosson's South Africa and Johnson CAs use methods designed to look
specifically at the rhetoric of power maintenance and the rhetoric of
justifying war. Sudhoff looked at the rhetoric of apologia and diplo-
matic rhetoric. Since the methods were designed for a specific kind
of communication, they imnediately focus on the unique qualities of
82
their subject matter. Because the methods are specific, they are
inherently concise.
The second option is to pick a method that is not complex in its
nature. Some theories are not as involved as others. If a method
that is not complex is appropriate, then this simplicity is not a
problem. For example, the fatehr of rhetoric, Aristotle, gave us one
of the less involved methods, ethos, logos and pathos. Three of the
CAs used this option. Marcosson's CA on Glenn and Jordan uses a
simple method that just asks the critic to look at the personality
and attitude of both speaker and audience, as well as the elements
of speech. Murphy's CA uses the quest theory which consists of look-
ing for the five elements of a quest story. Ferguson's CA used a
combination of looking at the value expressed in a particular beer
commercial and then seeing how the advertisers modified the value.
While Ferguson had a long list of values to choose from, there were
only three conmercials and so only three values. As for the modifi-
cation of the values, there were only four possible options. All
three CAs used methods that the average undergraduate could easily
understand. But since the methods were appropriate for the analysis,
the methods worked.
Third, select a broad theory, but edit the method in such a way
to make it concise. Three of the CAs did this. Heaton's CA using
Edelman's strategies of ambiguity, simplification and strategy is the
best example of this. Edelman's works all focus on how political
elites maintain the status quo through creating specific realities.
As such, it is a detailed and complex theory. But for the purpose
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of his specific analysis, Heaton draws upon three specific strategies.
Goodlick's CA on how Phylis Schlafly beat back the ERA does the same
with Bomiann's fantasy theme analysis. Rasmuson's CA did this twice
by simplifying both Burke and Bormann.
Since a concise method is likely to be easier to understand as
well, this win make the CA more palatable for the inexperienced
judge. If the judge can undersatnd what is happening in the CA, he
or she is more likely to rank the CA higher. Plus, a concise and
simple method will combat the boring label that CA has. The point
of a CA is to analyze. The method is a tool to help do thise. By
keeping the method concise and simple, the focus can be on the analysis,
not on the methodology. Since most judges' area of interest is not
rhetoric, a competitor is not going to keep an audience in a CA round
interested by focusing on the method.
Besides being concise, the method should also be unique. The
time limit dictates that only so much can be done with the analysis.
Instead of analyzing everything about the topic, pick a particular
SMEC variable and focus upon that.
As well as being concise and unique, the method should also be
traditional in the sense that it is derived from one of the recog-
nized schools of theory. This insures acceptance by the judge of
the method as a legitimate analytical tool. Hopefully, this will
negate any method bias on the judge's part.
Once the topic and the methodology have been selected, the next
concern is conducting the actual analysis. The major finding in terms
of whether a CA can operate as an argument and therefore as a rhetorical
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criticism, is that a CA can. So, the overall guideline for the analy-
sis is to have the criticism operate as an argument as defined by
Brockriede (1974). The obvious point that is sometimes lost in even
the best CAs is that the method selection should be justified. As a
rule, I would advise competitors and coaches to heed the advice of
McGee (1983) and read Brockriede's article on rhetorical criticism
as argument. Since the implied standard for the event is that it
operate much like rhetorical criticism, it would be wise for a com-
petitor to know what makes a rhetorical criticism function as an
argument.
The one other guideline to follow in terms of the analysis has
to do with the furthering-the-field problem that Murphy (1983) sees
as being problematic in CA. Murphy is correct in describing an
attempt to create new rhetorical theory in a CA as absurd. However,
the data CAs do demonstrate how a contribution can be made. Instead
of creating a new theory, the contestant should limit the advance to
just asking a pertinent question concerning the theory. As evinced
in Marcosson's Johnson analysis and Sudhoff's Kennedy analysis, a
strategically asked question can move the CA to the significant
argument end of the continuum.
Once the actual analysis is completed, the concern of the com-
petitor is to turn the criticism into a competitive speech. McGee's
criteria demonstrate an acceptable way to do this. The biggest point
to be made here is to stress the need for previewing and signposting
throughout the speech. This seemed to be the one area where as speeches,
the data CAs were collectively lax. Remember that the CA is a speech
and has to face certain audience expectations.
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If any two themes run throughout the guidelines, they should be
that audience analysis and a recognition of the time limits are para-
mount. Remember and take into consideration that the judge in CA will
likely be inexperienced when it comes to rhetorical criticism. This
does not mean that CA should take on a condescending air. However, it
does mean that your main audience is not interested in how rhetorical
criticism is conducted in the Quarterly Journal of Speech . To deny
that is to court disinterest and criticisms from the judge. And not
surprisingly, that is the general atmosphere for CA today. Few are
interested in it and the event is widely criticized. So when you
select your topic and method, conduct your analysis and write your
speech, remember that the same audience analysis that you would do in
any other speech event or speaking situation applies just as much to CA.
Also remember and take into consideration that the time limit is
only ten minutes long. The time factor is probably the biggest burden
a competitor in CA has to carry. Given more time, the topics could
be expanded, more intricate methods could be used and more detailed
analysis could be conducted. Plus, if the competitor were faced with
an inexperienced judge, explanations could be offered to make the whole
analysis understandable. But the simple truth is that there are only
ten minutes to conduct the analysis. This affects topic selection,
method selection and even the degree of specificity in the analysis.
The time limit and the judge's inexperience are perhaps the two most
important rhetorical constraints that a competitor in CA will face.
While these guidelines will not insure success, they will deter
the common criticisms that face CA. There are three basic criticisms
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of CA today. First, there are complaints of shallow analysis (Logue,
1981; Larson and O'Rourke, 1983; McGee, 1983; Murphy, 1983). Second,
McGee (1983) points out the inexperience of most coaches and students
with CA. This is reflected in Larson and O'Rourke's (1983) work which
demonstrates that there is no one clear goal for CA. And third. Murphy
(1983) points out the overdependence on method in present CAs and the
resultant absurd efforts to advance rhetorical theory with a CA. If a
competitor or coach used the suggested guidelines correctly, these com-
plaints could be avoided.
First, the complaint of shallow analysis can be met by selecting
topics that can be realistically dealt with in the time limit. The
same goes for the analytical method. And if the student keeps in mind
that the analysis has to operate as an argument, the points of the
analysis will have to be demonstrated.
Second, while these guidelines will not automatically grant rhe-
torical knowledge to those interested in CA, they will provide some
direction for the inexperienced competitor. By selecting topics that
are rhetorical and methods that are acceptable and understood by most
judges, biases and inexperience can be avoided. And by conducting the
analysis as an argument, the CA will have an obvious direction and
goal that will be recognizable to the judge.
Finally, by limiting the topic and method to facilitate a better
analysis, the emphasis will be taken off the method. Plus, when the
audience analysis factor is taken into consideration, there will be
less incentive to focus on the method. And not to over-state its
value, but when the student views the analysis as an argument, the
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tendency to just pigeonhole the analysis into neat little categorical
cubbyholes will also deter the emphasis on method. Plus, the acknow-
ledgment of the time limit and the impossibility of advancing the
field will be restraining students to ask intelligent questions
instead of making absurd claims about new rhetorical theories.
On the whole, I believe that these guidelines will make for
better CAs. They will make the competitor recognize the important
factors that influence the creation and subsequent degree of success
for a CA. And since they are based on what is right with CA, the
guidelines tell the student what to do when writing the speech,
instead of the current trend that just emphasizes what not to do.
Invariably, when I have talked to the people who criticize CA,
I find that they do it out of a fondness for the event. They criti-
cize CA because they want to make it a better and more widely attended
event. However, when we only criticize in the negative sense of the
word, we are being unfair to CA. I too think the event is worthwhile
and in trouble. Yet, I choose to look at the CAs that are healthy
representatives of the event. If we can take a more optimistic per-
spective and emphasize what is right with CA, I think that we can make
them even better and we can have more contestants. But to do so, we
have to be able to tell those students what they will have to do to
write a good CA. I hope these guidelines can do just that.
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Appendix A
Synopsis of the Communication Analyses
What follows is a breakdown of each CA so that the entire speech
does not have to be read to understand my analysis. The actual
introduction of each CA is quoted and then the analysis, method and
effects of the CA are summarized. Following that, the conclusion
is quoted. The entire text of each speech is also available in
Appendix B.
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Sam Marcosson 1980
INTRODUCTION
In one of the classic episodes of the old Star Trek series, the
Enterprise becomes a battleground for one Commissioner Beal and the
fugitive that he has been chasing, a revolutionary named Loki . Loki
had been the leader of a racially motivated uprising on their home
planet, Charron. The racial difference between Beal and Loki?
Seal's people were black on the left side and white on the right,
while Loki's were the reverse.
The program, which won a Hugo Award as the outstanding science
fiction episode of 1967, was a statement about the racial crises
facing the United States at that time. But it could just as easily
apply today--to the Republic of South Africa. That nation has
been plagued by racial strife for over a decade, strife emanating
from the control exercised by 4J5 million whites over 18^ million
blacks. The South African v;hites, now isolated from the rest of
the world, are clinging tenaciously to power. How the government
is holding to power is a classic example of the rhetoric of power
maintenance as outlined by Andrew King. The strategic importance,
the mineral wealth, as well as what we can learn about how such
non-Democratic regimes hold power, make the rhetoric of the South
African whites clearly worthy of rhetorical analysis.
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Andrew King, of the University of Arizona, outlined his theories
in the April, 1976 issue of the Quarterly Journal of Speech . He
observed that when a group's power is challenged, it will consider
a variety of choices of action. As such challenges occur, and are
observed, the patterns of the rhetorical strategies become clear,
and a rhetorical movement is established.
METHOD
Andrew King's Power Maintenance: This theory deals with the
rhetorical strategies of groups in power when under attack. For
this analysis, Marcosson used three of King's strategies:
1. Definition: "To set the terms of the conflict in such
a way as to be advantageous to the group holding power."
2. Crying Anarchy: "To claim that chaos will be the
result of any change in power."
3. Co-optation: "To give some nround to the challenging
group, that does not involve actually losing power."
ANALYSIS
Marcosson looked at how each strategy was manifested by the
South African government:
Definition: 1. The government defined the problem as multi-
national, not as multi-racial. 2. The government claimed
their definition of what it takes to have leadership as the
rule for leadership. Naturally, this rule favored the whites.
Crying Anarchy: The South African whites pointed to the
violence in black-controlled states and claimed that black
governments were doomed to failure.
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Co-optation: 1. The South African government allowed
blacks to join the labor unions. 2. The South African
government created "independent" homelands for blacks.
However, the homelands were still controlled by the white
government.
EFFECT
Marcosson argued that the South African whites were success-
ful at maintaining their power:
1. The whites are still in power.
2. South Africa has less racial violence than Rhodesia due
to definition.
3. The blacks have accepted the homelands due to crying
anarchy.
4. Violence is down due to co-optation.
CONCLUSION
Whether these rhetorical strategies of maintaining power-
definition, crying anarchy, and co-optation—will succeed in the
long term cannot now be known. So far, though, these strategies
have succeeded. As King states, "The strategies discussed are
examples of limited warfare. Their very constraints cut losses,
minimize risks, and avoid the social instability that accompanies
crushing defeat." Perhaps the example of Beal and Loki may provide
us with an accurate gauge of South Africa's future, even though
we don't know if Charron used King's strategies. Seal's 10,000
year chase of Loki ended when the Enterprise brought the two back
to Charron--a planet where all the people had long since killed
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each other in racial fighting. The chase, the hatred of the two
men, were futile; the remnants of a culture devoured by the same
racial divisions now present in South Africa.
Julie Goodlick 1980
INTRODUCTION
On March 22, 1972, the Equal Rights Amendment passed the United
States Senate and was opened for state ratification. Within only
three years, 34 states had ratified, and to date only three states
are needed to pass the amendment. The original deadline for ratifi-
cation came and went, and an extension was set at June, 1982.
However, today we hear very little about the ERA in comparison to
the mass of ardent pro- and anti-ERA rhetoric of the mid-70's.
Is ERA dead? No, not at all, but on the surface one might believe
so. What happened? A retrospective look at ERA shows that the
anti-ERA forces were stronger and more effective, perhaps, than
we realized.
As Hazel Greenburg of the Equal Rights Amendment Project said
in 1976, "In the ratification process, it is female opposition epi-
tomized by Phyllis Schlafly's Stop ERA group that is deterring
passage." Indeed, Phyllis Schlafly herself became the primary
agent or spokesperson for the entire ERA counter-movement. She
has a tremendous following and has created two very wealthy and
powerful anti-ERA groups--Stop ERA and Eagle Forum. Obviously
Schlafly's leadership power is extremely significant in under-
standing the anti-ERA movement, and I believe her power derives
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chiefly from her anti-women's movement, anti-ERA rhetoric. It is
my purpose then to analyze a speech by Schlafly in order to illumi-
nate her incredible power for gaining the numbers needed in the
fight against ERA.
METHOD
Ernest Bormann's Fantasy Theme Analysis: Bormann looks at
how groups adopt a given fantasy and "chain it out" to others.
The idea is to include more people in the collective fantasy. A
critic should identify the fantasy theme present and how a rhetor
motivates others to accept the theme.
ANALYSIS
Goodlick claims that Schlafly successfully propagated her
anti-ERA theme by claining the women libbers wanted to destroy
traditionalism in America. Further:
1. Schlafly's speech, "Understanding the Difference" is
analyzed because it is a representative example of
Schlafly's rhetoric.
2. Schlafly's key theme is that the sexes are fundamen-
tally different and the ERA is attempting to destroy
this. The villains, then, are the "libbers" and the
heroes are the "positive" women of America.
3. The motivation that Schlafly uses is that all positive
women should spend at least a half an hour a day fight-
ing the ERA and saving traditionalism.
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EFFECT
Goodlick has already insisted that Schlafly was successful.
The point to this analysis was to show how the success came about.
CONCLUSION
Today the rhetoric of the ERA controversy seems to have mel-
lowed somewhat, though the amendment remains unratified. Looking
at the controversy in retrospect, we might have to say that the
anti-ERA movement has almost been successful in its efforts. In
the early 70's, Ms^. magazine called Phyllis Schlafly "the Sweetheart
of the Silent Majority," but apparently, with Schlafly's help in
spreading that powerful rhetorical vision, the majority didn't stay
silent for long.
Sam Marcosson 1981
INTRODUCTION
Soaring 160 miles above the surface of the Earth as the first
American to orbit the globe, gazing down upon the vast continents
and oceans, must have been an incredible high for astronaut John
Glenn.
Standing 30 feet above the delegates at the 1976 Democratic
Convention, delivering one of the two Keynote Speeches, must have
been an incredible low for Senator John Clenn.
For that Keynote Address by Senator John Glenn was one of the
most poorly received in the history of the American two-party system,
especially when compared to the reception given that evening's other
Keynote Speech--that delivered by Texas Congresswoman Barbara Jordan.
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Because of what we can learn about the Keynote Address as a
speech genre by comparing a successful example to a failed one, the
two speeches are clearly worthy of rhetorical analysis. Especially
since Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Jamieson observed in the
introduction to their book Form and Genre that such a study of these
two speeches would aid in the understanding of generic rhetoric.
Ironically enough, the message of the two speeches was remark-
ably similar. Both Jordan and Glenn spoke of the need for government
to earn the faith of the people, and of a conmitment to traditional
American ideas and values. The crucial difference between the two
speeches was the manner in which the message was presented, and so
it is appropriate to compare them through Robert Oliver's rhetorical
model, "Delivering the Persuasive Speech," from his book The Psychology
of Persuasive Speech .
METHOD
Robert Oliver's model "Delivering the Persuasive Speech":
Oliver feels that the key to successful persuasion is to conform
to the audience expectations through:
1. Personality: The rhetor should conform his/her per-
sonality to the personality of the audience.
2. Attitude: The rhetor must align and focus his/her point
of view with that of the audience.
3. Elements of Speech: The voice diction and phrasing
must be appropriate for the occasion.
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ANALYSIS
Marcosson demonstrated that Glenn failed to fulfill any of
the expectations, while Jordan fulfilled them wonderfully. Mar-
cosson went point by point and showed how the speakers handled
their speeches.
EFFECT
Jordan received accolades and was proposed as a potential
Supreme Court judge on the basis of the speech. Glenn's career,
which had been on the upswing, was damaged. He was no longer con-
sidered as a vice-presidential running mate for Jimmy Carter.
CONCLUSION
As he delivered a speech virtually no one listened to, John
Glenn may have wished that he were back, 160 miles above the sur-
face of the Earth, gazing down upon vast continents and oceans,
and listening, on his radio, to Barbara Jordan.
John Murphy 1981
INTRODUCTION
On January 20, 1981, Governor Ronald Reagan fulfilled a 12
year old dream and became President Ronald Reagan. In doing so,
he dumbfounded many observers who had claimed that Reagan could
not capture the high office. As Newsweek 's November 17, 1980 issue
states, "Once he was the most underestimated man in American
politics--a washed up movie star, it was said, who was too old,
too simple and too far right to be President." Somehow, though.
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that washed up movie star managed to garner 483 electoral votes.
Certainly, from our perspective, we must wonder what rhetorical
strategies Reagan used.
METHOD
Herman Steltzner's Quest Story: Steltzner's theory looks at
situations where a rhetor essentially characterizes him or herself
as a hero on a quest. There are five elements of the quest that
must exist:
1. A prized object and/or person to be found and possessed
or married.
2. A long journey to find the object because its where-
abouts is not originally known to the seekers.
3. A hero.
4. The guardians of the object who must be overcome before
the quest can be finished.
5. The helpers, who with their knowledge and/or magical
powers assist the hero and, without whom, he could never
succeed.
ANALYSIS
1. Reagan portrays America's "New Beginning" as a return to
our former greatness as destined as the prized object.
2. Time, in a historical sense, is the long journey. America
is on the end of a long road back to greatness.
3. The hero is Ronald Reagan.
4. The guardians are the Democratic Party leadership, speci-
fically the Carter administration.
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5. The helpers are the American people, regardless of
prior political affiliation.
EFFECT
Since the campaign was already called a success. Murphy was
doing more of an explanatory analysis. But Murphy does point to
some of the implications of Reagan using the quest story. To see
these, go to the Conclusion.
CONCLUSION
But the very use of quest may damage his Presidency. As
Steltzner explains, quest inherently magnifies the issues and the
hero. Yet as various experts, including Newsweek 's January 26,
1981 issue, Gerald Ford, and Harry Truman have pointed out, the
Presidency does not have as much power as people think it does.
Put a larger than life hero into a life-sized presidency, and you
get high expectations. George Bush put it this way: "Even people
who aren't enthusiastic about us at first are hoping for an awful
lot. It's unrealistic and they have to realize that." Quest does
not help here, and the political ramifications could be devastating.
Just imagine if Jason had come back with half the Golden Fleece.
Andy Heaton 1982
INTRODUCTION
As Speaker of the House Tip O'Neill put it, Wednesday, July 29,
1981 was a great day for the aristocracy. In the morning, there
was the royal wedding. And in the afternoon, the "royal" tax cut.
Despite strong objections from its Democratic leadership, the House
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of Representatives approved the massive, three-year tax cut plan
supported by Republican President Ronald Reagan.
The final vote wasn't even close: 238 to 195. Yet as late as
two days before the crucial vote, it looked like a majority of House
members would support the Democratic alternate plan. The New York
Times concluded, "The principle reason behind the President's dramatic
victory was Mr. Reagan's televised speech to the nation on Monday
night. One Democratic congressman put it more bluntly, 'I hope he
doesn't go on the tube again
. . . and say no more sex.'"
We usually tend to attribute Reagan's success on television
to the "media presence" that comes from his former profession. In
the May, 1981 Quarterly Journal of Speech
,
Goodwin Berquist and
James Goldin of Ohio State University support this contention. Yet
if we give Reagan credit for excellence only in the non-verbal aspects
of communication, we are probably selling the man short. Besides
being well delivered, Reagan's tax speech was well written. And the
writing, the Associated Press notes, was principally Reagan's own.
Unlike many politicians, Reagan relies very little on speechwriters.
Without a doubt. President Reagan will continue to speak out
on important issues. And if we are to completely undersatnd Reagan's
effectiveness as a communicator--and as President—we need to pay
some attention to the too often ignored verbal aspect of Reagan's
success in analyzing his tax speech. Murray Edelman, of the Univer-
sity of Wisconsin, provides us with the means of doing this in his
book The Symbolic Uses of Politics.
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METHOD
Murray Edelman's The Symbolic Uses of Politics : Edelnan looks
at how politicians use language to create specific realities. In
many ways this is a Burkeian view of political science. Heaton
uses three of Edelman's concepts for the CA:
1. Strategy: "Edelman states that in the face of a serious
problem, 'a leader whose acts suggest he (is following a
strategy) finds it easy to attract a loyal and enthu-
siastic following. '"
2. Simplification: "Edelman notes that large numbers of
people cannot recognize or tolerate complex situations
. . . and that the best way to reach these people is
through simplifying—even oversimplifying—the message."
3. Ambiguity: "Ambiguous terms can have a variety of
meanings, but almost always evoke an emotional response."
ANALYSIS
Regarding Strategy, Reagan gave the impression that his tax
program was well planned. Also, he made a point of making the
Democratic plan look like it was hastily thrown together.
In the area of Simplification, Reagan simplified the tax cut
when he described it. For example, he made the complex and con-
troversial All-Savers plan sound like it was a simple matter.
In the third area. Ambiguity, Reagan used phrases like "renew
the American spirit" and "make America great again" throughout
the speech.
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EFFECT
Heaton claims that Reagan was successful due to the speech's
message. He cites that:
1. A former Carter speechwriter, who only read the speech,
called it wonderful even if it were only read in a dull monotone.
2. Western Union and the House's mail room were swamped with
telegrams and letters after the speech.
3. One Representative received 400 pro-tax cut telephone
calls after Reagan's speech.
4. Another Representative claimed that Reagan successfully
had gone over the heads of Congress to the American people.
CONCLUSION
There's no doubt Reagan is a good communicator. And, as we've
seen through analysis of his July 19th tax speech, he's capable of
delivering that simple and direct message as well. That's something
to keep in mind as we observe Reagan's performance in the legislative
battles that lie ahead in the next few years. He probably won't
win them all, but Ronald Reagan is certainly one persuasive speaker
who can make more than a trite solution out of "Write your congressman"!
Sam Marcosson 1983
INTRODUCTION
"Lyndon Johnson told the nation, 'Have no fear of escalation,
I am trying everyone to please. And though it isn't really war,
we're sending 50,000 more to help save Vietnam from Vietnamese.'"
Tom Paxton's protest song of the 1960's was only one of many, as
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America raised its voice against the American involvement in South-
east Asia. And one of the basic problems, Paxton suggests, was
what Lyndon Johnson told the nation. Johnson's rhetoric contributed
greatly to his problems, and to public dissent surrounding the Vietnam
conflict. And a study of that rhetoric can tell us much about the
Vietnam War, and about presidential discourse in general.
METHOD
Robert Ivie's Presidential Motives for War : Ivie studied how
presidents have justified the entry into war and isolated four
specific steps that the rhetor must go through for a successful
justification:
1. The president will identify what ideal is being threatened
and necessitates our entry into war.
2. The president will identify a crisis that threatens that
ideal
.
3. He will show the cause for that crisis.
4. Finally, war will be proposed as a final solution.
ANALYSIS
Marcosson claims that Johnson failed because he did not set
up the fourth stage well:
1. The ideal in Vietnam was freedom.
2. The crisis and the cause of the crisis was Communism and
aggression.
3. Unfortunately for Johnson, he stressed that the U.S. role
was only to support the South Vietnamese and to supplement
106
their activity. On the basis of that, he had no grounds
for the escalation of the war. War was not the final
solution to the problem.
EFFECT
Marcosson notes that the first real protest to the war was
that which pointed to the contradiction in Johnson's rhetoric and
his policies. This then caused people to question his prior claims
and led to the general undermining of Johnson's war policy.
Marcosson also argued that there may be a specific sub-genre
of presidential rhetoric in terms of limited-war rhetoric.
CONCLUSION
The difficulty faced by Lyndon Johnson in justifying our
involvement in Vietnam may also indicate a positive trend for our
society. Our society may finally be becoming sophisticated enough,
and our people wise enough, that we will never allow our leaders
to justify easily war--the destruction, the death of thousands of
young men, women, and children--to justify easily what almost never
is "justifiable."
Steve Sudhoff 1983
INTRODUCTION
During the recent history of the American presidency, brothers
have often played important roles. During the Kennedy years, John,
Robert, and sometimes even Ted would be involved in major policy
decisions. Richard Nixon sometimes had trouble controlling the
questionable business dealings of his brother, Donald. And, of
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course, there were Jimmy and Billy. At first it seemed as though
the only problems associated with Billy Carter were that he guzzled
beer and relieved himself in public. But, as it seems with all
brothers, Billy was around when Jimmy needed him . . . the least.
For it was during the summer of 1980, as the Iranian hostage crisis,
the sad shape of the American economy, and the impending Democratic
National Convention began to close around President Jimmy Carter,
that Billy Carter's name was splashed across American newspaper
headlines with reports of possible illegal business transactions
between Billy and the government of Libya. Yet, when it seemed
that Billy might be the final nail in Jimmy's political coffin,
Jirrniy was able to resurrect his hold on the Presidency through
Ronald Reagan's favorite medium, television. On August 4, 1980,
as a skeptical American electorate looked on, Jimmy Carter held a
nationally televised press conference in the East Room of the White
House. On the day before the press conference. New York Times colum-
nist Terence Smith wrote that, unless Carter was extraordinarily
successful at the conference, Billygate would remain a nagging
political headache that would stay with him throughout the Presi-
dential campaign. Yet, at the conference. Carter put on the show
of his life, defending not only the actions of his brother, but
also his own actions in permitting Billy to deal with the Libyans.
Carter statements at the conference are an excellent example of the
use of political apologia. It seems appropriate, then, that we
examine Carter's statements with a rhetorical tool designed to be
used in studying apologetic address.
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METHOD
Ware and Linkugel's Generic Criticism of Apologia: This theory
is based on the generic characteristics of self-defense speeches.
Ware and Linkugel have isolated several potential defense postures
and strategies that a person could assume when under attack, attempt-
ing to defend himself. Sudhoff looks at one specific posture and
two strategies:
Absolute Posture: "Focusing audience attention upon the
particulars of the charge" in an attempt to be cleared of
the charge is the nature of this posture.
Denial Strategy: "Denial consists of the simple disavowal
by the speaker of any participation in, relation to, or
positive sentiment toward whatever it is that repels the
audience."
Differentiation Strategy: This ".
. . subsumes those
strategies which serve the purpose of separating some fact,
sentiment, object or relationship from some larger context
within which the audience presently views the attribute."
ANALYSIS
Sudhoff claimed that Carter was effective in his use of denial
and differentiation:
Denial: Carter simply denied any wrongdoing in the matter.
Differentiation: Carter argued that his administration was
honest and quick to respond to the attacks, not incompetent
in their handling of them. Plus, since Carter appeared to
be under control and the press did not, it further demon-
strated his competence.
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EFFECT
Carter was successful in his attempt to clear his name:
1. Newspapers cleared Carter of any wrongdoing the day
after the press conference.
2. Potential congressional investigations were called off.
3. Carter's popularity in the polls went up after the
conference.
4. Sudhoff claimed that Ware and Linkugel's theory also
applied to extemporaneous situations as well as pre-
pared addresses.
CONCLUSION
Having examined Carter's press conference of August 1980, we
see that Carter was able to use apologia to retain, although briefly,
his hold on the Presidency. Of course, Carter's remarks did not
help him win the November election, but perhaps historians will
treat Carter a bit more kindly in light of his brilliant performance.
Cham Ferguson 1983
INTRODUCTION
Everyone likes to be seduced. Everyone enjoys being the center
of attention. Who recognizes this the most? TV ads, TV rhetoric.
Who are the champions of television commercials? The beer advertisers.
American breweries spent 550 million dollars in 1981 in hopes
of getting us to become alcoholics preferring their beer. There are
many beer companies and beer ads. At this time, though, the fiercest
competition in TV seems to be taking place between Miller and
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Anehuser-Busch as they fight for the number one spot. Since its
purchase by Phillip Morris Company in 1971, Miller has been advanc-
ing steadily on Anheuser-Busch 's coveted crown as the king of beers.
As the fight enters the 80's, an analysis of Miller TV ads could
provide valuable insight into their battle plan.
In this speech, I will analyze Miller's three main beers:
Miller Hi-Life, Lowenbrau, and Miller Light. I will examine three
TV conriercials offered by Miller, each a representative example of
how Miller is trying to sell its beer.
METHOD
Steele and Redding's American Value System and Fisher's Motive
View of Cormiuni cation: Steele and Redding believe that there is a
body of American values that underlies most persuasion. They then
proceed to list many of those values. Fisher's theory discusses how
an image in persuasion can be modified to effect persuasion. Fisher
sees one of four possible modifications happening:
1. Affirmation: Giving birth to an image.
2. Reaffirmation: Revitalizing an image.
3. Purification: The correcting of an image.
4. Subversion: The undermining of an image.
ANALYSIS
Ferguson isolated the value in each commercial and then examined
how that value was modified.
The Miller Hi-Life commercial used the Puritan Morality value
and it was affirmed with the Miller beer. The cormiercial tied the
reward for hard work with Miller.
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The Lowenbrau cormercial highlighted the Material Comfort value
and reaffirmed it with the Lowenbrau image. Viewers were told that
affluence was theirs when they drank Lowenbrau.
However, Ferguson observed that none of Steele and Redding's
values fit the Lite Beer commercial. So Ferguson noted that the
comnercial was using what he called a Macho Male value. This value
was purified in such a way that diet beer was now seen as manly.
EFFECT
Ferguson generally assumed that the commercials were successful:
1. Miller had moved to number two in the market and was
now selling 21% of the beer in America.
2. The general concensus was that the commercials were
the reason for the success.
3. Anheuser-Busch responded by raising their advertising
budget.
CONCLUSION
So if you are into rowdy good times at the local bar, relaxing
weekends with friends, bowling with buddies or just browsing through
Aristotle, remember. If you've got the time. Miller's got the rhetoric.
Todd Rasmuson 1984
INTRODUCTION
A recent T-shirt proudly pictured a football coach strolling
across a calm lake. The caption read, "If he can't walk on water,
he sure knows where the stumps are." His wife had been quoted, as
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he slipped into bed, as saying, "God, your feet are cold." The coach
responded, "Around the house, dear, you can call me Paul."
Although few people may remember this coach on a first name
basis, his nickname, along with his incredible accomplishments as
coach at Alabama, will long be remembered. The legend is Paul "Bear"
Bryant.
But Bryant is known for more than a collection of winning statis-
tics printed in a trivia book. According to Alabama's House Speaker
Pro Tern, Roy Johnson, "He was a legend and an inspiration to the young
people of this state. His life and his accomplishments have enhanced
the image of Alabama throughout the nation and the world."
Bryan'ts significant influence raised his status to a mythical
level and he was even worshipped. Many stories developed about
Bryant that strengthened this rhetorical image. One such story
had him shopping for a burial plot, and a cemetary salesman showed
him one for a thousand dollars. Bryant said, "That seems a little
steep, boy. I'm only going to be here for three days."
By examining Bryant's rhetorical image, many interesting analogies
can be drawn that support the idea of Bryant as Alabama's Secular
Christ. Because of Bryant's significant influence, his rhetorical
persona is worthy of our careful consideration.
METHOD
Kenneth Burke's Concept of a Secular Christ and Ernest Bormann's
Fantasy Theme Analysis: Burke argues that in out present age, certain
individuals can serve as a secular Christ figure. To do so, they
must have mutual beliefs with their audience, they must display strong
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leadership, and they must have made a sacrifice. Bormann looks at
how groups of people develop and "chain out" fantasies. The idea
is to incorporate other people into the group thene.
ANALYSIS
Rasmuson looked at how Bryant acted as the Christ figure and
how the myth was chained out. Examples of the three qualities neces-
sary for a Christ figure were examined in Bryant's life. Then
Rasmuson looked at how this myth was propagated by Bryant's football
players, the Alabama fans, and by the sports media.
EFFECT
Rasmuson was doing an explanatory type analysis, so there was
no real discussion of effectiveness.
CONCLUSION
Whether they will be successful without Bryant, it is difficult
to predict. But they will no doubt remember that believing and
winning are the "Bear" necessities.
Steve Sudhoff 1984
INTRODUCTION
A French ambassador once observed, "It is fortunate that diplo-
mats generally have long noses, since they usually cannot see beyond
them." In the relationship between the United States and the Soviet
Union since WW II, it seems that at times both governments have
refused to see beyond the ends of their noses in order to make basic
compromises in their own positions which could have led to mutually-
beneficial agreements. However, on the afternoon of June 10, 1963,
114
President John Kennedy took a major step toward a more peaceful
world. In an address to the graduation class of American University
in Washington, D.C., Kennedy announced his willingness to sign a
limited nuclear test ban treaty with the Soviet Union. Labeled a
"Strategy of Peace," the speech was widely acclaimed as the major
diplomatic break responsible for the signing of the Limited Nuclear
Test Ban Treaty two months later. Given the current stagnation of
arms control, it seems that v;e can learn something by examining
Kennedy's speech and his diplomatic strategy.
METHOD
Robert Ivie's Rhetoric of Diplomacy: Ivie's work centers on
the characteristics of diplomatic speech. From his observations,
Ivie has found four characteristics that are common to diplomatic
speech:
1. The speech must appeal to a tri-level audience. It must
not alienate the diplomat's home government, the "enemy,"
or the neutral governments listening to the address.
2. The speech must be sifficiently ambiguous so that there
is a loophole to retreat through in case something goes
wrong. But it must not be so ambiguous that the speech
is useless.
3. The speech must be able to rationalize any potential
inconsistencies between the stance being forwarded and
the prior stance of the diplomat.
4. The speech must be depersonalized. The speaker should
make it clear that he or she is representing a govern-
ment and the message is therefore legitimate.
'.
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ANALYSIS
Sudhoff s analysis was basically demonstrating that Kennedy
followed the first three characteristics, and ignored the final
characteristic of impersonality.
EFFECT
Sudhoff concludes that the speech was a success despite the
break from the theory by noting the following points:
1. Kennedy's top speech writer called it Kennedy's
greatest speech.
2. The New Republic magazine called it a diplomatic
breakthrough.
3. The Soviets took an unprecedented step and printed
the full text of the speech in Pravda.
4. Britain's Prime Minister reported that the Soviet
Premier wanted to have talks once he heard the speech.
5. The Soviets signed the treaty within two months of
the address.
6. Sudhoff proposes that the theory be looked at again
to see if high ranking diplomats, like a president,
can still be successful even when using personalized
references.
CONCLUSION
By taking bold initiative, an American president was able to
sign a meaningful arms control agreement with the Soviet Union.
Perhaps such an initiative would not work today. But in this time
of short-nosed diplomats, McGeorge Bundy's words come to mind:
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"... where there is zeal ir the search for agreenent . . . and a
firm use of the powers of the office, the President can become . . .
an instrument of hope for all men everyvMhere."
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Appendix B
Sam Marcosson, 1980
In one of the classic episodes of the old Star Trek series,
the Enterprise becomes a battleground for one Commissioner Beal
and the fugitive he had been chasing, a revolutionary named Loki.
Loki had been the leader of a racially motivated uprising on their
home planet, Charron. The racial difference between Beal and Loki?
Seal's people were black on the left side and white on the right,
while Loki's were the reverse.
The program, which won a Hugo Award as the outstanding science
fiction episode of 1967, was a statement about the racial crisis
facing the United States at that time. But It could just as easily
apply today— to the Republic of South Africa. That nation has been
plagued by racial strife for over a decade, strife emanating from
the control exercised by ih million whites over 18% million blacks.
The South African whites, now isolated from the rest of the world,
are clinging tenaciously to power. How the government is holding
to power is a classic example of the rhetoric of power maintenance
as outlined by Andrew King. The strategic importance, the mineral
wealth, as well as what we can learn about how such non-Democratic
regimes hold power, make the rhetoric of the South African whites
clearly worthy of rhetorical analysis.
Andrew King of the University of Arizona outlined his theories
in the April, 1976 issue of the Quarterly Journal of Speech. He
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observed that when a group's power is challenged, it will consider
a variety of choices of action. As such challenges occur, and are
observed, the patterns of the rhetorical strategies become clear
and a rhetorical movement is established.
King describes several strategies that can be used by authori-
ties struggling to hold power, three of which have been used by the
South African whites. The first is Definiti-on, to set the terms
of the conflict in such a way as to be advantageous to the group
holding power. Second is Crying Anarchy, to claim that chaos will
be the result of any change in power. And third. Co-optation, to
give some ground to the challenging group that does not involve
actually losing power.
The first strategy is Definition, or standard setting. The
goal is control of others through the manipulation of definitions.
The whites in South Africa have in two ways used definition in
their attempts to maintain authority.
First, they have tried to define away the problem of racial
discrminiation by claiming that the nation is multi-national rather
than multi-racial. Former Prime Minister John Vorster gave a
prime example of this rhetoric in a 1978 speech before the American
Society of Johannesburg. Vorster said, "American politicians look
upon South African tribes as tribes of the same nation. But they
are different nations. The Zulu is as different to the Tswana as
the Turk is to the German. We are not a multi-racial country, but
a multi-national country." Thus, the government attempts to avoid
the racial problem by defining it out of existence.
119
In addition, the whites' attempt to define the conflict in
such a way that blacks cannot qualify for leadership. The whites
claim that control of the country should rest not in the hands of
the majority but with the group that was there first. No wonder,
since South Africa was first settled by white Europeans with blacks
moving in later. By the white definition of the conflict, their
rule is perfectly legitimate and the blacks have no claim to power.
So by using Definition, the whites have established their
rule as legitimate. But they have to take the process a step fur-
ther. More than legitimate, they have to show that their rule is
actually beneficial to the nation. And to do that, they have used
a second of King's strategies. Crying Anarchy. The whites claim
that the nation will collapse unless they are left in charge. As
King states, "To the establishmentarianists themselves, or to the
third parties faced by the uncertainties of rapid change, the cries
of anarchy may often seem compelling."
The South African whites have used this strategy with great
skill. Officials often point to the failure of democracy in such
neighboring black African states as Tanzania and Mozambique, and
to their contention that blacks in Sough Africa are economically
better off than their counterparts in nations that have majority
rule. King emphasizes, "Most people have a stake in the existing
order, and when one's substance is threatened, there is an immediate
loss of objectivity."
Officials also point to Angola, where the institution of
majority rule resulted in a civil war of black against black.
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By playing on the fear of anarchy and war, the government
hopes to convince blacks to approve of, or at least tolerate,
apartheid. The government reasons that if blacks fear that the
institution of majority rule would result in a worsening of their
situation, they might be less inclined to oppose the current system.
To garner further support on the part of blacks for apartheid,
the whites have used a third of King's strategies. Co-optation.
Co-optation, according to King, involves making limited concessions
to the challenging groups without losing actual power. As King
puts it, "When pressure becomes overwhelming, it may still be
possible to assimilate one's rivals. Government programs, however
inadequate, destroy the urgency of the rivals' rhetoric. In the
mouth of a dominant group member. Co-optation is presented as the
only realistic alternative."
As both internal and external pressure has mounted on South
Africa, the government has begun to use Co-optation. No, the
whites do not have any plans to dismantle the system of grand
apartheid. But they are attempting to appease the blacks through
limited concessions.
For example, Botha's ruling Nationalist Party last year
announced plans to allow blacks to form unions, to encourage
employers to pay white and black workers the same wages, and to
abolish the law that bans blacks from certain occupations. The
plan sounded impressive, but as the May 14, 1979 issue of Time
pointed out, it didn't really amount to much. Of Ih million black
workers, fully two million will still be kept from unions because
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they aren't officially South African citizens. No employers will
be required to desegregate work places or pay an equal wage, only
encouraged to do so. And the policy of reserving certain jobs
for whites had been virtually abolished anyway due to a severe
shortage of white labor. As King indicates, this is the cardinal
rule of Co-optation: Give a little, but maintain authority.
In addition, whites have announced plans for the future that
amount to Co-optation. In the short term, blacks will have their
own Parliament and Prime Minister, which will have no decision-
making power and play only an advisory role in the South African
government. Under the final plan, all blacks will hold citizenship
in semi -independent homelands. Three such homelands have already
been set up, with more planned.
The fact that the homelands policy is intended to keep the
whites in power is underscored by a statement by Cornelius Muldur,
the former Cabinet Secretary in charge of black affairs. When the
homelands policy has been fully implemented, Muldur states, "there
will not be one black nan with South African citizenship." Whites
will then have gained permanent control of the nation.
Since the obvious goal of the rhetoric of South African whites
is power maintenance, the fact that the white minority government
there is still in power is the best indication that the various
rhetorical strategies used have been successful. Specifically,
each of the three strategies has been effective.
The success of the policy of Definition can best be measured
in the relative rarity of violence in South Africa. There have
122
been disturbances, most notably the riots in Soweta township in
1976 in which 618 people were killed. But compared to Zimbabwe/
Rhodesia, South Africa has been a peaceful nation. And the only
major policy difference between South Africa and the now out-of-power
regime in Rhodesia through 1976, according to Foreign Affairs , had
been the South African characterization of the problem as multi-
national rather than multi-racial. In other words, Rhodesia did
not use the strategy of Definition, while South Africa did—successfully.
The strategy of Crying Anarchy has caused at least limited
support on the part of many black leaders for apartheid and has thus
relieved pressure on the government. The best example of black
support for apartheid, according to New African magazine, is the
tribal chieftains who have become leaders of the three homelands
created so far—Transkeii , Bophutuswana, and Venda. So Crying
Anarchy has been an effective strategy for Botha's government in
enlisting the support of black leaders.
Similarly, the government has enlisted the support of rank-
and-file South African whites through the policy of Co-optation.
The policy was first used in 1976 after the Soweto riots and thus
has not been employed long enough to fully evaluate it. On a short
term basis, though, it has clearly been an effective strategy. The
only change in South African policy since the Soweto riots has been
the adoption of Co-optation, and although tension remains, violence
has virtually stopped.
Perhaps even more significantly, the government policy of
Co-optation has, as Newsweek put it on October 29, 1979, "evoked
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excitement among South African blacks. 'There is a feeling in the
air that something is happening,' says Percy Quoboza, editor of
Johannesburg's only black newspaper."
So Co-optation has helped to keep the whites in power by
increasing the black acceptance of that domination.
Whether these rhetorical strategies of maintaining power-
Definition, Crying Anarchy, and Co-optation--will succeed in the
long term cannot now be known. So far, though, these strategies
have succeeded. As King states, "The strategies discussed are
examples of limited warfare. Their very constraint cuts losses,
minimizes risks, and avoids the social instability that accompanies
crushing defeat." Perhaps the example of Beal and Loki may provide
us with an accurate gauge of South Africa's future, even though we
don't know if Charron used King's strategies. Seal's 10,000-year
chase of Loki ended when the Enterprise brought the two back to
Charron— a planet where all the people had long since killed each
other off in racial fighting. The chase, and the hatred of the two
men, were futile— the remnants of a culture devoured by the same
racial divisions now present in South Africa.
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Julie D. Goodlick, 1980
On March 22, 1972, the Equal Rights Amendment passed the
United States Senate and was opened for state ratification. Within
only three years, 34 states had ratified and to date only three
states are needed to pass the amendment. The original deadline for
ratification came and went, and an extension was set at June, 1982.
However, today we hear very little about the ERA in comparison to
the mass of ardent pro- and anti-ERA rhetoric of the mid-70's. Is
ERA dead? No, not at all, but on the surface one might believe so.
What happened? A retrospective look at ERA shows us that the anti-
ERA forces were stronger and more effective, perhaps, than we realized.
As Hazel Greenburg of the Equal Rights Amendment Project said
in 1975, "In the ratification process, it is female opposition epi-
tomized by Phyllis Schlafly's Stop ERA group that is deterring
passage" (Greenburg, 1976: xvii). Indeed, Phyllis Schlafly herself
became the primary agent or spokesperson for the entire ERA counter-
movement. She has a tremendous following and has created two very
wealthy and powerful anti-ERA groups: Stop ERA and Eagle Forum.
Obviously Schlafly's leadership pov/er is extremely significant in
understanding the anti-ERA movement and I believe her power derives
chiefly from her anti-women's movement, anti-ERA rhetoric. It is
my purpose, then, to analyze a speech by Schlafly in order to illumi-
nate her incredible power for gaining the numbers needed in the fight
against ERA.
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The speech I will analyze was given in 1976 and is entitled
"Understanding the Difference." Schlafly later used much of the
content of this speech in the first chapter of her best-selling
book. The Power of the Positive Woman . This particular speech
serves as a very typical example of Schlafly 's rhetoric and her
purposes. It was given at the height of the ERA controversy when
the countermovement was just reaching the peak of its development.
The basic purpose of the speech was to introduce a new anti-ERA
program~"Half Hour a Day to Stop ERA"—yet Schlafly deals through-
out the speech with aspects of the entire feminist movement, allow-
ing the rhetorical critic a broad view of her overall rhetoric.
Perhaps more significant, though, is the audience for whom the
the speech was given— the Executive Council members of Eagle Forum,
those national leaders who would return to their respective chapters
and spread Phyllis' word to women throughout the land.
The nature of Schlafly's rhetoric and the audience to whom it
was directed make this speech especially well-suited for study via
Ernest Bormann's Fantasy Theme Analysis. Bormann's methodology
deals with the rhetorical function of fantasy, the rhetor's ability
to create a set of symbols that leads to a symbolic reality or
rhetorical vision. This symbolic reality may hold a special mean-
ing for audience members, and the rhetorical vision, then, may help
to acculturate more people into the speaker's group or movement.
This process of group acculturation was Schlafly's long-run purpose,
and in analyzing her speech using Bormann's method, we can see how
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she effectively spread a rhetorical vision that helped her recruit
more people for the anti-ERA cause.
Bormann developed his methodology from studies of the small
group process of fantasizing. A fantasy might be called a group's
perception of a given idea or subject, and a successful fantasy
will "chain out," that is, catch on and spread out across a larger
group. Bormann's application of this basic idea of fantasy chaining
is to large groups hearing a public speech or message.
The first step in analyzing Schlafly's speech, then, is to
look at what Bormann calls the "dramatic content," those fantasy
themes which are eventually chained out among the anti-ERA followers.
The primary fantasy theme in this speech is one of sexual differ-
ences. Schlafly seems to say that the inherent differences between
the sexes make sexual equality impractical and even unjust, yet
the women's libbers want to destroy all these differences and have
total equality. According to Bormann, the language used by the
group promotes the fantasy themes, and Schlafly's language here is
indeed the key developmental factor in the fantasy. She works
from a framework of "what they want," describing what she believes
are the "fundamental dogmas" and the "Commandments" of the women's
lib movement. Her language is one of superlatives. For example,
she says:
... the drive of the women's lib movement is to
refuse to allow any differences based on differences
between men and women. They want men and women to
be treated the same, all the time, everywhere, in
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every part and aspect of our life. And it's not
just."
A second fantasy developed throughout the speech is the threat
to traditionalism which the women's movement and ERA creates, and
Schlafly develops this fantasy through a framework of "what will
happen if they have their way." She foresees a complete sexual
role reversal and says "they really want to get the women into the
jobs and turn the men into househusbands." She predicts the deteri-
oration of morals and the destruction of the family unit by describing
one of the "Commandments" of women's lib as "Thou shalt be neutral
as between morality and immorality, as between the institution of
the family and alternate lifestyles."
As the fantasy themes of sexual differences and traditionalism
chained out, those involved in Schlafly's cause would begin to use
the specific language and ideas in their own right; they would
adhere to a unique set of symbols all their own, or as Bontiann
describes it, they would become caught up in their own symbolic
reality, filled with "heroes, villains, emotions, and attitudes"
(Bormann, 1972: 398). In this case, the emotions and attitudes
provoked in the receivers of the messages are what are most likely
to recruit new actives.
Obviously the two fantasy themes mentioned will provoke strong
emotion in any traditionalist, any person disliking a drastic change
in the status quo; that emotion will be fear, and this factor will
then lead to the attitude that "they must be stopped." Yet even
more clear in the fantasy drama are the strong characterizations
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of the heroes and the villains which emerge and which appeal to
that beginning sense of fear, subsequently strengthening it.
Schlafly describes the heroes and villains in terms of positive
and negative. The libbers, of course, are the villains; Schlafly
says, "Negative is the word that best describes the women's lib
movement. It is a negative view of life." Schlafly also sees
the libbers as villains because they don't want to have babies.
She describes the heroes as "our kind of women, the Positive women"
who "think it is self-evident that the female body with its repro-
ducing organs was not designed by a conspiracy of male chauvinist
pigs, but by the architect of the human race." So the villains are
the bitter, unhappy, immoral women's libbers--the Negative women--
while the heroes are the God-fearing, traditionally dutiful wives
and doting mothers--the Positive women.
Schlafly develops another set of heroes also— Positive women
who've made it big in non-traditional areas. She uses examples
like Janet Lynn, the ice skater, who Schlafly describes as a "lovely,
lovely woman who has been a testament to her religious faith every
time she is interviewed on TV"; or Rose Totino, a Pillsbury Corpora-
tion Vice President who became successful when she accepted Christ
and once said, "I am not a women's libber. Why should women go
from superiority to equality?" So in Schlafly's mind, it's okay
to be a corporation vice president, as long as you're not for
women's lib and ERA, and such women become heroes in the anti-ERA
movement.
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Schlafly herself is probably the number one hero— that is,
heroine— in the symbolic reality shared by her followers. These
women can identify with her roles as wife and mother; to them, she
represents the epitome of traditional American womanhood. She
believes in motherhood as the primary part of the natural order
of women. She says, "Women have a maternal instinct, else the human
race would have died out long ago." She believes that women can't
be separated from this biological sphere without drastic consequences.
Moreover, she holds strong fundamental religious values, evidenced
by her designation of God as "the architect of the human race."
Schlafly's heroism becomes a part of the overall symbolic reality,
and adds much to her power in gaining new group members.
According to Bormann, once a group member has accepted the
symbolic reality, the degree of response may lead to attitude
change, strong commitment, or motivation to action. Clearly
Schlafly is seeking motivation to action as the purpose of her
speech. In her conclusion she says, "Surely most women can find
another half-hour in their day to do something that will help to
save the values of family, God, home, and country that we Are
working for. I think you can enlist a lot of new people in our
cause with a Half Hour a Day to Stop ERA." With this, the chain-
ing process and the rhetorical vision become clear. The audience
members in this situation are motivated to enlist others in the
cause, and in doing so, they employ what has become the established
rhetoric of the anti-ERA movement--the fantasies that create fear,
the characterizations of libbers as villains and traditional women
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as heroes, the whole symbolic reality that they have already
accepted—and a rhetorical vision of "let's stop the ERA and save
ourselves" is successfully spread and shared by women throughout
the country.
Today, the rhetoric of the ERA controversy seems to have mel-
lowed somewhat, though the amendment remains unratified. Looking
at the controversy in retrospect, we might have to say that the
anti-ERA movement has almost been successful in its efforts. In
the early '70's, Ms_. magazine called Phyllis Schlafly "the Sweet-
heart of the Silent Majority," but apparently, with Schlafly's
help in spreading that powerful rhetorical vision, that majority
didn't stay silent for long.
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Sam Marcosson, 1981
Soaring 160 miles above the surface of the Earth as the first
American to orbit the globe, gazing down upon vast continents and
oceans, must have been an incredible high for astronaut John Glenn.
Standing 30 feet above the delegates at the 1976 Democratic
Convention, delivering one of the two Keynote Speeches, must have
been an incredible low for Senator John Glenn.
For that Keynote Address by Senator Glenn was one of the most
poorly received in the history of the American two party system,
especially when compared to the reception given that evening's
other Keynote speech--that delivered by Texas Congresswoman Barbara
Jordan.
Because of what we can learn about the Keynote Address as a
speech genre by comparing a successful example to a failed one,
the two speeches are clearly worthy of rhetorical analysis. Especially
since Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Jamieson observed in the
introduction to their book Form and Genre that such a study of these
two speeches would aid in the understanding of generic rhetoric.
Ironically enough, the message of the two speeches was remark-
ably similar. Both Jordan and Glenn spoke of the need for govern-
ment to earn the faith of the people, and of a commitment to
traditional American ideals and values. The crucial difference
between the two speeches was the manner in which the message was
133
presented, and so it is appropriate to compare them through Robert
Oliver's rhetorical model "Delivering the Persuasive Speech" from
his book The Psychology of Persuasive Speech .
According to Oliver, the key element in successful oratory
is to conform to the expectations of the audience on each of three
levels. The first level is that of the personality of both speaker
and audience. As Oliver states, "The speaker directs the group,
but he directs it in accordance with the basic nature of the group
itself." If the rhetor misreads the personality of his audience,
or if he does not conform to their expectations of his personality,
he loses much of his effect.
The second expectation level is that of attitude. The audience
has a preset point of view towards the speaker, and he towards it.
According to Oliver, "It is a key part of the speaker's task to
bring the generalized attitude of the audience into sharper focus,
to heighten the degree to which that attitude is felt, and to shore
it up with facts and feelings that will last."
Finally, the actual elements of speech--the voice, diction,
and phrasing of ideas— come into play. If, for example, Lawrence
Olivier had delivered Hamlet's soliloquy with a Southern drawl,
.
he would have lost much of his impact, not to mention an Academy
Award. Diction is equally important— imagine Olivier doing Hamlet
with a list or a stutter. Again, the audience's expectations
would not have been fulfilled and impact would have been lost.
And as for phrasing, would Hamlet itself be a classic if "To be,
or not to be?" was instead, "Well, should I kill mvself?"
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Taken together, the personality and attitude of both speaker
and audience, as well as the elements of speech, form the crucial
components of successful oratory.
In Senator Glenn's speech, he first encountered failure in
his misinterpretation of the personality of his audience and in
its misconception of his personality. Glenn was speaking to a hall
full of fiery Democratic party activitists— the usual Convention
delegates, active at the local party level—activists who were ready
and waiting for fiery oratory. Instead Glenn gave them, intention-
ally and admittedly, a low key address. Glenn himself said he
"deliberately avoided using crowd-stirring oratory." Glenn's choice
of tone was unfortunate, for his speech thus lacked the grand phrases
and excited tones that normally mark the Keynote and are crucial
to the Keynote genre, according to Edwin Miles in his 1960 Quarterly
Journal of Speech article "The Rhetoric of the Keynote." And these
rhetorical highs were especially expected from Glenn, the former
astronaut, the great, exciting American hero--a living symbol of
a bright and promising future. Just as Glenn had misread his audi-
ence, they too had misread him.
Representative Jordan, on the other hand, anticipated well
the nature of the people she was addressing. Her speech was full
of the partisan phrases she knew would excite her Democratic lis-
teners. She declared, "The Democratic Party can lead the way.
We can find new ways to implement the system and realize our
destinv."
135
And the delegates were ready for Barbara Jordan. They expected
the Jordan they remembered from the Nixon impeachment hearings,
the one who became a House Judiciary Committee star for her eloquent
and impassioned defense of the Constitution.
And it was just that Barbara Jordan the Convention got. She
observed, "The past notwithstanding, a Barbara Jordan is before you
tonight. This is one additional bit of evidence that the American
dream need not forever be deferred." It was stunning in its impact,
largely because it was exactly what the delegates had expected from
a personality like Barbara Jordan.
Jordan was equally successful in anticipating the mood of the
delegates. They knew there was something special about the first
black, and the first woman, to deliver the Keynote Address at a
major American political party convention. Their attitude was one
of anticipation and excitement.
Jordan captured that sense, and her audience, with her open-
ing lines: "There is something different about this opening
night. What is different, and what is special, is that I, Barbara
Jordan, am a Keynote speaker." Needless to say, the attitude of
the delegates reflected that of Jordan, and she had their attention
for the rest of the speech.
Similar excitement awaited Senator Glenn. His speech was
the first major address of the Convention. As such, it would set
the tone for the rest of the week. The delegates expected oratori-
cal dynainite--but got a wet firecracker. Glenn seemed to be going
his best to put a damper on the mood of his audience. He seemed
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almost to be reproaching then when he said, "Now is the time for
all citizens to accept their obligation to participate." Glenn's
mood was one of calm, steady, sincere determination; almost the
bearing of a college lecturer before a class. Unfortunately for
Glenn, his "class" had been expecting bombastic oratory.
On one last level, though, Glenn still had the opportunity to
capture his audience. But his voice was a monotone, doing nothing
to excite the delegates. Glenn's diction was faulty as he attempted
to make himself heard over an arena that was paying little attention.
And his phrasing was amateurish and convoluted, as in this passage:
"We face great challenges, but we also face great and wondrous
opportunities to correct those faults where we have fallen so far
short of where we should be."
To complete the picture of contrast. Rep. Jordan excelled in
all three areas of speech elements. Her voice is perhaps the most
magnificent in politics. It led one observer to remark upon hear-
ing it for the first time that "it was as if the gates of Heaven
had opened." And as for diction, no one speaks more clearly or
distinctly than Barbara Jordan. David Rosenbaum of the New York
Times compared Jordan's vocal crispness to that of a Shakespearian
actor. And Jordan's phrasing that night was magic, as in this
example: If we promise, we must deliver. If we propose, we must
produce. If we ask for sacrifices, we must be the first to give."
In short, Barbara Jordan's speech was a classic example of
everything the Keynote is supposed to be—exciting, inspiring, and
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beautifully delivered, all qualities sadly lacking in this Keynote
Address of Senator John Glenn.
As might be expected, the results of the two speeches were as
different as the addresses themselves. For Barbara Jordan, all was
right with the world. Time magazine wrote, "Jordan's speech will
take its place among Democratic Convention oratorical classics."
And the New York Times editorialized, "If the delegates had been
willing to match their cheers with their votes, Barbara Jordan
might have won the Democratic Presidential nomination."
Even today, the impact of that speech remains alive. Jordan
is now voluntarily retired from the U. S. House of Representatives,
and is considered a likely choice to fill the next vacancy on the
U. S. Supreme Court--as soon as a Democrat is back in the White
House to make the appointment. Such speculation about Jordan's
future began after that stirring Keynote Address.
Senator Glenn's speech, on the other hand, put an end to some
speculation about his future. Before the speech, Glenn was con-
sidered one of Jimmy Carter's top choices to fill the second spot
on the Democratic ticket. The Miami Herald
, in fact, wrote in an
editorial published the day the speech was delivered that Glenn
would be Carter's choice. Such speculation died quickly after
the speech. Carter aide Hamilton Jordan remarked immediately
afterward, with a broad grin on his face, "Well, we know now who
we don't want for vice-president, don't we?" And James Grissinger
of Pi Kappa Delta wrote in The Forensic , "We watched and listened
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to John Glenn. What we saw and heard was trite, unimaginative,
lacking in style and imagery, lackluster in delivery—and deadly
dull."
As he delivered a speech virtually no one listened to, John
Glenn may have wished he were back, 160 miles above the surface
of the Earth, gazing down upon vast continents and oceans, and
listening, on his radio, to Barbara Jordan.
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John Murphy, 1981
On January 20, 1981, Governor Ronald Reagan fulfilled a twelve
year drean and became President Ronald Reagan. In doing so, he
dumbfounded many observers who had claimed that Reagan could not
capture that high office. As Newsweek stated November 17, 1980,
"Once he was the most underestimated man in American politics— a
washed-up movie star, it was said, who was too old, too simple and
too far right to be President." Somehow though, that washed-up
movie star managed to garner 483 electoral votes. Certainly, from
our perspective, we must wonder what rhetorical strategies Reagan
used.
In analyzing the campaign rhetoric of Ronald Reagan, I will
concentrate on his nomination-acceptance speech. Professor Kurt W.
Ritter demonstrates in the Fall 1980 Central States Speech Journal
that nomination-acceptance speeches tend to be repetitious of pre-
vious material, noting that "the unoriginal quality of the acceptance
speeches is significant, for it suggests that they are a kind of
brief rhetorical summary of what the candidate believes are his
best appeals." Time magazine's article of July 28, 1980 confirms
that Reagan adhered to that philosophy, noting that "he repackaged
phrases and lines from speeches he has been making for months."
Thus, Reagan's nomination-acceptance speech should be representa-
tive of his rhetoric. To illuminate that rhetoric, I will utilize
140
the Quest Story. I chose this methodology for a couple of reasons.
Reagan's strong personal identification with the campaign, saying
for instance, "I will not stand by and watch this great country
destroy itself," and his call for a "great national crusade" indi-
cate that Quest could provide us with a useful way into Reagan's
rhetoric. Further, the President provides us with an opportunity
to begin to examine the effects of Quest on practical politics.
W. H. Auden originated this form of the Quest Story with his
article "The Quest Hero" ( Texas Quarterly , Winter, 1961). Herman
Steltzner modified Auden's analysis slightly and put this literary
criticism in a rhetorical setting with his article "The Quest Story
and Nixon's November 3, 1969 Address" (QJS, April 1971). Professor
Steltzner details the five essential elements in a Quest: 1) A
Prized Object and/or person to be found and possessed or married,
2) a Long Journey to find the Object because its whereabouts is
not originally known to the seekers, 3) a Hero, 4) the Guardians
of the Object who must be overcome before it can be obtained, and
5) the Helpers, who with their knowledge and/or magical powers
assist the Hero and but for whom he would never succeed.
Steltzner succinctly explains the importance of the Prized
Object. "To look for a paperclip," he says, "is not a true quest."
He tells us the Prized Object should have "magnitude" and involve
"potentially great risks and great moments." Ronald Reagan provides
such an Object, but before he reveals it, he reviews the situation
with an eye toward setting up his Prized Object. He states, "Never
before in our history have Americans been called upon to face three
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grave threats to our wery existence--a disintegrating economy, a
weakened defense, and an energy policy based on the sharing of
scarcity." The candidate then denigrates the opposition, saying
they think that "America has passed its zenith," or that "it's had
its day in the sun." He directly confronts the enemy: "I utterly
reject that view." Only then does he reveal his Object: "Together,
let us make this a New Beginning." Reagan has made clear that the
America his opponents see, "a future of sacrifice and few oppor-
tunities," cannot be prized. His "new beginning" is a "renewal"
of our "compact of freedom." It requires "a commitment to care
for the needy," and "courage and sacrifice to defend our values,"
but it could allow us to "recapture our destiny" and "make America
great again." The Prized Object has been located and defined.
Time plays a central role in Reagan's analysis and thus
the Long Journey phase assumes importance. Steltzner explains that
long journies dignify the Object but he also points out that to
satisfy listeners, one must make the timeless future somehow con-
crete and reasonably immediate. Reagan dignifies his Object by
incorporating the American Revolution renewed: Abe Lincoln renewed
and now Ronald Reagan renews. He associates himself with timeless
American values and a timeless American journey. The nominee
fulfills the second condition in two ways. His very presence as
the nominated candidate of a major political party convinces his
audience that the Quest can succeed. He also repeatedly assures
them that "the time is now." Not only does this sentence charge
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the air with urgency, but also it allows his audience to feel that,
in Steltzner's words, "The battle with time can be won."
To lead the Quest, a Hero must appear. Professor Steltzner
explains that not just anybody can win the Prized Object, but only
one person with the right qualifications. He does, however, specify
two types of Hero. The first has a "superior aura manifest to all",
while the second has a "concealed aura." He turns out to be the
Hero when his manifest betters have failed. Heroes of the first
type had failed in this Quest. Reagan's conservative predecessor,
the messianic Barry Goldwater, had fallen in 1964, and certainly
the ghost of his campaign lurked in the corners. Reagan explicitly
cites another superior aura in FDR. Roosevelt had promised to
"abolish useless offices" and make government "give up luxuries."
This humble candidate swears to redeem those unkept promises. He
identifies himself as a second-aura hero through his style and his
content. Time, for instance, says the speech sounded as if "the
thoughts had just occurred to him, and darn it, he was going to
share them with his friends all over the country." Reagan talks
of "practical down to earth things, not ideological commitments."
Humble Grandpa Ron had fallen in 1968 and 1976. But now his warm
style has matured and helps lead this Quest to victory.
First though, he must overcome the Guardians. Early on Reagan
identifies the major issue of the campainn--the direct moral and
political responsibility of the Democratic Party leadership in the
White House and Congress. Reagan runs down a list of specifics.
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then asks, "Can anyone look at the record of the Administration and
say, 'Well done'?" Significantly though, Reagan creates no other
Guardians than the Administration. Not the labor unions, not the
moderate Republicans, no one. He thus assures himself of Guardians,
but he's isolated and weakened them.
The designation of the negative side of the coin, the Guardians,
naturally has an effect on the positive side, the Helpers. Ronald
Reagan opens his ranks to all Americans. "Everywhere," Reagan says,
he and his wife Nancy, "have met thousands of Democrats, Indepen-
dents and Republicans
. . . bound together in that community of
shared values." Theodore Sorensen, JFK's speech writer, sums it
up by saying, "Ronald Reagan tried to make the tent he was con-
structing large enough to hold a significant portion of the popula-
tion, and I think he did."
Election day proved that. Steltzner points out that even when
a speech fits all of the criteria, as this one demonstrably does,
the critic must look at the political effects since, in this case
and Nixon's, an effect was the goal. Reagan won an overwhelming
victory.
But the very use of Quest may damage his Presidency. As
Steltzner explains. Quest inherently magnifies the issues and the
Hero. Yet as various experts including Gerald Ford, Harry Truman,
and Newsweek magazine have pointed out, the presidency does not have
as much power as people think it does. Put a larger than life Hero
into a life-sized presidency, and you get high expectations. George
Bush put it this way: "Even people who weren't enthusiastic about
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us at first are hoping for an awful lot. It's unrealistic and they
have to realize that." Quest does not help here, and the political
ramifications could be devastating. Just imagine if Jason had
returned with only half of the Golden Fleece.
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Andy Heaton, 1982
As Speaker of the House Tip O'Neill put it, Wednesday, July 29,
1981 was a great day for the aristocracy. In the norning there
was the royal wedding. And in the afternoon, the "royal" tax cut.
Despite strong objections from its Democratic leadership, the House
of Representatives approved the nassive, three-year tax cut plan
supported by Republican President Ronald Reagan.
The final vote wasn't even close: 238 to 195. Yet as late
as two days before the crucial vote, it looked like a majority of
House members would support the Democratic alternative plan. The
New York Times of July 30, 1981 concluded: "The principle reason
behind the President's dramatic victory was Mr. Reagan's televised
speech to the nation" on Monday night. One Democratic congressman
put it more bluntly: "I sure hope he doesn't go on the tube again
. . . and say no more sex."
Usually, we tend to attribute Reagan's success on television
to the "media presence" that comes from his former profession. In
the May, 1981 edition of the Quarterly Journal of Speech , Goodwin
Berquist and James Goldin of Ohio State University support this
conclusion. Yet if we give Reagan credit for excellence only in
the non-verbal aspects of communication, we are probably selling
the man short. Besides being well-delivered, Reagan's tax speech
was well written. And the writing, the Associated Press noted.
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was principally Reagan's own. Unlike many politicians, Reagan
relies very little on speechwriters.
Without a doubt. President Reagan will continue to speak out
on important issues. And if we are to completely understand Reagan's
effectiveness as a communicator—and as President—we need to pay
some attention to the too-often-ignored Verbal aspect of Reagan's
success in analyzing his tax speech. Murray Edelman of the Univer-
sity of Wisconsin provides us with the means of doing this in his
book The Symbolic Uses of Politics .
Drawing from a number of sources including works of Leon
Festinger, pollster George Gallup, and Kenneth Burke, Edelman
presents an explanation of how and why the political process is
influenced by the symbolic reality created by the rhetoric of our
leaders. The fact that Edelman relies heavily on examples from
former Presidents suggests the suitability of his work for an
analysis of Reagan's rhetoric. An investigation of the work re-
veals three concepts which help to explain the success of Reagan's
tax speech: Strategy, Simplification, and Ambiguity. While
Edelman does not claim political rhetoric must contain these three
elements to be successful, he suggests that each of them can make
an important contribution toward success.
The first of the three concepts is Strategy. Edelman states
that in the face of a serious problem, "a leader whose acts suggest
he [is following a strategy] finds it easy to attract a loyal and
enthusiastic following." Whether the strategy itself is any good
is less important. Edelman includes the observation that when
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people are convinced a leader has a plan, they do not hold him or
her immediately responsible for 100 percent success.
Reagan capitalized on this concept of strategy by character-
izing his tax cut proposal as an essential part of his economic
program. He noted that steps toward economic recovery had already
been taken with passage of the administration's budget cuts. But,
he added, "Our economic package is a . . . carefully constructed
plan .... Only if Congress passes all of its major components
does it have any real chance of success." Reagan further emphasized
strategy by claiming his Democratic opposition didn't have one.
"They've put a tax program together for one reason only," Reagan
said, "to provide themselves with a political victory. Never mind
that it won't solve the economic problems confronting our country
. . .
." Now Reagan never promised that his plan would solve the
nation's problems, saying only that it offered a chance . But he
did emphasize that he had a strategy, while his opposition did not.
And that distinction played a crucial role in the public's accep-
tance of Reagan's plan. As the Chicago Tribune of August 2 reported,
"True, the Democrats wanted to cut taxes, too ... . But Reagan's
cuts were part of his comprehensive economic plan .... [Thus] the
public was quite willing to be mobilized in the cause."
But strategy was not the only reason Reagan won support for
his proposal. He was also able to capitalize on Edelman's second
concept. Simplification. Edelman notes that large numbers of
people cannot recognize or tolerate complex situations and that
the best way to reach these people is through simpl ifying--even
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over- s impl i fy i ng—the message. Particularly in the face of poor
economic conditions, Edelman says, people are willing to accept
distortions of reality if they serve to counter feelings of in-
security.
One of the remarkable things about Reagan's tax speech was
that it covered an extremely technical subject without getting
bogged down in statistics. Reagan accomplished that by engaging
in a good deal of simplification. One example occurred when Reagan
told his audience about the all-savers plan— a proposal that allows
financial institutions to offer tax-free interest on certain
accounts. Reagan said only that the plan included "short-term
but substantial assistance for the hard-pressed thrift industry."
That explanation was accurate, but far from complete. Actually,
the all-savers plan is quite complicated and rather controversial,
for some analysts feared it might actually hurt the thrift industry
in the long run. In his speech, however, Reagan omitted the com-
plexities of the plan, keeping his message easy to understand.
Reagan applied the same principle of Simplification to the
other provisions of his tax bill and, in one of the speech's most
memorable lines, to the entire bill as a whole. Reagan quoted
the Southern farmer who reduced the entire tax-cut issue to its
most basic form in asking his congressman, "Well, are you fur 'em,
or agin 'em?" Reagan was thus able to transform a complex question
into a referendum on his personal popularity. Though perhaps a
bit of a distortion, at a time when his standing in the polls was
high, Reagan made effective use of Simplification. Newsweek
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magazine concluded that Ronald Reagan is better at simplifying
issues than any president since Harry Truman.
Just as this concept of Simplification appeals to the public's
dislike of complexity, so does the third concept—Ambiguity. Am-
biguous terms can have a variety of meanings, but almost always
evoke an emotional response. Edelman gives the example of a poli-
tician who might claim a proposed law would "curb unfair tactics"
and "safeguard the public interest." It would be difficult to
argue with goals such as those, until you realize that terms such
as "unfair" and "public interest" mean different things to differ-
ent people. By using ambiguous language, a politician can conceal
possible differences with the public.
Reagan used this strategy of ambiguity extensively through-
out his speech. The Republican plan, Reagan said, would "renew the
American spirit." It would "make America great again." And of
course it offered the ever-present "new beginning." Those terms
and others like them are examples of the type of language referred
to by John Cragin of Illinois State University and Donald Shields
of the University of Missouri at Saint Louis in their 1976 study
of presidential campaign rhetoric. Cragin and Shields found that
the most successful political language is composed of "safe poli-
tical phrases that most Americans would have difficulty rejecting",
ambiguous phrases very m.uch like the ones found scattered through-
out Reagan's tax speech.
Reagan thus included elements of all three of Edelman's con-
cepts: Strategy, Simplification, and Ambiguity. Obviously we
cannot discount entirely the effects of Reagan's delivery on the
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success of the speech. But Hendrik Hertzberg, a former speechwriter
for Jimmy Carter, supports the general contention that it was textual
elements that were the crucial factor. In The Mew Republic , Hertz-
berg called REagan's speech "an impressive piece of v/ork" though he
never saw nor heard it, only reading a copy of the text. As Hertz-
berg remarked, even if it had been delivered in a dull monotone it
still would have been effective. Delivered instead in Reagan's usual
style, the speech generated an amazing response from the public.
Western Union reported a ten-fold increase in traffic; moreover, the
House and Senate received more than twice as many letters as usual
over the next three days. And the response was overwhelmingly in
favor of the President. One representative. Bo Ginn of Georgia,
reported only four pro-Democrat phone calls out of more than 400, and
one of those was from Jimmy Carter. The avalanche of public support
had an undeniable effect on Congress. As Representative Bill Nelson
of Florida put it, "Previous Presidents tried and failed to go over
the heads of Congress. But in this age of electronic media, a good
communicator can go straight to the public with a simple and direct
message."
There's no doubt Reagan is a good communicator. And, as we've
seen through analysis of his July 19th tax speech, he's capable of
delivering that simple and direct message as well. That's something
we need to keep in mind as we observe Reagan's performances in the
legislative battles that lie ahead in the next few years. He probably
won't win them all, but Ronald Reagan is certainly one persuasive
speaker who can make more than a trite solution out of "Write your
congressman"!
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Sam Marcosson, 1983
Lyndon Johnson told the nation, "Have no fear of escalation, I
am trying everyone to please. And though it isn't really war, we're
sending 50,000 more to help save Vietnam from Vietnamese." Tom
Paxton's protest song of the 1960's was only one of many, as America
raised its voice against the conduct of American involvement in
Southeast Asia. And one of the basic problems, as Paxton suggests,
was what Lyndon Johnson told the nation. Johnson's rhetoric con-
tributed greatly to his problems, and to public dissent surrounding
the Vietnam conflict. And a study of that rhetoric can tell us much
about the Vietnam War, and about Presidential war discourse in
general
.
Robert Ivie's October, 1974 Quarterly Journal of Speech article,
"Presidential Motives for War" provides us with a lens for viewing
Johnson's rhetoric. Ivie analyzes, "The vocabulary of American
Presidents to locate the Images they project in justification of
War, "--precisely the rhetorical process in which Lyndon Johnson
engaged.
Ivie identifies four stages in Presidential war discourse,
which he then establishes as a criteria for successful war rhetoric.
In the first stage, the President will identify an ideal, a moral
principle, which is being threatened and necessitates our entry
into war. Within this stage there operate god-terms, defined by
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Richard Weaver as representing that ideal to which all others are
secondary. Next the President will identify a crisis which treatens
that ideal. Third, he will show the cause of that crisis, and in
so doing, "will persistently hold the enemy accountable for the
crisis confronting America." Within each of these two areas operate
devil-terms, the antithesis of the god-tenn. In Lyndon Johnson's
Vietnam War rhetoric, the second and third areas of Ivie's method
were closely intertwined. Finally, the President will propose the
solution--war. It is crucial that war be proposed only as a last
resort, pursued only when other, peaceful approaches have failed to
restore the ideal or prevent the disharmony. Johnson's rhetoric
fits this classification system remarkably well, and it allows us
to understand the failure of his rhetoric, through his failure to
fulfill that fourth stage of Ivie's method.
Johnson was remarkably effective, however, in that first stage-
identifying the ideal. To Johnson, freedom was the ideal, and it
operated as a god-term worth defending in Vietnam. A February, 1966
Johnson address, for example, contained 49 separate references to
freedom, such as, "Tonight, in South Vietnam, more than 200,000 of
our young Americans stand there fighting for your freedom." "The
American forces of freedom," he declared, "were defending freedom's
frontier."
Even two years later, with dissent over the war reaching its
peak, Johnson stuck to his rhetorical guns. In his famous March 30,
1968 address in which Johnson announced a temporary halt to the
bombina of North Vietnam and that he would not seek re-election to
. 'i
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the White House, Johnson continued to identify freedom as the opera-
tive ideal. In reference to South Vietnam he said, "Its people
maintain their determination to be free of domination by the North."
Thus did Johnson's rhetoric identify freedom as the ideal, the
god-term. But his rhetoric also had to show the corresponding
devil-terms, which Ivie writes operate within the framework of
"the crisis" and "the cause of the crisis."
In Johnson's rhetorical scheme of things, the crisis was '
aggression--hostility against South Vietnam. F. M. Kail writes in
his book What Washington Said that in 1965, "Aggression became the
principal symbol for hostile activity in South Vietnam." And the
accompanying devil-term which served to identify the cause of that
crisis was, of course. Communism. A January, 1966 Johnson address
served to make the link between Communism and aggression quite
clear through the President's effective use of a "before-after"
scenario. The before portion was pre-war, idyllic Vietnam:
Not too many years ago, Vietnam was a peaceful
land. In the North was an independent. Communist
government. In the South the people struggled
to build a nation, with the friendly help of the
United States.
This section was followed by the after phase.
Then, a little more than six years ago, North
Vietnam decided on conquest. And from that day
to this, soldiers and supplies have flowed from
North to South in a swelling stream, swallowing
the remnants of revolution in aggression.
And from that point on in the speech, for the next nine paragraphs,
Johnson made 12 separate references to "conquest," "assault," and
"aggression." The symbolism was unmistakable: the threat to
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freedom—the ideal, the god-term--came fron Communist aggression,
the crisis and its cause, the devil terms. And as F. M. Kail makes
clear, for the next three years until Johnson left the White House
he was remarkably consistent in linking "Communism" with "aggression."
For the first three stages of Ivie's method, then, Johnson's
rhetoric would seem to be perfectly appropriate Presidential War
discourse, and it would seem to offer us little insight into
Johnson's rhetorical failure. It is in that fourth stage, identify-
ing the solution, that Johnson's rhetoric fell far short of "appro-
priate"--perhaps "disastrous" would be a better term.
Like Eisenhower and Kennedy before him, Johnson stressed that
the U.S. role in the solution was to support South Vietnam--to
supplement their activity. In April of 1965, for example, Lyndon
Johnson told the nation, "We have made a national pledge to HELP
South Vietnam to defend its independence." Once again, Johnson's
approach had not changed three years later. By the time of his
denouement, the March 30, 1968 address, Johnson told the public,
"Our presence there has always rested on this basic belief: that
the main burden for preserving their freedom must be carried out
by the South Vietnamese themselves."
For Eisenhower and Kennedy, it was legitimate to speak of a
limited U.S. responsibility, since our commitment there was relatively
limited. The number of troops being sent and dollars being spent
seemed appropriate, or at least rational, for a nation that was sup-
porting another.
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Johnson's escalation was an entirely different rhetorical situ-
ation. If the primary burden was still South Vietnam's, many
Maericans wondered why was the U.S. committing 500,000 young men,
and billions of dollars a year, to the fight? It seemed to most of
us that the U.S. was shouldering the burden which Johnson kept tell-
ing us was Vietnam's.
Ivie also points cut that war becomes an acceptable course
only when the public believes it is the only means available to
protect the ideal. By presenting Vietnamese action as an alterna-
tive means, Johnson served to undermine the justification for the
massive American involvement. If the South Vietnamese could still
act on their own behalf, the U.S. action was premature--and, to the
American public, unjustifiable.
That the failure of Lyndon Johnson's Vietnam War rhetoric
occurred in the solution phase was demonstrated in the character
of the public protest surrounding the Vietnam VJar. Much of that
protest centered on the actual conduct of the war--the solution.
Senator William Fulbright and Arthur Schlesinger both argued that
by bombing North and South Vietnam, the U.S. was destroying the very
people we were trying to "save." New Left political activitist
Carl Oglesby went so far as to say that the U.S. was destroying
itself by our conduct of the War. Later on in the 1960's questions
did begin to arise about whether there really was "freedom" in South
Vietnam, and about the "aggressive" nature of the Communists in
North Vietnam—but these questions arose later, after Johnson's
difficulties with the solution phase, and the conduct of the war.
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had undermined his credibility and paved the way for the downfall
of his administration.
A study of Johnson's rhetoric yields several conclusions.
The first concerns Robert Ivie's methodolocjy itself. Johnson's
failure to fulfill that fourth stage of Ivie's prescription, and the
public response he met with, indicate that at least that portion of
the criteria is valid, and that a president who fails to meet it is
likely to be met with a massive credibility gap.
Even more important, many of the questions about the differences
between a "full-scale war" and a so-called "limited war" seem to
gain at least a partial answer. At least on the rhetorical level,
a president who enters a limited war situation may be taking upon
himself an impossible burden. As Ivie describes it, war is a final,
ultimate, no-holds-barred solution. But the very term "limited war"
implies limited means and objectives. This contradiction in the
nature of a limited war may make it impossible for a leader to jus-
tify such a course. Certainly, further study is needed into the
possibility that a new sub-genre of limited war rhetoric may be
forming within the overall category of presidential war rhetoric
—
research which should center on our involvement in Korea, our inter-
vention in Lebanon in 1956, in the Dominican Republic in 1964, and
the current situations in El Salvador and Lebanon.
The difficulty faced by Lyndon Johnson justifying our involve-
ment in Vietnam may also indicate a positive trend for our society.
Our society may finally be becoming sophisticated enough, and our
people wise enough, that we will never again allow our leaders to
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justify easily war—the destruction, the death of thousands of young
men, women, and children--to justify easily what is almost never
"justifiable."
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Todd Rasmuson, 1984
A recent T-shirt proudly pictured a football coach strolling
across a calm lake. The caption read: "If he can't walk on water,
he sure knows where the stunps are." His wife had been quoted as
he slipped into bed, "God, you're feet are cold!" The coach responded,
"Around the house, dear, you can call me Paul."
Although few people may remember this coach on a first name
basis, his nickname along with his incredible accomplishments as
coach at Alabama will long be remembered. The legend is Paul
"Bear" Bryant.
But Bryant is known for much more than a collection of winning
statistics printed in a trivia book. According to Alabama's House
Speaker Pro Tern, Roy Johnson, "He was a legend and an inspiration
to the young people of this state. His life and his accomplish-
ments have enhanced the image of Alabama throughout the nation and
the world.
Bryant's significant influence raised his status to a mythical
level and he was even worshipped. Many stories developed about
Bryant that strengthened this rhetorical image. One such story had
him shopping for a burial plot, and a cemetery salesman showed him
one for a thousand dollars. Bryant said, "That seems a little steep,
boy. I'm only going to be here for three days."
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By examining Bryant's rhetorical image, many interesting
analogies can be drawn that support the idea of Bryan t as Alabama's
Secular Christ. Because of Bryant's significant influence, his
rhetorical persona is worthy of our careful consideration.
In this criticism, I will concentrate on the later part of
Bryant's career which developed his rhetorical image because it
is most likely how Bryant will be remembered. To illuminate the
impact of the myth, I will use his retirement speech delivered
on December 15, 1982 as a prime example of his rhetoric. The
application of ideas from two rhetorical critics effectively illus-
trate the concept of Bryant as a Secular Christ. First, Kenneth
Burke discusses the structure of a rhetorical myth and secondly,
Ernest Bromann points out how a myth propogates as disciples spread
the word.
Kenneth Burke, always on the lookout for analogies, in his book
The Rhetoric of Motives , asks the questions. Our culture formed
about the redemption of the sacrifice of a crucified Christ. What
happens in an era of post Christian Science when the ways of sociali-
zation have been secularized? Must some person or persons take
over the redemptive role?
To answer these questions using Bryant as a role model, one
must determine if Bryant possesses the necessary characteristics
in the structure of a rhetorical myth. Three credentials are impera-
tive to qualify Bryant as a Christ figure: mutual beliefs, strong
leadership, and what Burke labels as the essence of religion,
sacrifice.
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In order for an audience member to worship Bryant, Burke would
claim their interests must be joined. The more common ground
between speaker and audience, the stronger the identification,
understanding, and appreciation of ideas. Bryant's rhetorical myth
spread his beliefs like an Alabama star: bright and hot at its
origin, but some heat and light radiated across the nation. To
an unquestioning Alabama fan, Bryant could do no wrong, but respect
and admiration could even come from a dedicated Cornhusker.
Besides identifying with believers in football, Bryant was
also noted as a strong Christian. It was said an athiest in Alabama
is someone who didn't believe in Bear Bryant. Bookstores carried
postcards picturing Bryant walking on water saying, "I Believe."
Bryant began believing as a young child in Moro Bottom, Arkan-
sas. His parents had only one book in the house, the Bible: and
the family's social life existed at one regular place: the Smith
Chapel, about a quarter mile from his home. His mother wanted him
to become a preacher, and Bryant felt he had.
Although Bryant never led a congregation in church, he demon-
strated strong leadership on the football field and produced the
best college coaching record of all time. Bryant said, "God did
give me the gift of leading men. I can do that. So I don't try
to save the world. I just go at it one football player at a time."
As a leader, Bryant instilled a God-like fear and respect
into his players and assistant coaches. John David Crow, a Heisen-
man trophy winner, was afraid to knock on his door to interrupt
him. And after being ordered to be at Bryant's office first thing
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in the morning, assistant coach Dude Henessey, not knowing what
first thing meant, slept on the office floor that night.
One coaching technique used by Bryant that put fear into his
players and positioned the Bear as an omniscient God was his use
of the coaching tower. According to an interview I had v/ith one
of his players, "When Bryant climbed to the top of the tower plat-
form, you didn't want him coning down until practice was over or
it meant trouble." Sports Illustrated , November 23, 1981 writes,
"The gridiron King will zero in on this one or that one for two or
three plays. But of course, no one down there knows whom he might
be v;atching at any given moment. But everyone feels the Bear is
coming right down on him which is the way he wants it."
This God-like judgment gave even more power to the rhetorical
myth, but the more power, the more Bryant remained humble. His
Christ-like humility has a significant argumentative function in
his rhetoric. In his retirement speech, Bryant uses an enthymeme
with the premise, "We lost two big football games we should have
won," and draws the conclusion, "I've done a poor job of coaching."
Bryant jumps past a few small mistakes and his audience must con-
centrate on his overall coaching ability, which really cannot be
denied. However, Bryant's fans do not fall for this type of argu-
ment. Senior majorette for Alabama, Kim Norris, says: "Nobody's
supposed to beat Bear Bryant. But we know it's not his fault,
whatever he says. It's the quarterback who fumbled or it's just
a bad day, but it's never Coach Bryant."
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The third characteristic of a mythic figure, and very impor-
tant according to Burke, is sacrificing. In his retirement speech,
Bryant makes the supreme sacrifice of giving up his important
coaching position for the football program. He says: "They deserve
better coaching than they've been getting from me this year, and
my stepping down is an effort to see that they get that better
coaching from someone else."
Throughout his career, his work and his vision of winning are
propogated by groups of disciples. Ernest Bormann, in his 1972 QJS
article, "Fantasy and Rhetorical Vision: The Rhetorical Criticism
of Social Reality," constructs a vision of fantasy themes that chain
out in speaker-audience transactions, in viev/ers of television
broadcasts, in listeners to radio programs, and in diverse settings
for public and intimate communication in a given society.
Bryant's rhetorical vision is propogated by three groups of
disciples: the football players, the fans, and finally the reporters.
Bryant's football players spread his beliefs by winning foot-
ball games and Bryant didn't forget this fact. One may wonder how
well Bryant remembered the thousands of players he coached over the
years. Well, one player returned after three years of pro ball, and
Bryant not only remembered him but also the name of the girl he
used to date. Each football Saturday Bryant's players practiced
their religion in a church called Bryant-Denny stadium, and seated
in the rows of pews along the sidelines, fans wildly shouted the
secular equivalents to "Alleluiahs and Amens."
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Like his brief resignation speech, Bryant didn't have to say
much to please the sellout crowds that attended his games. Bryant
converted fans around the nation to Alabama's popular religion through
his actions. The Bear was a winner, and a record 323 wins had gained
him quite a following.
Bryant's rhetorical myth had significantly chained out due to
one disciple group: the media. In fact, Bryant delivered his resig-
nation speech in a small press room to an audience of three-fourths
reporters. Of course, his speech was heard by more than this imm.e-
diate audience. TV, radio, magazines, and newspapers covered the
event, and a copy of his speech was even printed in the program of
his final football game. College football fans knew a mythical
hero was hanging up his houndstooth hat.
Obviously, Bear Bryant is not a true savior, and football is
not an authentic religion. However many Christ analogies can illu-
minate Bryant's rhetorical myth. Because of mutual beliefs, strong
leadership, and sacrifice, Bryant possessed the appropriate mythical
structure. And through the football players, fans, and reporters,
Bryant's rhetorical myth propogated to the end of his career.
However, Kenneth Burke, in his book. The Rhetoric of Religion
,
speaks of Christ as having retired from the world though at the same
time without having retired. The beliefs communicated by Bryant's
rhetorical myth are still very evident today. The University of
Alabama was highly ranked in the nation this year, and other coaches
are preaching ideas that they learned from Bryant. In fact, Ray
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Perkins, who had once been at Alabama under Bryant, returned from
the pros to coach the Crimson Tide. However he removed the coaching
tower since he realized he could only continue God's work. Whether
they will be as successful without Bryant, it is difficult to predice.
But they will no doubt remember that believinn and winning are the
"Bear" necessities.
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Steve Sudhoff, 1983
During the recent history of the American presidency, brothers
have often played important roles. Durinn the Kennedy years, John,
Robert, and sometines even Ted would be involved in major policy
decisions. Richard Nixon sometimes had trouble controlling the
questionable business dealings of his brother, Donald. And, of
course, there were Jimmy, and Billy. At first it seemed as though
the only major problems associated with Billy Carter were that he
guzzled beer and relieved himself in public. But, as it seems with
all brothers, Billy was around when Jimmy needed him . . . the least.
For it was during the summer of 1980, as the Iranian hostage crisis,
the sad shape of the American economy, and the impending Demogratic
National Convention began to close around President Jimmy Carter,
that Billy Carter's name was splashed across American newspaper
headlines with reports of possible illegal business transactions
between Billy and the government of Libya. Yet, when it seemed
that Billy might be the final nail in Jimmy's political coffin,
Jimmy was able to resurrect his hold on the presidency through
Ronald Reagan's favorite medium, television. On August fourth,
1980, as a skeptical American electorate looked on, Jimmy Carter
held a nationally-televised press conference in the East Room of
the White House. On the day before the press conference. New York
Times columnist Terrence Smith wrote that, unless Carter was
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extraordinarily successful at the conference, Billygate would renain
a nagging political headache that would stay with hin throughout
the presidential election campaign. Yet, at the conference. Carter
put on the show of his life, defending not only the actions of his
brother, but his own actions in permitting Billy to deal with the
Libyans. Carter statements at the conference are an excellent example
of the use of political apologia. It seems apprepriate, then, that
we examine Carter's statements with a rhetorical tool designed to
be used in studying apologetic addresses. "They Spoke in Defense
of Themselves; On the Generic Criticism of Apologia," by B. L. Ware
and Will Linkugel, provides us with just such an appropriate tool
to examine Carter's statements. For, as they note, "The questioning
of a man's moral nature, motives, or reputation, is qualitatively
different from the challenging of his policies. Witnesses to such
a personal charge are most easily and most completely satisfied only
by the most direct of responses by the accused." And, in fact.
Carter's press conference was just such a direct response, because
Billygate was just such a case where Jimmy Carter's reputation was
called into question. For, as one analyst noted, this scandal, to
the American public, was another example of Carter's ineptitude and
mismanagement, "another piece of plaster loose behind the wallpaper."
Our analysis here can be threefold. First, we need to look, in
greater depth, at the method put forth by Ware and Linkugel and to
describe those parts of the method relevant to our analysis. Then,
we can examine Carter's remarks in light of the method, and finally,
we can look at Carter's success, and the effects of that success.
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In their article, Ware and Linkugel argue that a speaker giving
an apologetic address will usually adopt a major rhetorical posture
which helps to place in the minds of the audience what the speaker
is attempting to accomplish. As we look at Carter's press conference
remarks of August fourth, 1980, we can clearly see the attempts by
Carter to clear his name; Carter is obviously seeking acquittal from
public opinion and the press. Ware and Linkugel would classify
such a posture as being "absolutive," as Carter sought acquittal
by "focusing audience attention upon the particulars or specifics
of the charge." In adopting this posture. Ware and Linkugel argue
that a speaker would use strategies indicating the presence of tv;o
factors of verbal self-defense. These factors are "denial," and
"differentiation." Denial consists of "the simple disavowal by the
speaker of any participation in, relation to, or positive sentiment
toward whatever it is that repels the audience." Differentiation,
on the other hand, "subsumes those strategies which serve the purpose
of separating some fact, sentiment, object, or relationship from
some larger context within which the audience presently views that
attribute." The movement on the part of the audience is to view
the attribute as being less abstract, more specific.
Having briefly examined Ware and Linkugel's work on apologia,
we can turn our attention to Carter's press conference remarks of
August fourth, 1980. While at the conference Carter used strategies
indicating the presence of two other factors of verbal self-defense-
bolstering and transcendence. His use of such strategies was quali-
tatively and quantitatively insignificant in comparison to his use
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of strategies indicating the presence of denial and differentiation.
As we look at strategies termed as denial, we see that Carter used
such strategies from the beginning to the end of the press conference.
In answering the first question, "Do you konw where the Libyan
payments did go and how Billy used the money?". Carter responded,
"No, I don't know where the money went, or where it might go." When
asked about whether he knew that Billy had received money from Libya,
Carter stated, "No, I never had any indication that Billy was receiv-
ing any money until I read about it in the newspapers on July 15."
In subsequent responses to questions Carter denied knowing of Billy's
financial stake in the dealings, denied a personal financial interest
in the dealings, and denied having discussed the case with Billy.
Carter also relied upon what Ware and Linkugel refer to as "denial
of intent" in order to persuade his audience, the American public.
Carter states, "Billy did go to Libya," but "without my knowledge
or approval." He noted that after one Libyan delegation had visited
Georgia, "Billy was severely castigated by [me] . . . Following that,
I tried to persuade him not to go to Libya," but Billy disobeyed,
to which the President stated, "I don't believe there's anything
further I could have done that would have been effective."
Besides these strategies of denial. Carter also used strategies
classified as differentiation in an important way. A major problem
faced by Carter was the "aura of incompetence" that surrounded his
administration. Before the press conference, columnist Joseph Kraft
noted that, "The President . ... [has shown] no capacity to deal
with the Billy problem .... [W]hy did it happen? Because Jimmy
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Carter is an essentially weak President who does not deal with
problens until they hit hin in the face." In order to overcome such
criticism, Carter had to differentiate--separate— the Billygate
issue from the issue of incompetence, to make the audience view
Billygate as something less abstract, not simply another example
of the incompetence of the administration. In using this strategy.
Carter makes the following statement: "I don't believe this has
been a comedy of errors, or that we have made many errors. A few,
yes, we've made some mistakes— but that was because we were in a
hurry to get all the information out. It was much better to have
all the inforTiation come out . . . than if we would have stone-
walled the question for two or three weeks." In addition. Carter
argues that time would be the ultimate judge of the administration's
accomplishments. He noted, "I believe the historic record of this
administration will show that it was a competent administration . . .
and had many notable achievements." What Carter requested is a
strategy of differentiation noted by Ware and Linkugel, "... a
suppression of judgment until his actions can be viewed from a
different temporal perspective."
Given Carter's use of strategies indicating the presence of
denial and differentiation, we can conclude that Carter's posture
was absolutive--that he sought acquittal. Perhaps the best way to
verify this conclusion is to examine the public reaction to Carter's
statements, thus also gaining some overall measure of Carter's
success. First, we see that the audience— the press and the public--
was highly impressed by Carter's use of strategies indicating the
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presence of denial. Typical newspaper headlines the next day read,
"Carter Denies Impropriety in Dealings With his Brother." One New
York Times columnist, on the day after the press conference, stated
that Carter, by providing a blitzkrieg of information denying the
charges, brought the issue to a political climax. Carter's use of
strategies showing differentiation reinforced this posture. By
separating the BiUygate issue from the issue of incompetence, Carter
showed the reporters as making a mountain out of a molehill. Herbert
Klein, the communication director at the Nixon White House (and
therefore an expert on both mountains and molehills), said that
Carter kept his cool and made the newsmen look unprofessional. One
reporter, Sam Donaldson, even received calls from viewers denouncing
him as viscious toward the President. Carter's posture was clearly
absolutive.
Yet, what were the direct effects of this posture? For one
thing, congressional investigations into the matter all but ended.
Senator Robert Dole, who had been pushing for an investigation, the
next day backed away, claiming no basis for the charges. According
to Washington Post Editor Barry Sussman, Billygate had "gone poof."
The reaction among the general public was similar. A Hew York Times
poll conducted the two days before the press conference showed that
only forty-seven percent of those polled believed that Carter was
telling the truth about Libya. After the press conference, that
percentage was fifty-nine percent. In addition. Carter solidified
his support among Democratic voters. Before the conference, the
preference among Democrats for who should receive the party's
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nomination was forty-three percent for Carter and forty-three per-
cent for Kennedy. After the press conference, the margin was fifty-
seven percent for Carter, and thirty-two percent for Kennedy. At
least in its immediate impact, Carter's press conference was highly
successful. In addition. Carter's remarks give us greater insight
into the nature of apologia, for we see that apologia can be found
not only in those communication events entirely prepared in advance,
but also in the more extemporaneous atmosphere of a press conference.
We see an affirmation and an extension of Ware and Linkugel's work
in that we find that factors of verbal self-defense, and a posture
of verbal self-defense, can be found in those communication events
not entirely prepared in advance.
Having examined Carter's press conference of August, 1980, we
see that Carter was able to use apologia to retain, although briefly,
his hold on the presidency. Of course. Carter's remarks did not
help him win the November election, but perhaps historians will
treat Carter a bit more kindly in light of his brilliant performance.
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Cham Ferguson, 1983
Everyone likes to be seduced. Everyone enjoys being the center
of attention. Who recognizes this more than anyone? TV ads, TV
rhetoric. Uho are the champions of television commercials? The
beer advertisers.
American breweries spent $550 million in 1981 in hopes of
getting us to become alcoholics preferring their beer. There are
many beer companies and beer ads, at this time though, the fiercist
competition on TV seems to be taking place between Miller and Anheuser-
Busch as they fight for the number one spot. Since its purchase by
Phillip Morris Co. in 1971, Miller has steadily advanced on Anheuser-
Busch 's coveted crown as the king of beers. As the fight enters
the 80's, a rhetorical analysis of Miller's TV ads could provide
valuable insight into their battle plan.
In this speech, I will analyze Miller's three main beers:
Miller Hi-Life, Lowenbrau and Miller Lite. I will examine three
TV commercials offered by Miller, each a representative example
of how Miller is trying to sell its beer.
In an attempt to illustrate and understand the rhetoric used
by these coirmercials, I will apply Edward Steele and W. Charles
Redding's "The American Values System: A Premise for Persuasion,"
in conjunction with Walter R. Fisher's "A Motive View of Communi-
cation."
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First, Steele and Redding arrive at the conclusion that 1) it
is possible to locate a body of relatively unchanging values shared
by most Americans, and 2) it is possible to observe the explicit
and implicit functioning of such values as the underpinning for per-
suasive, appealing argument. Within their article, Steele and
Redding imply that certain images are established through cultural
values. Once we see these specific images established in the three
commercials, I will move to Fisher's "motive view" of communication.
Fisher says images are subjected to or are attacked by four
motives, or kinds of rhetorical situations. They are: Affirmation,
concerned with giving birth to an image; Reaffirmation, concerned
with revitalizing an image; Purification, the correcting of an image;
and Subversion, the undermining of an image. Fisher argues that this
manipulation of the image causes a corresponding change in the image's
ethos. Persuasion, and hence rhetoric, is then effected.
Our first order from our rhetorical barmaid will be a draw of
Miller Hi-Life commercial. The representative Miller ad shows
several macho males as they get off work and head to town for a
good time at the local bar. Framed behind a cowboy and rural back-
drop, general frivolity and good times follow.
The most prominent value displayed is Steele and Redding's
Puritan Morality value. Based on an extension of the Puritan work
ethic, we now view hard work as being rewarded not with salvation
necessarily, but with economic success or impulse gratification.
This is established in the Miller as with the production techniques,
the song lyrics and the actual story.
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With the production techniques, we are subjected to many rapid
sequences of pictures. This, coupled with the up-tenpo music, helps
create the positive tension in the commercial. We know that these
guys are not only going to have fun, they're going to have some good
clean rowdy fun!
The lyrics of the song and the narrator then clearly establish
just what is taking place. We are welcomed to "Miller Time", the
end of the day when we are getting our just reward. As the song
says, "We've got the beer for what you have in mind." To reinforce
this, the narrator tells the potential alcoholic that Miller is the
"best beer for the best times."
Finally, the story of the commercial hits us with fast action
to reinforce the positive tension. Horses racing cars, swing dancing,
heads dunked in a water trough being whipped out spraying water, a
six pack of Miller pulled out of a trough, quick entrances and highly
energetic people in the bar, back slapping, hat waving and heels up
kicking.
The cormercial is clearly establishing an identification with
the Puritan moral ity value. We are told that we have worked hard
and it is time to have fun. Even more importantly, our reward has
to be a Miller. After all, it is the "best beer."
Tieing the image created by the value in with Fisher, it is
now apparent that affirmation is being employed.
Affirmation is used in situations when a communicator addresses
potential believers in an effort to get them to adopt a "new" concept.
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The Miller ad is trying to get the audience to adopt the new concept
that Miller is the best and only way to have fun. The new image is
a combination of the Puritan Morality and Miller beer.
This new image is driven hone at the very end of the commercial.
As the song lyrics tell us that "its all yours" the happy bartender
thrusts four Millers practically right into your face.
The second round ordered from the rhetorical tavern is the
Lowenbrau commercial. Lowenbrau is Miller's high-class beer, designed
to appeal to the more affluent drinker. So it is not too surprising
that the Lowenbrau ads are built on the foundation of what Steele
and Redding call the Material Comfort value. They note that the
opportunity to secure material comfort has elicited an unlimited
desire for them, which is broadly equated with happiness.
The typical Lowenbrau ad takes place at a weekend cabin retreat.
We are greeted with two men chopping wood as their wives return with
the groceries. As they go inside, the men decide to reward them-
selves with a Lowenbrau. The people, their clothes, the cabin and
all the surrounding images suggest upper-middle-class status.
As the mood is more relaxed in this commercial, the camera
takes long, slow shots. The music is very mellow, suggesting a
relaxing weekend at your cabin retreat.
The song lyrics in the backgraound establish the material com-
fort idea, "Tonight is something special, the beer will pour, but
it must be something more somehow--Let it be Lowenbrau." With the
narrator telling us that it is a "Great American Beer", one of the
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men notes that even though he's so tired, he would have a Lowenbrau
even if he had to hold it with two hands.
The commercial is clearly appealing to our material values.
The images are all upper-middle class. The cabin owners are clearly
affluent by their clothes and even by the fact that to then, chopping
wood is recreational, not everyday work.
This material value is subjected to Fisher's concept of Reaffirma-
tion. Reaffirnation describes a situation in which a communicator
attempts to revitalize an image or faith already held by the audience.
In the Lowenbrau commercial, that image is clearly one of material
gratification. We would all like to be able to have a weekend re-
treat. While we may not have the cabin, the material comfort, we
can have the material comfort of Lowe.'brau. We too can end our day
like the couples, with a clink of beer mugs raised in toast. It
may not be in a grand cabin, but it is Lowenbrau beer.
Lastly, Miller's latest line of beer has been Miller Lite. At
first this beer was marketed as a diet brew, but this idea did not
catch on. So the approach was dropped. Not surprisingly, the Lite
Beer ads now appeal to a Macho Male value. While Steele and Redding
do not directly address a Macho value, they do note in their article
that they do not make a complete inventory of all American values.
It could be argued that the recent attacks on the "men-have-to-be-
macho" image is proof in itself that such a value exists.
The representative Miller Lite commercial plays directly to
this value. Ue are confronted with the Miller Lite All Stars at
a bowling tournament. The All Stars are made up of retired macho
177
athletes. Ue see Bubba Smith, a former football player, poke new
holes in a bowling ball with his bare hands. Deacon Jones, a former
terror of the gridiron, knocks down three lanes of pins, with just
one ball
.
The identification of the Macho value is blatant. This is not
surprising, as Advertising Age magazine points out, "Brewers know
their best customer is the 18 to 49 year-old male, one who quite
likely thinks of himself as the macho type."
The problem for Miller is that while women prefer light beer
over regular, men still consume 70% of it. To keep the macho image,
the diet image has to be negated.
Hence, the commercial is best explained by Fisher's Purification.
Purification is found in situations in which a communicator attempts
to refine an image. The Lite commercial refines the image by appeal-
ing to macho jocks. For every time that we are told that it is less
filling, we are iirmediately reminded that it tastes great.
What's more, the big burly types are ready to force their view
right down your throat if you care to disagree. Hardly the kind of
im.age a diet beer would try to identify with. So, if we wish to
save a few calories, but still want to be a man, we can maintain
our image with Lite beer from Miller.
The success of such image manipulation is best established
by the impressive increase in Miller's sales. As Business Week
notes, in the last decade. Miller's market share has gone from 4.2%
up to Z^%. They go on to state that Miller has blossomed from a
seventh-place also-ran into a strong number two. The general
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feeling seems to be that the praise should be laid at the feet of
a massive and innovative advertising strategy. Perhaps the nost
convincing sign of success comes from Anheuser-Busch. Instead of
trying to up-grade their product to stave off the challenge, Anheuser-
Busch has decided to fight fire with fire. They increased their
advertising budget 245% since 1975, to the tune of 175 million dollars.
So, if you are into rowdy good times at the local bar, relaxing
weekends with friends, bowling with the buddies or just browsing
through Aristotle, remember.
If you've got the time. Miller's got the rhetoric.
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Steve Sudhoff, 1984
A French ambassador once observed, "It is fortunate that diplo-
mats generally have long noses, since usually they cannot see beyond
them." In the relationship between the United States and the Soviet
Union since World War II, it seems that at times both governments
have refused to see beyond the ends of their noses in order to make
the basic compromises in their own positions which could have led
to mutually-beneficial agreements. However, on the afternoon of
June 10, 1963, President John Kennedy took a major step toward a
more peaceful world. In an address to the graduating class of Ameri-
can University in Washington, D.C., Kennedy announced his willingness
to sign a limited nuclear test ban treaty with the Soviet Union.
Labelled "A Strategy of Peace," the speech was widely acclaimed as
the major diplomatic break responsible for the signing of the Limited
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty two months later. Given the current stagna-
tion of arms control, it seems that we can learn something by examin-
ing Kennedy's speech and his diplomatic strategy. In order to do
so, v;e can use a rhetorical tool designed to be used in studying
siplomatic speech. In his article entitled, "The Speech of Diplo-
macy as a Field for Research," published in the March 1950 Central
States Speech Journal , Robert T. Oliver provides us with just such
an appropriate tool for at least two reasons. First, Oliver lets
us analyze the interrelationships between the different parts of
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diplomatic speech, forcing us to analyze the specific attributes
which give it its effectiveness. Second, Oliver lends some practi-
cality to our analysis. As he notes, ". . . the effort must be
made to determine how speech operates in international relations
.... On this shrinking globe . . . diplomatic speech [will not]
falter ... in its increasingly vital significance to human sur-
vival." His words have even more impact, thrity-four years and
19,000 nuclear bombs later. Our analysis here can be in three
parts. First, we need to look in greater depth at the method put
forth by Oliver and describe those parts of the method relevant to
our analysis. Then, we can look at Kennedy's speech in light of
the method. And finally, we can look at Kennedy's success, and some
of the conclusions that we can draw from that success.
In his article, Oliver essentially notes four functions, or
characteristics, of diplomatic speech. These functions differ from
speech to speech, and are found in different combinations within
each speech. The first characteristic noted by Oliver is that diplo-
matic speech must attempt to appeal to a tri-level audience. The
speaker must attempt not to alienate the domestic constituency of
the government he is representing, must avoid making the wrong impact
upon the "enemy" audience, and must also seek to influence neutral
governments or audiences. The second characteristic of diplomatic
speech is that it must be sufficiently ambiguous so that it gives
the speaker a loophole to retreat through if he or she so desires.
A call to war may be uncontrollable or unsupportable; yet, "reckless
talk of the possibilities of peace" may leave the diplomat open for
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attack. Anbiguity must not be so great, however, that the speech
fails to move the audience that it is intended to influence.
Rationalization is the third characteristic of diplomatic speech.
Responses to world events should appear singular and consistent,
directly flowing from past policies; but, since perfect consistency
is impossible in a changing world, diplomats must learn to rational-
ize. A good diplomat, like any good politician, must learn to dance
around the distortions and contradictions of his government's poli-
cies. Finally, diplomatic speech must be depersonalized. Since
policy is determined not just by the speaker, but by the entire
government he represents, views expressed by the speaker are never
just his own but a synthesis of the views of the policymakers of
his government.
Having briefly examined Oliver's work, we can now turn our
attention to Kennedy's speech of June 10, 1963. We see that these
four characteristics existed in Kennedy's speech, but they are used
in different ways and, most importantly, in different proportions.
Initially, we can look at Kennedy's appeals to a tri-level
audience. Kennedy's major domestic audience was Congress, since
the general public, nearly sixteen months before the next election,
would have very little impact on any arms control agreement. Nearly
eight months after the Cuban missile crisis, Kennedy had to allay
Congressional fears of an ill-conceived, hasty agreement, perhaps
best summed up by Senate Minority Leader Dirksen from Illinois, who
asked if this would be a case of "concession and more concession to
Kruschev". Kennedy, after stating that the United States and the
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Soviet Union should build upon a mutual abhorrence of war, states,
".
. . we can seek a relaxation of tension, without releasing our
guard." He then goes on to refer to how international organizations
like the United Nations should be strengthened to solve future world
conflicts. Kennedy also appeals to a more neutral audience— the
Western allies. After the construction of the Berlin wall and the
blockade of West Berlin, Kennedy reaffirms U.S. security promises.
"Our conmitirent," he states, "to defend Western Europe and West
Berlin . . . stands undiminished because of the identity of our
vital interests. The United States will make no deal with the Soviet
Union at the expense of other nations." Finally, Kennedy appeals to
the "hostile" audience— the Soviet government--by stressing mutuality
of interest. Typical of Kennedy's conciliatory tone are the follow-
ing words: "... let us .. . direct attention to our common inter-
est and the means by which differences can be resolved .... [We]
all inhabit this small planet. We all breathe the same air . . . .
And we are all mortal ."
A second diplomatic chracteristic of Kennedy's speech was its
ambiguity. Initially, Kennedy defines the problem--world peace
—
and its solution in rather general terms, thereby justifying almost
any course of action. For example, he states, "I am talking of
genuine peace— the kind of peace that makes life on earth worth
living." He then states: "Genuine peace must be the product of
many nations, the sum of many acts. It must be dynamic . . . chang-
ing to meet the challenge of each new generation." In true politician-
form, he continues: "Our problems are man-made. Therefore, they
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can be solved by man." fio one, of course, would want to disagree
with his hopes, but Kennedy's ambiguity about the specifics of his
proposal enabled him to preempt potential criticism from his primary
domestic audience—Congress. He states, "The United States does not
propose to conduct nuclear tests in the atmosphere as long as other
states do not do so ... . Such a declaration is no substitute for
a formal, binding treaty .... [n]or would such a treaty be a sub-
stitute for disarmament--but I hope it will help us to achieve it."
Third, Kennedy uses rationalization to justify his stance. The
major attribute of Kennedy's speech was that it represented a break
from previous U.S. positions--inconsistency, which Robert Oliver
says a good diplomat should avoid. Yet Kennedy is able to defend
this inconsistency. First, Kennedy argues that the political game
has changed, so that the rules must also. For example, Kennedy
states, "I speak of peace because of the new face of war. Total
war . . . makes no sense in an age when a single nuclear weapon
contains almost ten times the explosive force delivered by all the
Allied air forces in the Second World War." The changing world
situation can therefore justify any arms control attempt. He goes
on: "No treaty . . . can provide absolute minimum security against
. . .
deception and invasion. But it can . . . offer far more
security, and far fewer risks, than an unabated, uncontrolled . . .
arms race." This, of course, is from the man who campaigned for the
Presidency on the basis of closing the "missile gap."
The final characteristic of diplomatic speech noted by Oliver--
depersonalization— is generally lacking in Kennedy's speech. Rather,
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his address is distinctive in how it directly ties the speaker into
the problem and the solution. "I speak of peace," JFK says, ". . .
as the necessary rational end of rational men." He adds, "I . . .
declare that the United States [will stop atmospheric testing]."
Overall, Kennedy makes seventeen separate references to himself,
while making only four references to the government he is repre-
senting.
Despite the absence of a crucial characteristic of diplomatic
speech, Kennedy's speech was incredibly successful. Kennedy's top
speechwriter, Ted Sorensen, called it JFK's greatest speech. The
New Republic magazine of June 22, 1963, stated, "The entire speech
breathed a fresh and hopeful spirit that is altogether different
from the stale air of the Dulles era." The Soviet Union seemed
impressed as well. The entire speech was reprinted in Pravda , some-
thing unheard of for an American speech during the Cold War. British
Prime Minister Harold Wilson found that, immediately after the speech,
Soviet Premier Nikita Kruschev felt reassured by Kennedy and was
clearly more open-minded about a test ban treaty. Kennedy Advisor
McGeorge Bundy called the speech as likely the cause as any for the
Soviet decision to sign the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty of
August, 1963.
From this analysis several conclusions can be drawn. First,
the abandonment by Kennedy of an important function of diplomatic
speech does not mean that we have to abandon Oliver's model but,
rather, refine it. It appears that there can be a trade-off between
rationalization and depersonalization in diplomatic speech. In this
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case, making the speech more personalized by the use of the top
national diplomat made it easier for the speaker to rationalize
inconsistency with previous policy positions. We therefore find
an affirmation and an extension of Oliver's method. But perhaps
more important are the implications of this speech for world peace.
By taking bold initiative, an American president was able to sign
a meaningful arms control agreement with the Soviet Union. Perhaps
such an initiative would not work today. But in this time of short-
nosed diplomats, McGeorge Bundy's words come to mind: "... where
there is zeal in the search for agreement . . . and a firm use of
the powers of the office, the president can become ... an instru-
ment of hope for all men everywhere."
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ABSTRACT
Because of the complaints within the literature concerning
poor argument and shallow analysis in Communication Analysis (CA),
this study attempts to determine what characteristics constitute
a successful CA. A successful CA was defined as a speech that
was in the finals of the American Forensic Association, National
Forensic Association or Delta Sigma Rho-Tau Kappa Alpha national
tournaments, or that won the University of Iowa tournament. Ten
such CAs were analyzed. (The analysis consisted of an identifi-
cation of the rhetorical situation facing a CA, and how CAs operate
as arguments and as speeches.) From this analysis, certain char-
acteristics were identified as belonging to a successful CA.
Important characteristics to CAs were topic, method, organization
and the rhetorical situation. Additionally, it was concluded that
CAs can be considered legitimate rhetorical criticisms. From the
analysis, specific guidelines for writing a competent competitive
criticism were offered. ..
